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Abstract 
This thesis makes a contribution to the study of Sino-African relations by 
analysing the bilateral relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the 
United Republic of Tanzania during its formative period in the 1960s. Tanzania was the 
largest recipient of Chinese aid during this period, which also marked the height of 
European decolonisation in Africa. As a work of international history, the thesis 
combines the analysis of the relevant secondary literature with extensive research using 
archival sources in Tanzania, China, the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), 
as well as oral history interviews. It links Tanzanian political developments with 
China’s African policy in the 1960s. The Sino-Tanzanian relationship was complex and 
multi-faceted; it was affected by external as well as local African factors. Indeed, as the 
thesis shows, its development owed much to African political actors and especially to 
President Julius Nyerere’s gradual consolidation of power and Tanzania’s relative 
political stability. 
The study begins by tracing the contact between Chinese officials and the 
Zanzibari and Tanganyikan nationalists in the late 1950s, which set the stage for the 
strong bilateral relations that emerged after independence. Chinese military assistance 
to Tanzania and Chairman Mao Zedong’s offer to construct the Tanzania-Zambia rail 
link buttressed these ties at the highest levels of government. This was further 
complemented by the nature of the Chinese aid programme, which contrasted starkly 
with Western aid. The resilience of the bilateral relationship was demonstrated most 
clearly by its continued resilience in the face of the destabilising effects of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution that were manifested in Tanzania from 1966 to 1968. 
Publicly, the Tanzanian government remained a stalwart supporter of the Chinese 
government, as shown by the Tanzanian delegation’s support for the “restoration” the 
government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the China seat at the United 
Nations.  
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Introduction 
I. The historical importance and context of Sino-Tanzanian relations in the 
1960s 
International relations underwent a seismic shift in the 1960s with the entry of a 
slew of newly independent states onto the world stage, created by European 
decolonisation and, in particular, the dismantling of the British empire. The fledgling 
governments were immediately confronted with urgent political, economic and social 
demands for change by their people. Tanganyika and Zanzibar, in East Africa, were at 
the forefront of these dramatic processes, as their respective nationalist movements had 
gained momentum from the mid-1950s. Tanganyika was the first territory in British 
East Africa to be ‘granted’ independence on 9 December 1961 under Julius Kambarage 
Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).1 Nyerere worked 
quickly to establish his government’s credentials domestically and internationally, but 
those plans were thrown into disarray by a series of tumultuous events in January 1964. 
A revolution broke out in neighbouring Zanzibar on 12 January 1964. Both the 
independence government – a coalition between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) 
and the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP) – and the constitutional monarchy 
of Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdullah bin Khalifa were ousted by a self-proclaimed 
revolutionary government, the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (ZRC).2 The timing of 
the Zanzibar Revolution, barely a month after the British authorities granted 
 
1
 Iliffe 1979; Nnoli 1978; Smith 1973.
2
 Hunter 2010; Burgess 2009.
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independence on 10 December 1963, threw it into the international spotlight as a 
potential flashpoint for regional instability and as an example for failed decolonisation.3 
Just days after the coup, the Tanganyika Rifles mutinied, followed by similar mutinies 
by the Ugandan and Kenyan armies, which together had formed the former colonial 
King’s African Rifles.4 The security crisis eroded Tanganyika’s reputation as a 
successful case of decolonisation and called into question the plausibility of Nyerere’s 
aspirations for his government to play a central role as a defender of African liberation.5 
Hence, the events in January 1964 not only exposed the inherent weaknesses of both 
the Tanganyikan and Zanzibari governments, but also precipitated a shift in external 
evaluations of the political situation in East and southern Africa.6 
In a Cold War context which clearly distinguished political friend from foe, the 
ZRC appeared bent on fostering close ties with one camp by requesting development 
aid from the Eastern Bloc rather than the West.7 Among the Communist governments 
which responded was the People’s Republic of China (PRC), much to the consternation 
and chagrin of many Western governments.8 In the face of accumulating domestic and 
external pressures, Nyerere and the ZRC leader Abeid Karume established a union 
between their countries on 26 April 1964 to consolidate their respective political 
positions. Their decision marked the birth of the United Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar (URTZ, the Republic of Tanzania from October 1964). 
 
3
 Petterson 2002; Clayton 1981.
4
 Petterson 2002. Uganda became independent on 9 October 1962 and Kenya the year after, on 12 December 1963.
5
 Legum 1964.
6
 Pachter 1982; Parsons 2003.
7
 Engel 1988; Petterson 2002; Hunter 2010.
8
 Wilson and Babu 1989. Throughout the thesis the term “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
under the Chinese Communist Party. The “Republic of China” (ROC) is referred to as Taiwan.
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At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Chairman Mao 
Zedong was keen to enhance his government’s profile among the newly independent 
countries and was attracted by the wealth of diplomatic opportunities presented through 
European decolonisation in Africa. Indeed, Beijing had started cultivating relations with 
independent African governments and African nationalist groups from the mid-1950s, 
both at the intergovernmental level as well as through “people’s solidarity” – the 
interpersonal contacts between Chinese and foreign individuals that were funded and 
actively fostered by various Chinese state-sponsored associations.9 As this thesis will 
examine in detail, local African factors – which have generally been neglected in the 
literature – were integral to the rapid development of Beijing’s relationship with the 
Zanzibari and Tanganyikan nationalists and subsequently the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral 
relationship. 
The research will show that the Chinese government emphasised its relationship 
with Zanzibar until 1963, when Tanganyika rose in continental prominence as host of 
the Organisation for African Unity’s (OAU) African Liberation Committee (ALC). The 
Tanganyikan government’s support for the southern African liberation struggle 
combined with the demands of its own post-independence national development made 
China – an anti-imperialist, third world power – an important partner and donor. These 
ties were strengthened after the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964 and 
boosted even further by the Chinese offer to construct the iconic, 1860 kilometre long 
Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) rail link in February 1965. By the end of that decade, 
 
9
 Ogunsanwo 2010, p. 41; Yahuda 1978; Yu 1975.
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China was Tanzania’s largest foreign aid donor and Tanzania was China’s most 
important African ally.10 
This thesis will demonstrate, however, that the evolution of the celebrated Sino-
Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s was neither straightforward nor smooth: It was 
complex and multi-faceted. The Chinese government’s motivations at the time were not 
primarily economic, but political; Tanzania was not a resource-rich country, so the 
access to African resources that is so crucial in the debate about today’s Chinese 
engagement in Africa was not a key factor in the 1960s. For Tanzania, the connection 
yielded Chinese aid monies, military and economic assistance, as well as mutual 
political dividends.11 Moreover, the Sino-Tanzanian relationship held immense 
symbolic value as a great Afro-Asian, South-South and East-South connection that fired 
the imaginations of third world leaders who ruminated upon the potential for change in 
the post-independence period. China’s political, economic and ideological profile made 
its foreign aid an interesting alternative to Western aid and offered African 
governments a useful bargaining chip in addition to its ostensible developmental 
benefits. Conversely, Western leaders rued Communist China’s entry into Africa and 
contributed to the hostility and suspicion that greeted Beijing’s diplomatic overtures 
towards certain governments.12 
To better understand the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship, the context of its development in the 1960s needs to be fully 
appreciated. This context has three threads: Firstly, decolonisation and Afro-Asianism; 
 
10
 Ogunsanwo 2010; Yu 1975.
11
 Niblock 1981.
12
 Wilson and Babu 1989; Petterson 2002.
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ssecondly, the potential fragility of the post-colonial state; and thirdly, Chinese 
diplomacy in the “third world”.13 These themes will be explained in the remainder of 
Part I of this introduction, before the focus of the thesis is set out in Part II. Finally, a 
discussion of the literature can be found in Part III. 
i) Decolonisation and Afro-Asianism 
Decolonisation bestowed political independence on new governments which 
were keen to establish themselves as legitimate stewards of their respective countries’ 
destinies. Afro-Asianism was the rousing concept around which the aspiring nations of 
the heavily colonised regions of Africa and Asia gathered to express their support for 
shared issues.14 The spirit of Afro-Asianism was given a clearer definition through the 
Asian-African Conference for International Order in 1955 held in Bandung, Indonesia, 
from 18 to 24 April 1955 (more popularly referred to as the Bandung Conference). As 
Mayall has argued, “Afro-Asian revisionism” was based on three objectives shared by 
most of the third world leaders: Non-alignment in the Cold War; the elimination of all 
forms of colonialism and racism; as well as modernisation and economic 
development.15 Prashad has similarly posited that “unity for the people of the Third 
World came from a political position against colonialism and imperialism, not from any 
intrinsic cultural or racial commonalities.”16 However, Afro-Asianism itself presumed a 
certain non-white solidarity that was derived from the victims’ backlash to colonialism, 
 
13
 The meaning of “third world” has been debated: See Wolf-Phillips 1987, pp. 1311-1327 and Worsely 1984 for the 
specific arguments. That debate should not be confused with Mao’s “three worlds” theory, an attempt to create an 
international united front against the Soviet Union, which was announced later, in 1974: See Wang 1998, p. 485. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term “third world” is used in the context of the 1960s, referring to those 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which bore some or all of these characteristics: Formerly colonised, 
non-aligned and economically impoverished.    
14
 Mackie 2005.
15
 Mayall 1990, pp. 126-127.
16
 Prashad 2007, p. 34.
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racial subjugation and discrimination – an initially implicit assumption on which the 
Chinese government later capitalised to shut the white Soviet government out from 
Afro-Asian affairs. 
Indeed, the expansion of diplomatic opportunities as a result of decolonisation 
led to an intense rivalry between the Eastern and Western political blocs for the 
political allegiance of the newly independent governments. The diplomatically isolated 
Chinese government, in particular, was eager to cultivate ties with the Afro-Asian 
governments in order to establish itself as a credible power in the third world. 
Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet dispute created an additional political dynamic, as the 
Chinese escalated their diplomatic efforts in Africa between 1960 and 1964 to position 
Beijing as the leader of the third world.17 The Soviet Union convened the Asian 
committees of its World Peace Council (WPC) at a conference in New Delhi in April 
1955 to prepare the delegates for the Bandung Conference later that month. 
Significantly, the delegations in New Delhi agreed to create a “broad front 
organisation” for Asia and Africa that would also include the Soviet Union.18 Although 
the WPC’s efforts had minimal impact on the proceedings in Bandung, as will be 
discussed further along, they later facilitated Soviet attempts to co-opt the Afro-Asian 
movement. Be that as it may, the Bandung Conference is remembered for a number of 
other, more significant, factors. 
The Bandung Conference’s political importance lay primarily in its potent, yet 
generally intangible, value. Indeed, as Shimazu has contended, the event was “replete 
 
17
 Goh 2005, pp. 36-37.
18
 Hutchison 1975, pp. 37-38.
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with symbolic meanings.”19 To begin with, the conference was helmed by three of the 
independent third world’s most recognised political heavyweights: Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno. Sukarno himself 
captured the implicit racial dimension of the gathering when he declared the event “the 
first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind.”20 In the 
uphill struggle for diplomatic and political legitimacy, many of the newly independent 
governments benefitted from the Afro-Asian promise of third world solidarity by 
emphasising their common experience of colonial exploitation, as well as drawing on a 
more visceral, racial backlash against white colonial power. The most striking outcome 
of the Bandung Conference was, arguably, Premier Zhou Enlai’s personal diplomacy. 
Zhou’s conciliatory manner and attempts to demystify his government’s foreign 
policies impressed many of the delegates.21 
For all the expectations and fanfare that surrounded the conference, however, it 
ended on an ambivalent note and bequeathed what Acharya and Tan have described as 
a “contested legacy.”22 The delegations that were perceived as being more Western-
oriented came head-to-head with the more fervently anti-Western elements, so that by 
the end of the event no serious plans had been made to institutionalise the Afro-Asian 
momentum. Within half a decade, the “Bandung spirit” had lost its shine to more 
pressing geopolitical demands, not least because the conflicts between major Afro-
Asian governments wiped out the brown and yellow glow. Moreover, the smaller Afro-
Asian countries were increasingly focused on the urgent needs of the post-colonial 
 
19
 Shimazu 2011, p. 3.
20
 Quoted in Acharya / Tan 2008, pp. 1-2.
21
 Shao 1996.
22
 Ibid.
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period and, in Africa in particular, on major challenges to the new states’ fragile 
sovereignties.23 
Nevertheless, the fundamental essence of the Bandung Conference remained 
relevant as a reference point that delineated subsequent discourses on Afro-Asianism 
and third world solidarity. It laid the foundations for the Afro-Asian and Afro-Asian-
Latin American groups in the United Nations (UN) reinforced the existing trend which 
later led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961.24 As will be 
shown in this thesis, this legacy was evident in the rapid development of the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s. 
ii) The potential fragility of the post-colonial state 
The second theme that influenced the context in which the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship was forged was the potential fragility of the post-colonial state. European 
decolonisation in Africa peaked in 1960, with sixteen countries having gained their 
political independence from France, the United Kingdom and Belgium that year.25 The 
newly installed governments found themselves confronted with the pressing demands 
of their citizens for the fruits of independence, most broadly defined as economic 
development, even as they were burdened with depleted human and infrastructural 
resources because of prolonged colonial neglect. Indeed, although the African leaders 
now had full control of the bureaucratic apparatus, the system had been structured to 
“exploit and not to liberate.”26 Hence, with such an imperfect arrangement, the African 
 
23
 Brennan 2010a.
24
 Prashad 2007, p. 41; Acharya / Tan, p. 9; Neuhauser 1968.
25
 Ogunsanwo 2010.
26
 Prashad 2007, p. 191.
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leaders were charged to deliver on the people’s expectations for change and 
development, whilst many Western leaders had very low expectations. 
The formal retreat of empire shaped the way in which the new African 
governments’ fledgling foreign relations were conducted. The developments and 
circumstances that produced the celebrated third world friendship between Tanzania 
and China owed much to the recession of European – and specifically, British – 
imperial power. Indeed, the Sino-Tanzanian friendship was a product of European 
decolonisation in Africa and was given even greater impetus by the partial 
decolonisation that persisted in the white minority racist regimes. The Chinese 
government was able to fill the resource and aid vacuums created by British 
decolonisation, as well as to take on an important role as a supporter of African 
liberation.27  
In Tanganyika, Nyerere’s foreign policy strategy had three clear dimensions. 
Firstly, he strove to validate his government’s position as a responsible member of the 
international community through the UN. Secondly, he embarked on a non-aligned 
foreign policy and established relations with the Communist bloc and socialist 
governments upon independence in 1961. His intention was to usher in international 
assistance from a range of bilateral donors; what Mayall has described as realising the 
“latent economic potential of a non-aligned foreign policy.”28 Thirdly, Nyerere pledged 
to support the southern African liberation struggles.29 This brought Tanzania into a 
direct conflict of interest with the UK, its former colonial power and a major donor, 
 
27
 Niblock 1971; Ogunsanwo 1971.
28
 Mayall 1990, p. 120.
29
 Bjerk 2008.
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which had vested interests in preserving the settler-dominated status quo in southern 
Africa. 
Nyerere’s three-pronged coping strategy was intended to help the new 
government establish its legitimacy and win the people’s loyalty, but it was an 
imperfect tool in practice. Tanganyika’s foreign policies, such as its support for African 
liberation struggles, complicated its bilateral relations with its major donors and gave it 
a more radical reputation at the UN. Moreover, the country’s heavy reliance on foreign 
aid and assistance created practical problems in harmonising the kind of assistance it 
was given by the various donors. The People’s Republic of China was a very valued 
foreign partner in this regard.30 Amid these competing pressures and demands, both 
internally and externally, it was not surprising that Western governments might have 
observed the third world leaders as having “a somewhat schizophrenic attitude.”31 
iii) Chinese diplomacy in the third world 
The third theme to be considered for the context of the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship is the role of Chinese diplomacy in the third world. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had been in power 
since its victory over the Republic of China (ROC) led by Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi 
(Chiang Kaishek) in 1949.32 The Communist Chinese government adopted a more 
outward-oriented foreign policy following its diplomatic debut at the Bandung 
 
30
 Yu 1970; Yu 1975.
31
 Mayall 1990, p. 117.
32
 After their defeat at the hands of the CCP, Jiang and his followers from the Guomindang (GMD, also Kuomintang, 
KMT) party fled across the Taiwan Strait, where they consolidated their rule as the government of the Republic 
of China (ROC). In this thesis, to avoid confusion, “China” and the “PRC” are used interchangeably to mean 
mainland China; “Taiwan” and the “ROC” are used interchangeably refer to GMD’s island stronghold.
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Conference in 1955.33 Its main foreign policy objectives were centred on political 
legitimacy and internationalism. The PRC leaders considered the ROC their main 
political rival and insisted on their allies’ official recognition of “One China” led by 
Beijing. Chinese intergovernmental diplomacy in Africa was more flexible and 
pragmatic in the first half of the 1960s, in line with its objectives for enhancing its 
profile in the third world.34 Additionally, Chinese foreign policy was greatly affected by 
its triangular relationship with the US and the USSR; Mao’s government made attempts 
to ameliorate the diplomatic isolation by shoring up support against the US policy of 
containment as well as against the Soviet Union.35 
Propaganda was a major part of what the Chinese government called its 
“people’s diplomacy”. The Chinese state-run press drummed up solidarity by extolling 
the similarities between China and the African countries. Moreover, Chinese 
delegations were dispatched to many newly independent African countries to seek 
official recognition and to offer aid packages. These representatives would emphasise 
the shared history of imperialist and colonial oppression, as well as the condemnations 
of the US and the former colonial states as neo-colonialists who undermined 
revolutionary and nationalist activities. By the late 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split had 
intensified to the extent that Mao had declared the Soviet Union China’s main political 
foe for preaching “peaceful coexistence”; he declared China’s support for armed 
struggle and revolution instead.36 
 
33
 Armstrong 1977.
34
 Ogunsanwo 2010.
35
 Segal 1982; Lin 2001.
36
 Chen 2002; Neuhauser 1968.
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Although – or maybe because – the Chinese Communists were shut out of the 
United Nations (UN), they were extremely active in other multilateral organisations. 
Many of Beijing’s most substantial early contacts with African nationalists took place 
within the Afro-Asian movement and, as the decolonisation process progressed, 
relations were intensified in East Africa. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (AASC, 
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation from 1960) was an important vehicle for 
Chinese diplomatic outreach to the third world generally and Africa specifically.37 The 
AASC was established in 1957 with primarily Soviet, United Arab Republic (UAR, the 
union of Egypt and Syria which lasted from 1958 to 1961) and Chinese patronage.38 It 
formalised Soviet, Egyptian and Chinese efforts to shape third world post-colonial 
political allegiances. The Zanzibari Marxists, who were active in AASC and 
Communist front organisations, used China as their model and reference point for the 
“usable future” of their country’s political and economic development.39 Borrowing 
Darwin’s concept of the bridgehead – the important “interface” between Victorian 
Britain’s metropole with the colonial periphery – Zanzibar was effectively Beijing’s 
bridgehead onto mainland Tanganyika. Chinese influence was “transmitted” through 
official and personal channels in Zanzibar, a development which was further reinforced 
by the creation of the union in April 1964.40 
Furthermore, Tanzania’s central role in supporting the southern African 
liberation struggles made it an important partner for China, both politically and 
symbolically. The converse was also true: Chinese military assistance was especially 
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valuable because of the reluctance of Western governments to assist the armed 
liberation struggles. Moreover, the Cold War milieu and Western unease with 
Communist activities in Africa meant that any major change made by the independent 
governments was seen by the West as a defection or orientation towards the Eastern 
bloc.41 When the Tanganyikan government’s diplomatic relations with West Germany 
and the United States became strained from 1964 (both governments were major aid 
donors), an alternative source of assistance was needed.42 
It was against this backdrop of imperial recession, the rise of Afro-Asianism and 
the immense needs of the newly independent African governments that Beijing was 
able to expand its own role. Moreover, as Liu has posited, Beijing’s Africa policy was 
“a calculated self-serving policy catered to appeal to the fervour of African anti-
colonialism during that period.”43 The Chinese leaders were critical of aid from the 
former colonial powers. Western bilateral aid had played a vital role in the post-war 
world as a means of promoting post-colonial development in the newly independent 
nations. However, foreign aid served as a tool for both Communist and non-Communist 
powers alike in their attempts to influence the political direction taken by the new 
governments.44 The Chinese political authorities went further by criticising Western aid 
for perpetuating the exploitative political and economic relationship between the former 
coloniser and its colony. 
The Western view of development aid, in comparison, was overtly less political 
in its presentation, being broadly structured along the lines of the prevailing theories of 
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development that did not threaten the international economic order of the time.45 As this 
thesis will show, Beijing designated its limited resources towards its foreign aid 
programme and emphasised its trade and economic relations with African countries in 
order to create and enhance opportunities for greater political, economic and cultural 
connections.46 Once again Chinese flexibility and pragmatism saw it undertake a broad 
range of projects requested by the recipient governments and, in some cases, stepping 
in to complete the projects where the original donors had withdrawn. Hutchison, too, 
described China’s African policy as “schizophrenic”, for its simultaneous 
“constructive” and “disruptive” elements: Subversion and revolution from below; 
cooperation and aid from above.47 Yet it was precisely this contradiction that allowed 
the Chinese government to simultaneously juggle its multiple roles as Communist 
donor, anti-imperialist power and militant revolutionary. 
However, Beijing suffered major diplomatic setbacks in Africa from 1965 to 
1968, as official relations with Burundi, Dahomey, the Central African Republic (CAR), 
Ghana and Kenya deteriorated.48 The Chinese government’s position was further 
weakened by its failure to convene a second Afro-Asian conference (touted as a 
“second Bandung”) in 1965 in Algiers, Algeria. The cancellation of the conference in 
spite of intense Chinese lobbying efforts revealed the extent of the Afro-Asian 
countries’ disillusionment with the divisive effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute on a 
purportedly Afro-Asian event.49 Beijing eventually withdrew from AAPSO in 1967 
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when it was marginalised by the stronger, pro-Soviet group. Why then did the Sino-
Tanzanian bilateral relationship not only continue, but intensify and flourish in that 
decade? This thesis will show that local African factors made all the difference.
II. Focus of thesis: Tanzania, China’s closest African friend in the 
1960s 
As a result of Nyerere’s non-aligned foreign policy, China was only one of 
Tanzania’s many bilateral donors in the 1960s. While certainly not in agreement with 
all of China’s policies, Nyerere saw a useful blueprint for a politically-charged, national 
development model in the Chinese system – not so much in economic terms, but as one 
that drew on mass mobilisation and party organisation. Nevertheless, China’s inclusion 
in the list of Tanzanian sponsors caused great alarm amongst the Western donors and 
increased the political stakes of foreign aid.  
This thesis explains the features of the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship 
through a re-appraisal of the factors which contributed to its rapid development in spite 
of generally sceptical African attitudes towards Communist China in the 1960s.50 In the 
existing scholarly literature about the topic, external factors (such as the Cold War) and 
Chinese factors play a predominant role. While these factors are necessary to interpret 
Chinese motivation, this thesis focuses on the local African factors and the way the 
Chinese government engaged with Tanzanian institutions, government and people 
differently from the donors who preceded it. As this thesis will show, the rapport that 
was forged between the governments of China and Tanzania at the highest levels in the 
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first half of the 1960s provided a solid foundation for their closer collaboration 
subsequently. Nyerere’s preference for a socialist development path for Tanzania 
bolstered the relationship further. In addition, the culturally-embedded factors, such as 
frugality and diligence, had particular resonance for the understated president. In 1968 
the Tanzanian president famously described the Sino-Tanzanian relationship as “a 
friendship between most unequal equals.”51 Nearly three decades later, when asked by 
his private secretary why he was so keen on visiting China, Nyerere replied, “I want to 
go to China now and then to be inspired.”52 
Beijing’s eventual entry into the UN in 1971 underscored the importance of the 
African governments and the Afro-Asian movement at large to its international 
standing. That outcome relied on the effective collaboration between China and 
Tanzania that had been built and facilitated through personal relationships and a high 
level of trust between their leaders. More importantly, the bilateral relationship was 
particularly impressive for having surmounted the immense obstacles and challenges 
that had threatened to thwart its development. 
Indeed, to understand more fully the growth and development of the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s, it is the contention of this thesis that the key 
phases and themes be discussed in relation to each other. As a work of international 
history, the thesis links Tanzanian political developments with China’s African policy 
in the 1960s by adding a historical dimension to political science approaches. It also 
explores the important role of African factors, ranging from the active participation of 
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individuals, to local political dynamics, as well as the interaction between the local 
context and external factors. The three main themes mentioned at the start of this 
introductory chapter – decolonisation and Afro-Asianism, the fragility of the post-
colonial state and Chinese diplomacy in the third world – will be further developed 
across all the chapters. 
Chapter One analyses the development of the Sino-Zanzibari relationship as 
being distinct from the Sino-Tanganyikan relationship. It demonstrates how the islands 
functioned as a bridgehead for the extension of Beijing’s soft power onto mainland East 
Africa through the intervention of key Zanzibari nationalists in the early 1960s. In those 
early years, African agency took the form of individuals who seized the chance to 
further their connections with the Chinese government and played a crucial role in 
anchoring Beijing’s interest and presence in East Africa. Surprisingly, the role of 
Zanzibar and the Zanzibari nationalists as the initial link between Beijing and East 
Africa has been widely neglected in the existing literature, along with the important 
dynamics between Zanzibar and Tanganyika that facilitated the subsequent 
development of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. Moreover, while it was true that 
Zanzibar retained a high level of autonomy until 1972, this thesis demonstrates that the 
islands’ relationship with Beijing relied on African agency – exercised through 
individual African political actors who later played a central role in shaping the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship. 
Chapter Two examines the parallel development of the Sino-Tanganyikan 
relationship in the early 1960s through the nationalist and post-independence periods, 
until the union with Zanzibar in April 1964. Nyerere successfully cultivated 
Tanganyika’s international profile and gained a reputation as a respected founding  
 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 24 
leader. This thesis provides a more complete international history perspective of the 
Sino-Tanganyikan (and later the Sino-Tanzanian) relationship through demonstrating 
how decolonisation – and incomplete decolonisation – affected the speed and substance 
of that connection throughout the 1960s. It argues that local responses to the challenges 
of post-colonialism influenced Tanzania’s foreign relations. Additionally, it suggests 
that Afro-Asianism helped many newly independent third world governments create 
some international legitimacy and foster transnational solidarity in their vulnerable 
post-colonial period. 
Chapter Three moves on to explore how the militant Sino-Tanzanian friendship 
was forged and discusses the challenges that arose as a result; an area that has received 
surprisingly little scholarly attention. The combination of both governments’ anti-
imperialist agendas and Tanzania’s post-independence military vulnerability provided 
the initial impetus for closer bilateral relations. However, much as Chinese military 
assistance was intended to strengthen Tanzanian military capacity, it became a double-
edged sword when it fuelled the rapid build-up of arms in Zanzibar and thus negatively 
affected local politics. 
Chapter Four examines the politics that surrounded Beijing’s offer to sponsor 
the Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) rail link, its largest overseas aid project at the time. The 
precariousness of the TanZam project throughout 1965 had much to do with the 
processes of political change in independent Africa in the 1960s, while the Sino-
Tanzanian collaboration broadened traditional conceptions of aid and sovereignty. 
Indeed, a significant point that has been neglected in the literature is that the Tanzanian 
government appreciated the politically-charged development model offered by the 
Chinese that emphasised the consolidation of state power and mobilisation of the 
people. 
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Chapter Five assesses the practical strengths and limitations behind the rhetoric 
of third world solidarity employed by China and Tanzania. Chinese medical assistance 
is the chosen case study for this chapter, which argues that China was able to make 
significant gains from a relatively modest aid programme because of the legacy of 
colonial neglect in Tanzania as well as the specific qualities of the Chinese medical 
system itself. The disjuncture between Beijing’s solidarity rhetoric in policy and in 
practice is examined through the distinctive aspects of Chinese aid policy and 
implementation; the evolution and politicisation of the Chinese healthcare system and 
Beijing’s health diplomacy; and finally, the convergence of these two factors in 
Tanzania’s contested aid market and Nyerere’s own drive for African socialism. 
Finally, Chapter Six argues that Sino-Tanzanian ties at the highest levels were 
strengthened during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, in spite of the 
ultra radical wave that engulfed the Chinese foreign ministry. It also explains how the 
bilateral relationship remained resilient throughout that period, as demonstrated by 
Tanzania’s unwavering support for the PRC until the latter finally gained membership 
at the UN in 1971. 
In identifying and assessing the major factors which affected the development 
of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship, the concluding chapter discusses what made the 
Sino-Tanzanian case unique amongst China’s relations with other African states in the 
1960s. It suggests a greater role played by the interaction of local African factors and 
post-colonial challenges, such as Nyerere’s foreign policy approach and the 
vulnerability of the post-colonial state, moving away from the existing emphasis on the 
dynamism of Chinese foreign policy. 
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III. Key arguments of the thesis 
The thesis highlights the importance of the long history of contacts between 
African nationalists and Communist China, dating from the Bandung Conference in 
1955 and lasting well into the 1960s, the decade of European decolonisation in Africa. 
It argues that while the recession of colonial rule created opportunities for Chinese 
diplomacy and foreign aid to take root on the continent, local African factors were also 
crucial to the steady development of Sino-African relations. 
Moreover, the existing historical literature on the Sino-Tanzanian relationship 
has tended to emphasise the period from 1967 until the mid-1970s, when the Chinese 
government formally committed itself to construct the iconic TanZam rail link. The 
thesis will break new ground by examining in detail the pre-history of that bilateral 
connection; it will demonstrate that Zanzibar and Tanganyika’s nationalist and 
immediate post-independent phases (from the late 1950s until the formation of the 
Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964) provided a fertile ground for the 
development of relations with the Chinese, revise when the height of the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship took place, as well as redefine the indicators of the bilateral 
relationship. Additionally, the thesis will address a gap in the historical scholarship on 
the expansion of Chinese diplomacy in East Africa by pointing out the contribution of 
Zanzibar and the work of the pro-Chinese Marxist cadres there. 
Building on the aforementioned arguments, the thesis will also analyse the 
extent to which Chinese military assistance to the southern African liberation 
movements and to Tanzania itself, as well as the Chinese government’s offer to 
construct the TanZam rail link, cemented the bilateral relationship. It will also argue 
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that Chinese responses to the upheavals in 1964 – the Zanzibar Revolution, the mutiny 
of the Tanganyikan Rifles and the formation of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar – 
facilitated Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume’s consolidation of power in Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar respectively. 
As has been highlighted in the existing literature, Chinese aid was different 
from the traditional Western aid programmes in its ethos, design and implementation. 
The thesis will examine its distinctive aspects and the extent to which it conformed to 
Beijing’s solidarity rhetoric in practice, using the example of medical assistance. It will 
be argued that Nyerere’s socialist vision for Tanzania drew inspiration – although not 
exclusively – from the Chinese development experience. The combination of Nyerere’s 
personal appreciation, Tanzania’s need for aid and the deteriorating political situation in 
southern Africa are examined as the key factors which converged and sealed the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship from 1965 until the end of that decade, in spite of the trials that 
were caused by the Chinese Cultural Revolution (particularly in its early phase from 
1966 to 1968). 
Finally, based on these arguments, the thesis will draw a broader conclusion 
about the importance of African agency in the successful development of the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship. It posits that Nyerere’s consolidation of his political authority 
in Tanzania from 1964 was crucial for allowing the Sino-Tanzanian relationship to 
flourish between 1966 and 1971. 
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IV. The historiographical background and literature review 
This thesis adds to the analysis of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s 
by taking into account the larger body of historical literature on related themes, such as 
Chinese and Tanzanian foreign policy, political studies and development studies. The 
historical literature on these complementary areas has provided the basis for analysing 
the gap between the official Chinese or Tanzanian pronouncements and the realities of 
the Sino-Tanzanian relationship in practice. It has been divided into four categories of 
secondary literature: Firstly, Chinese involvement in Africa; secondly, Tanzanian non-
alignment and foreign aid; thirdly, Chinese publications; and fourthly, development 
studies and social history. 
i) Chinese involvement in Africa 
The literature on Sino-Tanzanian relations in the 1960s and, more broadly, 
Sino-African relations has evolved alongside the major narratives in international 
relations. Scholars who observed Communist China’s diplomatic foray into Africa from 
the late 1950s and its subsequent overtures to the growing number of black African 
governments had extremely limited primary sources at hand, since very little was 
known about Beijing’s foreign policy objectives or policymaking processes. The 
literature on Sino-Tanzanian relations of the time tended to emphasise the role of the 
Chinese government, with the assumption that the fledgling and naïve African 
governments were incapable of managing their relations with the cunning Chinese. Liu 
has described a similar exaggeration of Chinese influence, this time by a Chinese 
diplomat, Zeng Tao, whose incomplete and inaccurate accounts of the Sino-Algerian 
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relationship created a “fictional vacuum” in which the Chinese appeared to be the only 
influential foreign power in Algeria.53 
Indeed, the exaggerated statements and militant propaganda produced by the 
Chinese state media appeared to validate concerns about Beijing’s primarily 
antagonistic behaviour and destabilising activities. Hevi’s personal account of his 
eighteen month-long experience as an African student in China described the prevalent 
racial discrimination and rigidity of a Chinese society that clearly ran counter to the 
official Chinese pronouncements of Sino-African solidarity.54 In his second book, 
published four years later, the Ghanaian pushed his argument further and warned of 
China’s sinister, self-serving objectives in Africa and its support for “indiscriminate 
revolution.”55 Financial and military data were also used as primary indicators of the 
extent of Chinese engagement in Africa, which framed Chinese and Communist aid in 
more confrontational (military) terms.56 These publications are clearly products of their 
time and, in spite of their obvious limitations, can be considered important primary 
sources for study in and of themselves. 
Scholars of international relations struggled to put forward a theory that could 
encompass the diverse range of Chinese activities in Africa.57 Taylor criticised the 
studies that focused on China’s ideological motivations for being generally “obsolete”, 
although the literature on Beijing’s foreign policy continues to underscore the 
importance that revolutionary diplomacy had for the Chinese leaders, as well as certain 
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African leaders and nationalists.58 Armstrong, for example, argued that Beijing’s 
foreign policy objectives were determined primarily by the African countries’ 
revolutionary potential.59 However, the extent to which that revolutionary potential was 
determined by African dynamics and realities, rather than by big power geo-political 
factors, has received considerably little attention.  
With the completion of many Chinese aid projects and Beijing’s offer to 
construct the Tanzania-Zambia rail link, first expressed to President Nyerere in 1965 
and completed in 1975, the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was thrust into the 
international spotlight. This led to a shift in the literature which saw the potential of 
Chinese aid as a credible alternative to traditional Western donors.60 The growing 
scholarly interest in the Chinese model ran in tandem with the paradigm shift that 
occurred in the development discourse. Dependency theory, which had its conceptual 
genesis in the third world, was beginning to eclipse modernisation theory, which had 
hitherto been used to validate much Western development assistance.61 An alternative 
current emerged in the historical scholarship and shifted away from what Hutchison 
termed the “Chinese bogey” school of thought, towards a more evidence-based analysis 
of Sino-African relations.62 
Four authors stand out among the China-Africa scholars from that period, for 
being the most frequently referenced in the contemporary literature: Yu, Larkin, 
Hutchison and Ogunsanwo. George Yu’s political science monograph China and 
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Tanzania: A study in cooperative interaction was the pioneer for having concentrated 
specifically on the Sino-Tanzanian relationship.63 He described it as a “partial informal 
alliance” which allowed both governments to foster closer political and economic ties 
without compromising on their freedom in political decision-making.64 Yu 
subsequently expanded on this analysis in a series of publications.65 His model for the 
Sino-Tanzanian relationship explains its resilience in the face of changing internal and 
external circumstances well, but understates the important effects that Tanzanian factors 
had on Chinese foreign policy. 
Bruce Larkin examined the evolution of Chinese foreign policy and its 
response to the diplomatic opportunities in China and Africa, 1949-1970: The 
Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China.66 For him, Chinese actions in 
Africa were distinct from its actions elsewhere and, through its form of diplomacy 
and aid policy, China had established a significant niche for itself in Africa with 
unique qualities of its own.67 Alan Hutchison in China’s African Revolution 
demonstrated that the Chinese filled the vacuum left by decolonisation in Africa 
and that, contrary to earlier accounts which had discounted the ability of African 
leaders to deal with the Chinese, argued that the Africans were astute and were 
thus able to reap the benefits of bilateral relations.68 Alaba Ogunsanwo’s doctoral 
thesis China’s Policy in Africa 1958-1971 was published as a book in 1975 and 
was most recently re-published in 2010. The author presented a comprehensive 
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analysis of Beijing’s “revolutionary pragmatism” and policy of “united front from 
above and disruptive policy from below” in the diverse African political 
landscape, with a convincing array of case studies.69  
Set in context, the four books were all researched and published during China’s 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that lasted from 1966 to 1976; a period of intense 
domestic upheaval within China that had severe repercussions on its foreign relations 
and the already limited external access to current information. Strikingly, these authors 
went beyond the usual stable of journalistic sources and conducted research in Africa, 
including Tanzania.70 The authors’ access to local interviewees and personal 
observations informed their perspectives on the topic and pushed the understanding of 
Sino-African relations further. However, while these works remain important studies on 
the evolution of China-Africa relations, they lack the depth and perspective that a single 
historical case study can offer about how the higher-level dynamics actually played out. 
As outlined by Alden, the studies on contemporary Sino-African relations 
generally fall into one of three main categories: China as an economic competitor, a 
development partner or coloniser.71 The evolution of China’s status – from that of an 
isolated Communist state in the 1960s to an ascendant de facto economic powerhouse 
in the 2000s with huge investments in African commodities and markets – grew in 
tandem with the country’s development path and is clearly reflected in the literature. In 
all three categories China and Chinese factors, rather than African ones, were the main 
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interest and dominated the inquiry. In reality, China in the 1960s had neither the means 
nor the interest to exploit its relationship with African countries economically; its 
political interest was to be seen as willing to help others in spite of its own limited 
means. Studies which cast China as a development partner are relatively new and tend 
to focus on the post-1971 period, after China officially joined the UN. The category of 
literature that brands China as a colonialist can be considered the consistent thread that 
links the 1960s to the present day.  
ii) Tanzanian non-alignment and foreign aid 
Nyerere’s foreign policy has received its fair share of scholarly attention from 
political scientists and development experts alike. Its professed non-alignment resulted 
in relations with a range of bilateral donors from across the political spectrum which 
made Tanzania a popular case study for the effects of foreign aid.72 However, very little 
research has been done from a historical perspective. This thesis, as a work of history, 
adds new information about the role of individuals to the existing Sino-Tanzanian 
literature and delves much more deeply into the disparate ways in which Chinese aid 
interfaced with Tanzanian institutions, individuals and the community. It addresses the 
persistent gaps in the scholarly literature on China and Tanzania which has, for the 
most part, concentrated on the political and economic aid aspects of the relationship. 
Bilateral aid has both political and moral aspects and has spawned completely 
separate discourses in the literature. In general terms, the political and development 
branches of the literature on aid differ on four points: The definition of aid; its context; 
its sources and how aid effectiveness is determined. The political science scholarship 
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approaches aid as a tool for soft power that enhances the donor’s influence in the 
bilateral relationship. Hence a number of the earlier works show a clear ideological 
division along East-West lines.73 Specific to Tanzania, the country was a popular 
academic case study for many left-leaning foreign academics, a “condition” which Ali 
Mazrui referred to in 1967 as “Tanzaphilia”.74 This scholarly interest was a reflection of 
the intellectual community’s generally deep respect for Nyerere. As the progenitor of 
Tanzania’s most seminal policies and an inspiring orator whose speeches were 
regularly compiled and published, Nyerere was the subject of many academic studies in 
that period.75 
Wolfgang Bartke has established the difficulty in obtaining exact figures for 
Chinese aid, particularly in the 1960s, because of the lack of comprehensive Chinese 
sources, currency conversion rates and the fundamental differences between Western 
and Chinese aid projects.76 A collection of essays on the US, Swedish and Chinese aid 
programmes in Tanzania published in 1999 offers what was possibly the earliest study 
of Chinese assistance from a development studies – and not political science or 
international relations – perspective.77 According to Ai Ping, who authored the chapter 
on the Chinese aid programme in Tanzania, Beijing’s original objective for providing 
overseas aid was to support “proletarian internationalism.”78 The author concluded that 
the Chinese agencies had brought with them their own experience and, thus, 
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constrained their flexibility in aid delivery because they did not fully appreciate the 
specific African conditions and local factors. 
Menghua Zeng’s doctoral thesis, An Interactive Perspective of Chinese Aid 
Policy: A Case Study of Chinese aid to Tanzania, analysed the reasons behind the shift 
in the Chinese government’s foreign aid policy from political internationalism to 
mutual economic development.79 Although Zeng called the 1960s the “development 
period” of Chinese aid policy, there is very little discussion of the important formal and 
informal ties which were forged in that period, which continued to influence Chinese 
aid policy (as well as Tanzanian perceptions of Chinese aid policy) in subsequent 
decades. Moreover, Zeng’s study sheds little light on how the evolving Chinese foreign 
policy interacted with the dynamic Tanzanian situation. 
iii) Chinese publications 
The Chinese literature on Africa can be considered a distinct category in itself 
as, for the most part, it remains a reflection of the government’s interest in promoting 
awareness amongst the people and hence complements its overarching diplomatic 
objectives. Chinese professor Li Anshan has suggested a periodisation of the Chinese 
discourse on Africa into four chronological parts: “sensing Africa” (1900 to 1949), 
“supporting Africa” (1949 to 1965), “understanding Africa” (1966 to 1976) and 
“studying Africa” (1977 to 2000).80 These categories are valuable for providing the 
context to the study of Africa in Chinese scholarship. The second period of “supporting 
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Africa,” for instance, illuminates the state-determined directives and the Chinese 
leaders’ desire to increase their knowledge and understanding of developments on the 
continent. The literature at the time had political rather than academic aims, such as the 
use of anti-imperialist lessons from Africa to rally the Chinese people in support of 
African liberation groups and, by extension, for Mao’s continuous revolution. For 
example, Gao Liang’s Notes on Tanzania, authored by the New China News Agency 
representative, is a part-travelogue and part-political educational piece based on Gao’s 
observations in anti-imperialist Tanzania.81 
The period of “understanding Africa” encompasses the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 and Beijing’s entry into the UN in 1971. It was 
significant for the Chinese government’s concerted push to translate contemporary 
African publications into the Chinese language, fuelled by the leaders’ recognition that 
a broader knowledge base was necessary for Beijing’s enhanced international stature. 
Xue Fei’s Tanzania, for example, published under Xinhua Bookstore’s range of 
geography studies, presents a brief historical overview and expounds on the country’s 
physical and human landscape, resources and infrastructure.82  
The “understanding Africa” phase has been credited by Li as having provided 
the basis for subsequent Chinese scholarly studies on Africa. The final period from 
1977 saw a renaissance of sorts for African studies in China, with numerous 
publications appearing on China-Africa relations or purely African topics. As an 
illustration, three publications were produced in the late 1980s which covered maritime 
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relations, contacts and the history of overseas Chinese communities in Africa.83 
Nevertheless, few Chinese scholars have conducted fieldwork in Africa, which 
underscores the relevance of the official memoirs by former Chinese diplomats. In 
particular the essay by the first Chinese ambassador to Tanganyika, He Ying, offers 
anecdotal accounts of the relative inexperience and unfamiliarity of the diplomats with 
the local situation and highlights the importance of personal diplomacy.84  
Zhou Boping’s memoir gives a more personal account of Chinese diplomacy in 
action than is discernible from media accounts.85 His career with the foreign ministry 
was largely in Africa, with three of his four overseas appointments having been in 
Tanzania, Algeria and Zaire respectively.86 Zhou was appointed consul of the Chinese 
embassy in Dar es Salaam from the spring of 1967, where he served continuously until 
July 1971. More significantly, these accounts clarify the main priority of Chinese 
diplomacy at the time: The recognition of One China and, from 1968, a more pragmatic 
approach that strove to expand its official ties with more independent African 
governments rather than one which highlighted revolutionary prospects. 
The memoirs of two more senior Chinese diplomats, Qian Qichen and Huang 
Hua, offer insights into the higher-level dynamics of Chinese policymaking and, 
usefully, span across the decades of Chinese revolutionary policy.87 Qian was a member 
of several delegations to African countries from 1964 and was appointed Ambassador 
to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in July 1974. He encountered the complexities of the 
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liberation struggle in southern Africa and the fallout from Chinese support to all three 
liberation groups in Angola, which was largely a result of Sino-Soviet competition. He 
was later closely involved in long-drawn out discussions with the South African 
government on recognition for the PRC. Huang had a unique vantage point as a veteran 
“Africa hand” and observed his government’s African policy at close quarters. He was 
a member of the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference and was appointed his 
country’s ambassador to Ghana on 5 August 1960, then to the United Arab Republic 
from March 1966. Huang also assisted Zhou Enlai in discussions with US National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger during the latter’s secret visit to China in July 1971. 
iv) Development studies and social history 
More nuanced social histories on Sino-African relations began to appear after 
the Cultural Revolution.88 These set the tone for the recent development studies 
literature which offers a richer understanding of the trends in development, more 
generally, and specifically in African development. Nevertheless, as Thandika 
Mkandawire has pointed out, the discourse on African post colonial development and 
on the “developmental state” in Africa has been “rarely based on analysis of actual 
experiences, but merely on first principles, ideological conviction or faith.”89 This 
shortcoming has not, unfortunately, been addressed by historians and remains a blind 
spot in the historical understanding of the foundational period of Sino-African relations 
as separate from the contemporary political and economic aspects, as will be shown. 
 
88
 Bailey 1981; Snow 1988.
89
 Mkandawire 2001.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 39 
Indeed, the recent studies on China and Africa relations gradually reflect the 
mixed outcomes of Chinese re-engagement with Africa, for both Chinese and 
Africans.90 As mentioned earlier, China’s role as a development partner is one of the 
three categories described by Alden in the literature on contemporary Sino-African 
relations.91 Ian Taylor’s 2006 study attempted to dispel the myth of Beijing as a 
latecomer to Africa and offers a general overview of Sino-Tanzanian relations that is 
based on secondary sources until 2000.92 More comprehensive and current is David H. 
Shinn’s bibliography on the China-Africa literature from 2008, accompanied by an 
addendum from 2010 that includes scholarly work from various disciplines – including 
history – on China-Africa relations.93 While Shinn’s articles do not assess the trends in 
the literature, they show the spike in contemporary media and scholarly interest in the 
topic, which was sparked off by the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000. Beijing’s bold economic 
engagement with the continent from the 2000s has led to concerns of a “yellow peril” – 
reminiscent of similar fears in the 1960s – because many third-party governments feel 
threatened by Beijing’s huge financial capacity and its poorly articulated (and 
understood) ventures in Africa.94 
Deborah Brautigam draws on her earlier work on the impact of Chinese 
agricultural assistance to Africa in a rigorous study of the evolution of Beijing’s aid to 
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Africa from the Maoist period until the present day.95 Jamie Monson’s publications on 
the TanZam railway, in particular, use the advances in the field of social history and 
development studies to examine the railway’s effect on the livelihoods of those living 
along its route.96 This fleshes out our understanding of the complex histories that 
unfolded amidst the process of decolonisation. Two large-scale research projects have 
produced historical studies on Chinese contributions to the South African and southern 
African liberation struggles from the 1960s to 1990s: Zhong Weiyun and Xu Sujiang’s 
book chapter on China’s support for and solidarity with South Africa’s liberation 
struggle, published by the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) and this 
author’s chapter on Chinese support for the southern African liberation struggle 
commissioned by the Southern African Development Community (SADC).97 
Finally, this thesis strives to broaden the historical discourse that informs 
contemporary analysis of China-Africa relations. As Alden and Alves have argued, the 
Chinese government’s use of history in the construction and presentation of its African 
policy is “aimed at drawing lines of continuity that paper over [its] shifts and breaks”. 
The authors posited the particular importance of history, because it is “called upon […] 
to provide assurances that budding commercial ties will not result in exploitation or 
even some form of colonialism” by China.98  By examining the development of the 
Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship in the 1960s, the thesis will demonstrate the 
complexity of those ties, which was affected by numerous internal and external 
pressures. 
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As this section has shown, the literature on a very important period of Sino-
African relations – its inchoate phase in the 1960s – has its limitations and consist of a 
very narrow range of publications that are, for the most part, not themselves historical 
studies. This gap in the historiography is the main motivation for this thesis. 
V. Note on primary sources and conventions 
The use of multiple archival sources, oral history, as well as period and 
contemporary literature has allowed for the illumination of the multiple facets of the 
Afro-Asian collaboration in this thesis, demonstrating that a more thorough historical 
analysis of the “complex and uneven geographies of the postcolonial Cold War world 
as seen from outside the US” is indeed possible.99 A few notes on the sources used are 
necessary at this point. 
The Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA) in Beijing has, at the time of writing, 
released documents until 1966 and selected ones from 1967. The material pertinent to 
Sino-Tanzanian relations suggests the existence of a strong mutual regard and desire to 
understand world issues from the other’s perspective. The deleterious effects of the 
Cultural Revolution on the Foreign Ministry make the interpretation of the material less 
straightforward. Similarly, the Tanzania National Archives (TNA) in Dar es Salaam 
and the Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA) in Stone Town are the main archival 
resources in Tanzania, but the material from the late colonial and immediate post-
independence periods in the 1950s and 1960s is comparatively limited. Indeed, much of 
the relevant diplomatic material remains classified. The Institute for Commonwealth 
 
99
 Burton 2010, pp. 352-353.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 42 
Studies (ICOMM) has a small, but useful, collection of the Chinese-sponsored 
Zanzibari bulletin, Zanews. The published memoirs by Zanzibar minister Ali Sultan 
Issa and the works of Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu complement the material on 
Zanzibar and are supplemented with oral history interviews.100 These interviews were 
conducted between 2007 and 2009 with former Tanzanian officials, including 
ambassadors and former employees of the Foreign Languages Institute in Beijing. 
However, there are the usual caveats to the oral history interviews with the 
Tanzanian elite, such as an interest in presenting the official Tanzanian line, as most of 
the interviewees still worked for the government during the time of the interviews. For 
example, after having completed his term as the Tanzanian ambassador to China, 
Charles Sanga returned to Dar es Salaam in 2006 and was appointed presidential 
advisor. This was a clear sign of the Tanzanian government’s emphasis and importance 
placed on Sino-Tanzanian relations. Moreover, in comparison to the interviews by 
Ogunsanwo and Hutchison from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, those that were 
conducted for this study were cast against the backdrop of an ascendant and 
economically more powerful China. The officials were presumably more inclined to 
speak of earlier Sino-Tanzanian relations in a positive light. 
The British government archives are another valuable source for understanding 
the developments in post-colonial Tanzania in the 1960s. As the former colonial 
administrator for East Africa, the records are comprehensive across the pre-
independence and post-independence periods. Moreover, they offer a regional overview 
of British colonial policy in East Africa, revealing the concerns about the end of empire 
and the recession of their influence, while being defensive about any British neglect. 
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Her Majesty’s records also reflect the post-colonial challenges faced by the metropole 
and the struggle to preserve its vested interests. The British sources further offer useful 
firsthand accounts of many Tanzanian officials, with whom they had cordial relations. 
The records of meetings between Nyerere and British diplomats in particular reflect the 
personal affinity that the Tanzanian government and its officials had throughout the 
1960s. Nevertheless, the records also show British priorities and distractions by the 
Rhodesian problem. In a similar vein, the private papers of journalist, newspaper editor 
and academic Alistair Hetherington, housed in the London School of Economics’ (LSE) 
Archive, were particularly useful for their firsthand record of interviews with Nyerere 
and other senior Tanzanian and Zambian officials. 
The US governmental records at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) are a foil to the British colonial perspective. The US 
government was not as deeply engaged in mainland Tanganyika as it was in Zanzibar in 
the early 1960s. Indeed, its primary focus in Africa was on the Congo and later 
southern Africa after Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 
November 1965. A CIA report on the Zanzibar revolution, originally written in 1965 
and published in 2010, together with the published memoirs of US consul Donald 
Petterson and medical doctor Charles Swift, has been a useful third party primary 
source.101 
In sum, this thesis discusses and analyses the existing literature against the 
findings from research that has been conducted using a wide range of primary sources. 
While each category of sources has its own practical limitations, the volume and array 
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of primary material currently available on the Sino-Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s 
makes this study possible and particularly timely. 
Finally, a note on currencies: All currencies mentioned in this thesis are referred 
to in the original currency and converted to US Dollars ($) for easier comparison. The 
Dollar was the lead currency under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
that lasted until 1971.102 In Tanzania, the currency used was the East African Shilling, 
issued under the East African Currency Board from colonial times until 1966, when the 
newly established Bank of Tanzania issued the Tanzanian Shilling.103 Both were 
convertible to the Pound Sterling, although the Tanzanian Shilling kept de facto a stable 
exchange rate with the US Dollar when Sterling was devalued on 17 November 1967. 
In the PRC, the Yuan (or Renminbi) also had a fixed exchange rate to the US Dollar, 
although it was not freely convertible.104 
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Chapter One – China and Zanzibar, 1950s to 1964 
This chapter will demonstrate how Zanzibar played an unparalleled role in 
Beijing’s fledgling diplomatic venture into East Africa. The existing literature 
emphasises the Sino-Zanzibari connection in the aftermath of the Zanzibar Revolution 
of January 1964 and is strongly shaped by the dominant narrative of the Cold War 
rivalry.105 However, such an approach neglects the important ties which were forged 
between the Chinese and Zanzibaris before the revolution through Communist bloc 
activities in the late 1950s. From 1959, those contacts intensified and were cultivated 
further by the Zanzibari Marxist elite, for which Maoism offered a nationalist mantra 
and development strategy. The Secretary General of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party 
(ZNP) Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu (1924-1996) and a close circle of ZNP colleagues 
were instrumental in the rapid growth of Sino-Zanzibari ties before the union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar.106 This chapter argues that the little known period of intense 
collaboration in the early 1960s was the crucial foundation upon which Sino-Tanzanian 
relations were eventually anchored after the union. 
Some recent publications are particularly relevant to this discussion of Sino-
Zanzibari relations during the nationalist period. Of these, two works by Burgess are 
the most topical.107 The first, Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights in 
Zanzibar: The Memoirs of Ali Sultan Issa and Seif Sharif Hamad presents a valuable 
Zanzibari narrative and counter-narrative through contrasting the profiles of two 
prominent local politicians. The first memoir (of Ali Sultan Issa) is a particularly 
important and rare historical source for this thesis, as Ali Sultan was a close colleague 
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of Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, the main broker of the Sino-Zanzibari relationship. In 
addition to providing a perspective on Babu, Ali Sultan had also personally contributed 
to the development of the relationship by his own accord.108 Equally useful is Burgess’ 
article Mao in Zanzibar: Nationalism, Discipline, and the (De)construction of Afro-
Asian Solidarities, which examines the “material, discursive and imagined 
relationships” between the Zanzibaris and Chinese through the Zanzibari Marxists’ 
embrace of the Chinese model as a “usable future”.109 In addition to these works, a CIA 
report on the Zanzibar Revolution has been declassified and published; it is a useful 
third-party source that reflects the US administration’s discomfiture about the 
Communist threat in the third world, although the lines between analysis, speculation 
and official observations are blurred.110  
Some stones remain unturned in the historical understanding of Sino-Zanzibar 
relations. Burgess’ description of Tanzania as China’s bridgehead for spreading 
Maoism across the continent is not entirely accurate, because Zanzibar had performed 
that function even before the union was formed, as this chapter will describe and 
demonstrate. Indeed, Zanzibar specifically connected China and Africa from as early as 
1961. This chapter will explain why developing such a bridgehead was vital for the 
Chinese government’s policy in East Africa and will demonstrate that African factors 
and individual Zanzibaris were integral to the development of Sino-Zanzibari relations 
in four phases: Firstly, the confluence of objectives between Beijing and the Zanzibari 
nationalists before 1960; secondly, Zanzibaris as Beijing’s gateway to accessing 
Swahili East Africa between 1960 and 1963; thirdly, local developments in Zanzibar 
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which buttressed the Sino-Zanzibari relationship between 1963 and 1964; and finally, 
the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which paved the way for greater Chinese 
engagement on the mainland. 
I. Beijing and the Zanzibar nationalists: A confluence of objectives 
To understand the role of Zanzibar as a Chinese bridgehead, it is necessary to 
appreciate the territory’s modern history. The islands of Zanzibar, comprising of 
Unguja (Zanzibar) and Pemba, lay on important trade routes linking the Middle East 
with East Africa. Portugal was Zanzibar’s first colonial authority from 1505 to 1698, 
followed by the Omani Al-Busaidi dynasty which shifted their capital from Muscat to 
Zanzibar in 1832. Zanzibar became a British protectorate from 1890, with funds from 
London channelled through the Sultan. The domestic political arena was quickly 
polarised with affiliations that were dangerously pegged to ethnicity as only a minority 
of the people – predominantly those of Arab ancestry – had access to these resources.111 
The bitterness of the indigenous Zanzibari African population at Arab dominance was 
compounded by the influx of Africans from the mainland. The brewing tensions came 
to the fore when discussions on Zanzibar’s independence began in the 1950s. 
Zanzibar’s pre-independence period was dominated by three political parties: 
The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the ZNP and the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party 
(ZPPP). The ASP was renamed after the 1957 elections in which it stood as the Afro-
Shirazi Union (ASU). The ASU was formed in 1957 through an alliance between two 
informal groups with primarily social rather than political agendas: The African 
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Association on Unguja and the Shirazi Association on Pemba. After winning a majority 
of seats in 1957, the ASU reinvented itself as the ASP and fostered strong links with the 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).112 The ZNP was founded by the Arab 
radical Ali Muhsin Barwani in December 1955 as a non-racial Muslim party that 
supported pan-Africanism.113 Most of its members had fairly affluent backgrounds and 
hence could participate in politics without sacrificing their livelihoods. Most notably, 
there was a well-connected and organised Marxist elite within the ZNP that had 
benefitted from overseas education and training. The third political force, the ZPPP, 
spun off from the ASP in late 1959 and took a moderate stand on African representation 
in discussions of the post-independence government. 
Zanzibari nationalists actively participated in the numerous international 
platforms that were formed to foster political solidarity in the era of decolonisation. The 
earliest official contact between Chinese and Zanzibari representatives took place 
through the trade union movement, at conferences organised by the Moscow-led World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and, from 1957, through similar events by the 
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). This contact marked the start of 
the first phase of the Sino-Zanzibari relationship. Beijing was not initially in a rush to 
establish diplomatic relations because of its own limited diplomatic capacity.114 
Nevertheless, Chinese representatives took great pains to explain their government’s 
One China policy to the African governments and nationalist groups.115  
 
112
 NA, DO185/7. EP.27/33/1. Pritchard to Chadwick, 5 April 1963.
113
 Before slavery in the region was finally abolished at the end of the nineteenth century, Zanzibar was an important 
point in the regional transhipment of human cargo; Clayton 1981, p. 39.
114
 Indeed, Premier Zhou Enlai had advised the Chinese diplomats to wait for “the right moment” to establish formal 
relations; Liu 2001, p. 59.
115
 As China’s first ambassador to Tanganyika, He Ying, has recounted in an essay: He 1993, p. 302.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 49 
At the same time, the Chinese government used its media as a channel for 
communicating its policies. An article on Zanzibar first appeared in the state-run 
newspaper, the People’s Daily, in March 1958. The article described Zanzibar’s history 
and the islands’ mention in ancient Chinese records from the Song dynasty (which 
ruled China from 960 to 1279). But the objective of the article – and many similar ones 
on the other African colonies which appeared in the Chinese press – was to draw the 
Chinese people’s attention to the evils of colonialism, the local people’s fight for 
freedom and to emphasise the Chinese government’s solidarity with them.116 The 
newspaper article was also a signal of the Chinese leaders’ interest in forging closer ties 
with Zanzibar. For this Cairo, the capital of Egypt (the United Arab Republic, or UAR 
at the time) played an essential role.  
i) The ZNP and Chinese representatives converge under Nasser’s Afro-
Asian banner 
In step with the wave of European decolonisation in Africa, Beijing’s diplomacy 
gained ground in West Africa as its embassies in Ghana and Guinea – both countries 
led by prominent, black African leaders with strong anti-imperialist positions – 
broadened the possibility of Chinese contact with African liberation movements 
elsewhere on the continent.117 For East Africa, Cairo was the focal point from which 
Chinese influence first emanated, via the personal connections that were made through 
key individuals such as Babu and Ali Sultan. 
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Egypt held great historical, political and diplomatic significance for the Chinese 
government. Aside from having been the first Middle Eastern country to establish 
official ties with Beijing, the UAR was also a political heavyweight in Africa. Cairo 
was the centre for Afro-Arab and Afro-Asian debates on current issues and a haven for 
many African nationalist groups. The Chinese government opened its first African 
embassy in Cairo in 1956, which allowed its diplomats to monitor regional events and 
establish direct contact with the various anti-colonial groups.118 The Afro-Asian 
People’s Solidarity Council (AAPSC, later the Afro-Asian People’s Organisation, 
AAPSO), headquartered in Cairo, had national committees comprised of 
representatives from Afro-Asian governments, opposition parties and nationalist 
groups. The organisation’s spirited denouncement of colonialism and imperialism won 
it a reputation as a militant solidarity organisation, especially among Western 
governments. Both the ZNP and ZPPP regularly sent representatives to AAPSO 
conferences, which offered ample opportunities for interaction with Chinese officials 
eager to foster links with friendly nationalist groups. Indeed, the ZNP’s secretary 
general Babu soon emerged as the lynchpin connecting China and Zanzibar. To 
understand how Babu came to play this important role, it is necessary to examine his 
background and political thought. 
Babu had the prestige and intellectual exposure derived from an overseas 
education, a rare opportunity for most Zanzibaris. As a student in London in the 1950s, 
he was active in various pan-African organisations and jointly edited an anti-colonial, 
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socialist journal, the African, Asian and Latin American Revolution.119 A CIA report 
suggests that Babu was contacted by the Chinese in London at around that time because 
of his high visibility and relationship with the Soviets.120 Babu accepted Ali Muhsin’s 
invitation to become the ZNP secretary general after the party’s embarrassing defeat in 
July 1957 – during the territory’s first elections – and returned to the islands at the end 
of that year to resuscitate the party.121 Ali Sultan observed that Babu quickly proved to 
be “the brains of our political struggle here in Zanzibar” and both men actively 
cultivated ties with the Communist bloc countries.122 Moreover, under Babu’s direction, 
the ZNP quickly outpaced the ASP’s international connections.123  
The Chinese embassy in Cairo was an accessible source of foreign assistance 
and patronage, particularly because there was no countervailing Soviet presence there. 
Indeed, the Chinese records show that various groups approached the embassy with 
requests for assistance, including those from Cameroon, Congo, Algeria, as well as a 
representative from the ZNP’s youth wing, the Youth’s Own Union (YOU) in May 
1960.124 The evidence suggests that the ZNP representatives actively courted the 
Chinese for assistance. Ali Sultan was director of the ZNP’s international department in 
Cairo and was tasked with establishing contact with foreign sponsors. According to 
Chinese reports from August 1959, Ali Sultan had approached the Chinese embassy 
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twice for assistance: He requested a short visit to Beijing to meet with representatives 
of the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (CAASC) and the China Africa 
Friendship Association (CAFA), and voiced his intention to discuss the party’s other 
appeals for support.125 Babu also called at the embassy soon after, in late November, 
with a similar request to visit China to appeal for financial assistance, including 
scholarships for ten Zanzibari students to study in China, and a lino type machine.126 
The Chinese embassy reported to its foreign ministry that Babu was a valuable local 
contact, citing his extensive experience with the workers’ movement in Zanzibar, as 
well as an invitation from the British government for him to join an East African 
delegation of journalists to the UK. Hence the embassy suggested that the foreign 
ministry approve the ZNP’s appeals for assistance, as that would facilitate Chinese 
diplomatic efforts in East Africa and, at the same time, benefit Zanzibar.127 For these 
compelling reasons, Babu became the first liberation fighter from East and Central 
Africa to visit China in 1959.128 
Babu was thrilled to meet the most senior leaders and heroes of the Chinese 
revolution in Beijing and genuinely appreciated their style of personal diplomacy. He 
later described the trip as: 
An opportunity for me to see this great country and meet its revered leaders […] 
to deepen my knowledge of the Chinese revolution, especially its theoretical and 
practical foundations. The meetings with the Chinese leadership and late night 
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discussions with them on all questions of anti-imperialist struggle were most 
inspiring and helped to mould my world outlook.129 
If Babu was deeply affected by the combination of independence struggle with 
socialist revolution that he had seen in China, these impressions were not unique, as 
other Africans were also similarly awed by the progress that they witnessed.130 Babu 
also remarked about non-white solidarity with China, a country which had soldiered 
through a prolonged revolutionary war and risen up as “a very powerful, though 
underdeveloped, non-European country.”131 To some Africans and people of African 
descent, China with its “people of colour” generated feelings of solidarity: Its Marxist, 
developing country model countered the dominant “white and Western” vision of class 
struggle.132  
Ali Sultan visited China in April 1960 for a trade union conference and, 
typically for African delegations, was brought to various sites of historic importance to 
the CCP, including an excursion that retraced the Long March.133 Like Babu, Ali Sultan 
had a positive impression and he claimed to have “personally found the Chinese the 
most compelling of the Communist countries”, which he explained in the following 
words134: 
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I had not been as impressed by the greatness of the Russians as I was with the 
Chinese. In China, I was deeply impressed by the vast and formidable country, 
by the people’s sacrifice and their achievements, so upon my return to Zanzibar, 
I was in complete agreement with Babu about China, that this was the 
ideological line to follow.135 
Yet Babu was unique in having quickly been offered the role of principal East 
Africa correspondent for the New China News Agency (NCNA) during his visit, which 
he accepted immediately. The assignment tapped on Babu’s gift for political writing 
and, as Burgess has posited, Babu gave the ZNP a clear stance on important continental 
issues such as the Algerian War and the Congo crisis.136 This internationalist outlook – 
a Communist hallmark – framed local dynamics as part of capitalist evolution and a 
manifestation of larger class forces at work. The NCNA assignment placed Babu in a 
strategically important position by formalising his close links to the Chinese 
establishment: He was required to dispatch regional news to the NCNA headquarters in 
Beijing regularly and occasionally briefed Chinese officials. Hence the arrangement 
was a good match of Babu’s capabilities and political objectives, with the Chinese 
government’s fledgling ventures into the region.  
The ZNP opened an office in Cairo later that year (1960) to raise its new 
international profile and expand its network. As Cairo was the transit point for 
delegates travelling to the Communist bloc, along the Cairo-Moscow-China or Cairo-
Pakistan-China routes, the ZNP’s formal presence in Cairo helped it to overcome the 
poorly developed air travel routes between African countries and facilitated direct 
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contact with the Eastern bloc. The party benefitted from Gamel Abdel Nasser’s support 
for African liberation and was one of many groups which received the monthly 
allowance of £100 ($280) and gratis air travel from the Egyptian Ministry of 
Information’s African section.137 Ali Sultan was, by then, also very diplomatically 
savvy. He successfully approached the Chinese, North Koreans, Czechs and other 
socialist embassies in Cairo for material aid, scholarships, literature or “whatever else 
they could give” towards the ZNP’s cause, as well as training in intelligence, sabotage 
and weaponry.138 According to Ali Sultan’s memoirs, the Chinese had trained him in 
the use of firearms, hand grenades and plastic bombs over the course of one to two 
weeks, and a labour movement sent him £100 ($280) monthly.139 Ali Sultan and Babu 
were, thus, well-placed and sufficiently resourced to further the party’s nationalist 
agenda through their promotion of closer ties with the Chinese. 
ii) Chinese propaganda and closer ties 
The second phase of the Sino-Zanzibari relationship consisted of a quick 
solidifying of Beijing’s relationship with the ZNP from 1960 to 1963. One avenue that 
was used was the Chinese government’s official news agency, the NCNA, also known 
as Xinhuashe, which supplied news reports to other official Chinese publications. Upon 
establishing diplomatic relations with the independent African governments, the 
Chinese government quickly based NCNA representatives in the major countries: Cairo 
(UAR), Rabat (Morocco), Accra (Ghana), Conakry (Guinea), Tunis (Tunisia), Addis 
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Ababa (Ethiopia), Bamako (Mali), Algiers (Algeria), Mogadishu (Somalia) and Nairobi 
(Kenya). In Dar es Salaam, the NCNA representative was Gao Liang.  
The NCNA representatives were officially tasked to gather and disseminate 
information, report their findings to the Chinese government and support official 
Chinese policy through propaganda. Western governments generally believed them to 
be intelligence agents who incited unrest and anti-Western sentiment. The NCNA’s 
African network was expanded and deepened through the addition of local African 
correspondents, such as Babu, who specialised in interviews with exiled politicians or 
leaders of liberation movements. The correspondents’ contribution to Chinese news 
should not be underestimated, as many of their reports reached a wide audience, being 
first aired by Radio Peking or carried in the Chinese press, then subsequently re-printed 
in local African newspapers.140  
Evidence from British intelligence suggests that Chinese propaganda was well-
received by trade unions in Zanzibar.141 The islands’ trade unionists were among the 
delegates who attended a reception given by Mao in Zhengzhou in 1960, at which he 
called for Afro-Asian solidarity in their common struggle against American imperialist 
policies. Articles in the Adal Insaf newspaper on 21 May 1960 and the 5 May edition of 
Kibarua, the Zanzibar trade union publication, carried Beijing’s warning to African 
workers about American penetration in East and Central Africa through the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as well as their stooges in 
the African trade union movement. Chinese propaganda was supplemented with 
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sponsored visits to China which promoted the growth of personal connections and 
rapport between the leaders in Beijing and emerging African nationalists.  
The testimonies and personal accounts shared by Zanzibaris who had visited 
China helped to reinforce the official Chinese propaganda and diplomatic manoeuvres. 
Much was made of what they had seen in China. The YOU held a rally in June at which 
the delegates who had visited China described the great progress their Chinese 
compatriots were making in socialist construction.142 These activities prepared the 
ground and allowed the Chinese press to carefully cultivate popular local sentiment, as 
in the case of the US satellite tracking station (Project Mercury) in Zanzibar, which 
later erupted into anti-American protests. The Chinese solidarity groups worked in 
tandem with official Chinese foreign policy and organisations ranging from the Chinese 
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, to the Women’s Federation and the Youth 
Federation to send telegrams expressing moral support and solidarity for the Zanzibari 
people and protestors.143 Indeed, it is very likely that Chinese support went even 
further: The CIA alleged that the top twenty-five ZNP officials had been offered a trip 
to China as a reward for their support for the Project Mercury protest, a proposition 
which twenty-three officials reportedly accepted.144 
While individuals such as Babu and Ali Sultan had “put Zanzibar on the 
socialist map of the world”, they were also helping to develop much-needed skills in 
the process.145 An important part of Ali Sultan’s work was to garner scholarships for 
Zanzibaris at overseas colleges and universities. Most of these educational 
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opportunities were in the Eastern bloc countries, as the few which were offered in the 
West tended to be exclusively available to the elite.146 As Ali Sultan complained to 
British officials, the “unrealistically high academic standards” of their institutions 
invariably made those in the socialist countries more accessible to Zanzibari students.147 
However, overseas education was a failure in Sino-African relationships overall. The 
number of student delegations from Zanzibar to China grew from just two in 1960 to 
twelve in 1963, but by the middle of 1962, a mere twenty-two of the initial 118 African 
students remained. Nevertheless, as Ali Sultan has argued, this “exposure” made it 
possible to politicise the island and prepare it for the revolution and, hence, its influence 
on Zanzibari thought during the revolutionary period was “profound.”148 
In spite of its wide network and the cooption of local African expertise, Chinese 
propaganda was still, at times, a bluntly constructed and executed instrument, especially 
pertaining to Sino-Soviet rivalry. According to Ali Sultan, a speech he made on 
socialist liberation was appropriated by the Chinese without his knowledge for their 
own purposes. The text of his speech was featured on the People’s Daily front page and 
his statements lambasting Tito’s revisionism in Yugoslavia were used by the Chinese in 
their rhetorical battle with the Soviets.149 In a similar example, the Chinese Communist 
Youth League’s (CCYL) International Department reported discontent amongst African 
youths over Soviet policies in April 1960.150 Cameroonian and Zanzibari youths had 
called on the Chinese embassy in Guinea, reportedly to describe their disillusionment 
with socialism in the Soviet Union. The Zanzibari delegate claimed to have been 
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disappointed by the hordes of starving people he had seen and said ruefully that a 
capitalist system was probably still at work in the USSR. The visitors described Soviet 
suspicion and indignation at Africans travelling to China, as well as the obstructive 
measures which were taken to inconvenience them, such as delaying transit stops. All 
this was undoubtedly music to Chinese ears, as the PRC was eager to solidify relations 
with friendly groups through aid and rhetorical support. On the other hand, the Sino-
Soviet rivalry created opportunities for African nationalist groups to gain some 
advantages by playing one sponsor off against the other. The visits by Zanzibari 
delegations, most commonly the trade unions, to China and the Soviet Union suggest 
that the Chinese concentrated on the ZNP and the Soviets on the ASP.151 
Consequently, the Chinese embassy in Cairo was visited by various individuals 
and groups – legitimate or otherwise – who sought financial, material or moral 
support.152 The Chinese foreign ministry, on the recommendation of its diplomats in the 
field, generally took an open approach as it was interested in learning about the local 
political situation. The establishment of the ZNP’s outpost in Cairo was fortuitous 
insofar as it facilitated the party’s contact with the Chinese embassy there and 
corresponded with Beijing’s interest in increasing its understanding of newly 
independent African governments and nationalist movements. The low-level 
connections which started in 1959 were the bedrock on which future relations were 
anchored. The following section shows how Zanzibaris played a special role in 
Beijing’s African policy in the next phase. 
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II. The integral role of Zanzibaris and China’s soft power in East Africa 
Nye’s concept of soft power provides the most suitable explanation of China’s 
influence on Zanzibar. Soft power has been defined as a combination of intangible 
resources such as “culture, ideologies, institutions combined with values” and the 
ability to “make others want what you want”.153 As in the other Communist countries, 
the Chinese media was an extension of the state’s political and social control of 
information. No stranger to large-scale propaganda campaigns, the Chinese government 
quickly supplemented its overt diplomatic efforts in East Africa with the injection of 
soft power. With Uganda and Kenya still under colonial rule, Babu’s enthusiasm for 
cultivating closer ties in China made Zanzibar Beijing’s main entry point into the 
region. Thereafter Beijing enlisted the efforts of Zanzibaris to enhance its 
understanding of regional affairs, build up its diplomatic capacity through training a 
corps of Swahili language interpreters and project Chinese soft power in the region. 
This section examines the vital role that Zanzibaris played in facilitating the rapid 
extension of Chinese influence in East Africa through the key media of radio and press. 
i) Radio Peking 
The use of shortwave radio broadcasting as a tool of foreign policy was not new 
and radio was already a popular medium for mass communication in colonial East 
Africa. In Tanganyika, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, which broadcasted 
in English), “Calling East Africa,” Radio Cairo, as well as services from Nairobi, 
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Lusaka, Kampala and All India Radio were all available.154 China’s state-run overseas 
radio service, Radio Peking, launched its first English-language broadcasts to Egypt 
and Central Africa in 1956, with 3.5 hours of weekly programming.155 This was in 
addition to its existing broadcasts in French, Portuguese, Mandarin, Cantonese and 
Arabic. Shortwave radio bridged the geographical and cultural gulf between China and 
Africa by giving the former a voice, in countries where most people had only limited 
impressions of China. Compared to Radio Cairo, which promoted an Arab-centric and 
Islam-centric view, Radio Peking was less concerned with local intra-ethnic politics. 
Instead, it focused more on the dissemination of Chinese policies and the export of its 
official versions of news, while legitimising the CCP’s narrative of revolutionary 
struggle.  
In 1959 Radio Peking’s English-language service was extended further to 
include southern and eastern Africa and its weekly programming was increased to 
seven hours. As an indication of the continent’s growing importance to the Chinese 
leaders, West Africa was incorporated the following year (1960) and weekly 
programming was increased to fourteen hours. Additionally, Radio Peking began 
reaching out to Lusophone Africa through Portuguese-language broadcasts from 
October 1960.156 In East Africa, Radio Peking (as well as Radio Moscow) was 
reportedly received clearly in most parts of Tanganyika, in some places even more 
clearly than the local broadcasting station. The content of the radio programmes 
continued to focus almost exclusively on decolonisation, the Chinese people’s 
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solidarity with African liberation struggles and New China as a model to be 
emulated.157  
British observers criticised the Chinese broadcasts for being repetitive – they 
were based on a single tape with modifications made to suit the target audience – with 
an insignificant following among the locals.158 The rudimentary quality of Radio 
Peking’s initial English service in Africa was due in part to budget constraints, as it had 
“always worked on a shoestring”.159 Radio Peking recruited foreign linguists to 
overcome the language barriers which confronted Chinese propaganda efforts overseas. 
As of October 1960, three of the four announcers in the English-language section were 
overseas Chinese who hailed from the United Kingdom, South Africa and Canada. This 
was a promising policy at the onset, but quickly proved stillborn once the ideological 
criteria for the selection of foreign staff were tightened. An anecdote in British records 
describe how the editor in the Radio Peking English department was apparently 
someone whose sole qualification was a good proletarian background rather than an 
adequate command of English or any relevant technical knowledge.160  
The evidence shows that the Chinese government decided to reach out to East 
Africa more directly at around the same time. In April 1960 the Chinese embassy in 
Cairo reported a meeting with some Zanzibari students in which the latter expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the content of Egyptian broadcasts about East Africa.161 Soon 
after, Babu and Ali Sultan facilitated the recruitment of Swahili-language speakers for 
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Radio Peking. The Zanzibari candidates were educated, bilingual (at least in English 
and Swahili) and generally sympathetic to the Communist cause. Many were attracted 
by the promise of overseas employment combined with tertiary study. The first 
Zanzibaris to visit China arrived in Beijing in August 1960 and were possibly the first 
Africans sent there to work in a non-diplomatic capacity. Three were assigned to Radio 
Peking to present news commentaries and translate material from English into Swahili 
for broadcasting.162 The Chinese officials also considered them area experts who could 
be consulted for information pertaining to East Africa. 
Radio Peking was thus able to launch its Swahili service in 1961. Brennan notes 
that the station entered a contested market, with other new Swahili-language services 
including those by Moscow, Ghana and the Voice of America (VOA), which displaced 
the “Swahili language anti-colonial monopoly” that Cairo had enjoyed for six or so 
years.163 It is difficult to measure the success of propaganda efforts with any degree of 
accuracy, but the Swahili service clearly added to Radio Peking’s overall broadcasting 
output to Africa.164 The Chinese government probably considered it a success, as the 
NCNA reported in May 1963 that Hausa language broadcasts would soon be started for 
West Africa.165 By 1964 Radio Peking’s programming had increased to 71 hours per 
week and targeted the entire African continent.166 It boasted the loudest and clearest 
signal of any foreign station and grew in sophistication – it now had selected 
programmes catered for the ethnic Chinese communities in Zanzibar, Madagascar, 
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Mauritius and Reunion. In comparison, the Soviet and East European broadcasts, 
although amounting to 267 hours a week, were reportedly less clear. Nevertheless, the 
total radio output generated by the Communist bloc countries outstripped the BBC’s 
output, which only amounted to 180 hours per week. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, three of the four Zanzibaris sent to China in 
1960 worked at Radio Peking. The fourth was assigned to the Foreign Languages 
Institute in Beijing to teach Swahili to student translators and to translate Mao’s 
treatises.167 The Chinese foreign ministry took language training very seriously and had 
an ambitious plan to train 1,067 interpreters for 56 foreign languages in five years; by 
1961, over 1,500 students had been chosen across China to either study in a foreign 
language school, or to be sent for overseas study.168 These Chinese students, and 
subsequent batches of their colleagues, assisted the Chinese leaders in their official 
interactions with Swahili-speaking visitors, or were despatched with teams of experts to 
East Africa. The interpreters played a crucial role during the early years of Chinese 
diplomacy in Africa, when most senior Chinese diplomats did not speak a foreign 
language, and were vital in creating a positive impression of China.169 
Chinese diplomacy benefitted greatly from this Swahili-language capability as a 
former Tanzanian ambassador to China recalls: 
 
167
 Interview with the late Professor Haroub Othman, Dar es Salaam, 14 November 2006.
168
 Liu 2001, pp. 65-66.
169
 Ibid., p. 66.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 65 
The Chinese had some first class diplomats […] people who were familiar with 
Africa, who took the trouble to understand Africa, and […] also took the trouble 
to know the language […] so there was that sense of familiarity.170 
Indeed, the mere presence of the Zanzibaris in Beijing fulfilled the latter’s 
symbolic and practical objectives of third world solidarity and support for anti-
imperialism. 
ii) NCNA and Zanews  
The second main area in which Chinese soft power was felt was the press, in 
which Babu once again played a major role. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Babu 
was the NCNA correspondent for East Africa. Additionally, in a separate but related 
venture, Babu founded the Zanzibar News Service (Zanews) in 1961 with NCNA 
support. According to the CIA, the Chinese paid Babu over $20,000 a month for the 
operating costs of the (Chinese-sponsored) printing presses, as well as a large personal 
retainer.171 Zanews was the written voice of the ZNP’s youth movement and operated 
out of the ZNP office in Darajani, Stone Town. The newssheet was published in 
English with a print run of 1,000 cheap-to-free copies per edition. The paper contained 
an eclectic mix of international and domestic topics, as well as occasionally 
disseminated information on Chinese policy; the local news articles were inserted by 
Babu and his editorial team. Babu’s close ties with the Chinese were viewed negatively 
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by the British colonial authorities, which cited them as evidence of his being “bought 
and sold” by Beijing and “a menace to the peaceful development of Zanzibar”.172  
Yet Zanews appealed to an important segment of the local population. To 
understand the attraction that Zanews held for many locals, a brief look into the history 
of the press in Zanzibar is necessary. Under the British colonial authorities, African 
Zanzibaris had no access to newspaper production and the press was exclusively 
operated by the Arab and Asian communities. The publications were largely trade and 
community-focused papers which reflected the higher levels of education, organisation 
and social cohesion within these groups.173 As the independence movement gained 
momentum, the rapid politicisation of the people generated many roughly printed 
political leaflets in the 1950s and early 1960s.174 These newspapers, perhaps more 
accurately described as partisan pamphleteering, were read and disseminated along 
party lines. They had a symbolic function rather than being channels for 
communication and current news.175 According to Ali Nabwa, who was an editor with 
the paper in 1964, Zanews was the only locally produced publication that had a firm 
anti-imperialist stance and presented Marxist interpretations of international affairs.176 
Zanews articles were unique in being current and also regularly covered the conflict in 
Indochina and revolutionary events elsewhere. Hence the newssheet was generally 
popular among the intellectual elite who were literate in English and interested in 
international news. 
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Chinese support for Zanews also marked Beijing’s first direct intervention in 
local Zanzibari politics, which caused some political ripples. The newspaper was 
derided by British observers as “a scurrilous pro-Communist news sheet […] 
completely taken up with Chinese agitation and propaganda” with the objective of 
keeping Africans “steadily supplied with Chinese propaganda material.”177 The 
Americans believed that a majority of the Zanews staff received their wages and 
expenses from the Chinese Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Babu’s fiery Zanews editorials 
did little to endear him to the British authorities. His report of the election riots in 
Zanzibar alleged that the Americans and British had instigated the violence and that 
most of the casualties were ZNP supporters. The colonial government’s patience ran 
out when Babu claimed in another article, published on 29 December 1961, that the 
June riots were masterminded by the ASP with the connivance of the colonial 
government and he was charged in court.178 
The YOU general secretary Salim Said Rashid Mauly, a student at the London 
School of Economics at the time, appealed to the Chinese embassy and NCNA office in 
London for getting legal assistance for Babu.179 Zanews decried Babu’s arrest as a set-
up made with the knowledge of the ZNP-ZPPP alliance. The People’s Daily followed 
suit and condemned the British for their persecution of patriots and for the arbitrary 
arrests that were made under the pretext of emergency law. Zanzibari students in China 
also sent a message to the Chief Minister protesting against Babu’s arrest and called for 
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the government’s resignation if he was not released.180 Throughout this time, Babu 
reportedly maintained contact with the NCNA and despatched cables to its London 
office and kept them appraised of the case against him, including his belief that the 
whole affair was engineered to detain him while constitutional talks went on in 
London.181 In spite of these travails, Babu was still able to travel intermittently and 
carry out some of his political work, albeit to a lesser degree.182 Babu was released in 
1963 and the net effect of his incarceration was an even more compelling reputation 
amongst African nationalists as a political martyr.183 
As this section has shown, the development of Chinese soft power was possible 
through the cultivation of low-level Sino-Zanzibari contacts, Babu’s efforts in the 
stewardship of Zanews and the employment of Zanzibaris at Radio Peking. These 
measures built up mutual trust and support for the rapid growth of Beijing’s 
information campaign. Coupled with the Zanzibari nationalists’ impatience for change, 
local developments in Zanzibar strengthened the Sino-Zanzibari relationship even 
further and laid the ground for closer ties, the topic of the next section. 
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III. Local developments in Zanzibar and the buttressing of the Sino-Zanzibari 
relationship 
The third phase in the evolution of the Zanzibari bridgehead for Chinese 
diplomatic expansion into East Africa developed alongside three major political events 
between 1963 and 1964, namely the formation of the Marxist Umma Party, the 
Zanzibar revolution and the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This phase 
helped to push the Sino-Zanzibari relationship forward and demonstrates that local 
African politics played a bigger role in the decolonisation vacuum than Cold War fault 
lines. This section examines each of these political events in detail to highlight its role 
in buttressing the Sino-Zanzibari relationship. 
i) The Umma party 
Zanzibar was granted self-governing status by the British on 23 June 1963. 
Favouring moderate nationalists in the decolonisation process, the British authorities 
attempted to impress their political vision in the run-up to the Legislative Council 
elections in July 1963.184 They also warned the ZNP leader Ali Muhsin that power 
would not be handed over to his party unless it was rid of socialists.185 Throughout this 
time, the ZNP was torn by increasing factionalism and some members’ consternation at 
Babu’s flirtations with Communism. The situation was exacerbated further by Ali 
Muhsin’s appeals for Egyptian assistance, which gave the party an image of Arab 
dominance and disconcerted the African Zanzibaris in turn.186 
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Babu and his circle of comrades subsequently resigned from the ZNP and 
established the Umma party in June 1963, after his release from gaol. The split took 
place along ideological lines and reconfigured Zanzibar’s political groupings, with the 
Umma party being a merger of the ZNP left-wing – the backbone of the ZNP’s mass 
work – and the ASP left-wing. This combination made the new party particularly 
attractive to the trade unions and the militant ASP youth wing; the overseas exposure 
that many Zanzibari youths had experienced in the Communist bloc countries made the 
mobilisation process much easier.187  
Significantly, the more well-travelled members in the Umma party’s executive 
committee – Badawi, Khamis Ameir, Babu and Ali Sultan – were pro-Chinese. The 
executive committee comprised of fifteen members but, as Ali Sultan insisted, “the 
leader was clearly Babu.”188 However, because of their ethnicity, Babu and the Umma 
members lay open to criticism that Umma was Arab-dominated, even though their own 
platform was a non-racialist, class-centred one.189 The party did not subscribe to a 
racialist or religious platform for national unity and, probably as a result of that, had 
little appeal in the rural areas.190 Ali Sultan contended that Umma was exceptional in 
his country’s history because “we were a tiny seed, but a very good seed.”191 Sensing a 
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potential political threat, the British authorities banned Zanews, as well as the ZNP’s 
party paper Sauti ya Umma (Voice of the Masses).192 
The Umma party itself did not field any candidates in the Legislative Council 
elections in July 1963, but threw its support behind the ASP. The election results were, 
as before, a ZNP-ZPPP victory in the legislature because of the first-past-the-post 
system, with the ASP polling a majority of the votes but a minority of seats. The system 
of political organisation led to a great deal of disgruntlement among the African 
Zanzibaris. Between July and December 1963, the ZNP-ZPPP coalition government 
undertook strategic measures to extend its control over important ministries through the 
recruitment of party loyalists and a policy of “Zanzibarisation” was announced.193 The 
African Zanzibaris saw this as a demonstration of the government’s plan to create an 
Arab-run police state.194 
Although personal diplomacy had served Babu and the Chinese government 
well until that point, its limitations were quickly outweighed by the real political gains 
that Chinese support for the incumbent government would bring. The Sino-Zanzibari 
relationship was exceptional in another respect: China had a stronger position than the 
Soviet Union in Zanzibar compared to elsewhere in Africa.195 Beijing’s position was 
based on the assessments of its diplomats in the field and, in spite of its earlier support 
for Babu, the Chinese government fully intended to work with the ZNP-ZPPP 
government. Central to all of this was the coalition government’s position on the One 
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China policy. The Chinese ambassador in Cairo, Chen Jiakang, met the coalition 
leaders Mohamed Shamte and Ali Muhsin before independence in October. Both sides 
publicly expressed their mutual wish to develop strong bilateral ties.196 Ambassador to 
Tanganyika He Ying sent his colleague Zhou Nan to Zanzibar immediately after, in 
November 1963. He Ying deftly managed the rivalry between Shamte and Ali Muhsin 
– both of whom wanted to capitalise on Chinese influence and resources – to his 
advantage and quickly obtained Zanzibar’s diplomatic recognition for China. In spite of 
attempts by the Republic of China (ROC) to woo the ZNP-ZPPP government by 
dispatching its Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Xikun and a delegation to Zanzibar, the 
Taiwanese were excluded from the independence celebration.197 
Beijing officially recognised the constitutional monarchy under Sultan Seyyid 
Jamshid bin Abdullah bin Khalifa and the ZNP-ZPPP coalition when Zanzibar became 
independent on 10 December 1963.198 The Chinese press made it a point to emphasise 
that a long friendship had existed between their peoples before the disruption caused by 
imperialist aggression and colonialism oppression.199 The Umma party was unable to 
gain a formal political foothold. The ZNP-ZPPP victory and wavering Chinese support 
put Babu’s group in a weak position. Its fate plunged even further when the new 
government banned the party within three weeks of independence. A police search on 
the Umma Party headquarters in January turned up a large number of documents, 
including a diary written in Beijing containing a full description of the methods for a 
violent revolution. At around the same time, rumours spread in Zanzibar of the 
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government’s plan to carry out a mass arrest and purge of ASP leaders on 13 
January.200 The police searched Babu’s house and reportedly found a pistol – which he 
claimed had been planted – and indicted him.201 
The political situation in Zanzibar was unstable and tense in early January 1964. 
The coalition government enjoyed the support of the wealthy Arab segment, while the 
ASP appealed to poor Africans, to the extent that the British observed disgruntled 
Zanzibaris referring to their independence as Uhuru wa Waarabu (Arab Independence 
Day).202 This “Arabisation” was pushed even further by Ali Muhsin immediately after 
independence, when he signed an agreement to have Egyptian teachers sent to Zanzibar 
to replace the departing British staff.203 The threat of continued Arab domination and 
closer alignment with Egypt heightened the sense of urgency felt by the African 
Zanzibaris. Days later, a revolution broke out in the early hours of 12 January 1964. 
ii) The Umma cadres and the Zanzibar Revolution 
The confusion and lack of information in the immediate aftermath of the coup 
was stoked by the fanatical and, at times, blood-curdling radio broadcasts against the 
Sultan and Arab community made by the self-declared Field Marshal John Okello. 
Okello was actually only a minor ASP official who had managed to manoeuvre himself 
quickly into the limelight during the revolution.204 Shamte’s government had in fact 
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been overthrown by members of the ASP Youth League (ASPYL), who had secured 
firearms from police stockpiles and overran security installations across Stone Town. 
The British and Americans misread the situation as a foreign, Communist-
sponsored revolution and their initial reaction was to point to the Chinese as one of the 
prime suspects. Premier Zhou Enlai’s remark that “revolutionary prospects were 
excellent throughout Africa,” uttered during his tour of African countries that began in 
December 1963, appeared to be adequate proof of Chinese ill intent.205 The Western 
perception of Chinese involvement in the coup was suggestive of their paranoia about 
the latter’s influence on the decolonising African continent.  
Still smarting from its confrontations with Communist forces in Southeast Asia 
and Cuba, the US Department of State circulated a report titled “The Communist 
Spectre Looms in Zanzibar” a day after the coup.206 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, William Trimble, even cited NCNA representative Gao 
Liang’s cagey behaviour as compelling evidence: Gao had been overheard making 
telephone calls in Chinese while in Zanzibar.207 This was one of a number of inaccurate 
field analyses which fanned the anti-Communist paranoia and was not particularly 
illuminating, as Gao presumably spoke Chinese to his colleagues all the time. Trimble 
extrapolated his speculation into a possible Chinese entry into Zanzibar via Kenya, 
where the pro-Chinese Minister Oginga Odinga could ensure their smooth passage 
through immigration.208 
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The British government, as the former colonial power in East Africa, had a large 
vested stake in the region. Whitehall initially suggested that Babu had received a 
subsidy from the Chinese towards financing the coup, an allegation which was later 
rejected by the High Commission in Zanzibar.209 In the House of Lords, Conservative 
peer Lord Colyton alleged that Babu had precipitated the coup and that Beijing had 
clearly planned everything to transform Zanzibar into “the advance post of the Chinese 
Communist penetration into Africa.”210 He substantiated his case by drawing a causal 
link between the revolution and Zhou Enlai’s visit to Africa; Zanzibar’s transformation 
was later described as “a sort of Chinese Cuba threatening directly Kenya and 
Tanganyika”.211 Moreover, it was held that any externally sponsored security threats in 
former British East Africa might quickly inflame the lucrative but tenuous situation in 
southern Africa, as the nationalist movements there gained momentum. Similarly 
alarming references to the Zanzibar Revolution were uttered by Winston Joseph Field, 
the Prime Minister of the Rhodesian Front, who called post-coup Zanzibar a 
“bridgehead for the infiltration of East Africa where the shaky new governments stood 
little chance in warding off a well-planned and well-endowed campaign to replace them 
with regimes unsympathetic to Western democracies.”212 
Once the dust had settled, it was evident that there was no Chinese involvement 
in the revolution: Rather, it was carried out by ASPYL members of their own accord.213 
Nevertheless, Babu had returned from Dar es Salaam two days after the revolution and 
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the Umma cadres had taken good advantage of the turn of events, so well in fact that 
they quickly manoeuvred themselves into key positions within the new administration. 
The British observed that the entire operation appeared to have been executed in a “well 
planned and reasonably disciplined fashion [...] by people possessing a fair knowledge 
of military tactics”.214  
The Umma cadres saw their contribution as the transformation of an unfocused 
unrest into a revolution along Marxist lines that injected the ideological and strategic 
grounding necessary to revamp the existing political structure.215 Their visible positions 
within the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (ZRC) alarmed the British, who described 
Karume as being in the hands of the extremists after having quarrelled with the ASP 
“intellectuals” led by Othman Shariff, Hasnu Makame and Idris Abdulakil.216 Although 
the ASP had provided the largest base of political support for the new regime, the 
British guessed that Karume would stay in power for as long as the “balance of 
suspicion” within the Council lasted and that the communists would benefit from all the 
confusion.217 In contrast to neighbouring Tanganyika where “nationalism had to be 
engendered by imperial sponsorship,” the decolonisation process in Zanzibar was more 
traumatic by far.218 
The ZRC announced a new constitution on 22 January. On 30 January, the ZRC 
declared Zanzibar a one-party state under the ASP and the Umma party was officially 
dissolved. This second “death” of the Umma party was viewed quite differently from 
 
214
 NA, DO185/59, ZAN.75/227/1, Hickman to Crosthwait, 27 February 1964.
215
 Wilson / Babu 1989, p. 13.
216
 NA, DO185/56, ZAN.012/18/1, Crosthwait to Sandys, 22 July 1964, p. 7; NA, DO185/59, A Note on the Zanzibar 
Revolution.
217
 NA, DO185/59, Note on the Zanzibar Revolution.
218
 Darwin 1991, p. 102.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 77 
the ZNP-ZPPP government’s ban just weeks earlier. According to Ali Sultan, “we 
socialists had to work in whichever way possible […] the merger was permissible since 
the Chinese Communist Party had once joined with the Guomindang, although they 
remained separate.”219 In this way, the Chinese were able to make inroads with the ZRC 
through the Umma cadres who had joined the ASP. The newly-assembled government 
found itself in similarly choppy waters as its ZNP-ZPPP predecessor, but faced an 
additional challenge in the form of the maverick “Field Marshal” Okello and his pack 
of over five hundred armed followers.220 The latter group was responsible for the nearly 
two months of violence, intimidation and terror which spread in the countryside after 
the revolution. The main target of the violence was the Manga Arab community, many 
of whom were small-scale shopkeepers and small landowners living in the countryside 
in the north and east of Unguja. A large proportion of this group had their homes 
destroyed and an estimated 1,800 were interned in refugee camps in Zanzibar, although 
the number of victims may have been greater.221 Whatever symbolic gains had been 
made by the revolution were threatened by Okello’s maverick actions.222 Okello was 
finally removed with help from the Tanganyikan government. 
The existing literature suggests that Chinese recognition of the coup government 
came hot on the heels of the revolution. However, the exchanges between the Chinese 
embassy in Dar es Salaam and its Foreign Ministry reveal a rather more cautious 
stance.223 As mentioned earlier, Beijing’s ties with the ZNP-ZPPP coalition government 
were cordial and Chinese records show that the coup created a period of uncertainty in 
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bilateral relations, as the Foreign Affairs Ministry assessed the complex situation. He 
Ying identified two challenges facing Chinese diplomacy in Zanzibar following the 
revolution: The demonstration of the ZRC’s authoritarianism through the banning of 
the Umma party and the continued British military presence in the region.  
The Chinese ambassador concluded that the coup government was in control of 
the situation and was likely to consolidate its power further, although the former ZNP-
ZPPP government might still have some influence with Western (mainly American or 
British) supporters.224 He Ying recommended to his government that they observe the 
situation a little longer, while paying particular attention to the responses of the East 
African governments and other important Afro-Asian governments. If they recognised 
the new regime, Beijing could do likewise, although there would be no need for official 
congratulations to be sent.225 This was presumably to keep recognition low key, lest any 
further upheavals occurred in the Zanzibari government. 
Babu called on the embassy the following day and, exercising his new 
appointment as Zanzibari Foreign Minister, extended an invitation for Premier Zhou 
Enlai to visit Zanzibar. He Ying appeared convinced by Babu’s explanation of the 
situation and advised the Foreign Ministry that they should accept Babu’s invitation if 
asked again, pending the Premier’s time commitments and the regional situation.226 The 
Foreign Ministry approved these suggestions and advised the Ambassador not to broach 
the issue of recognition, but to keep it appraised should the Zanzibaris press for an 
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answer.227 This hesitation reflected the high emphasis that the Chinese government 
placed on the opinions of the other East African, African and Asian governments. 
By the end of January 1964 the PRC, along with East Germany, North Vietnam, 
Israel, Egypt and Yugoslavia, had formally recognised the ZRC. Babu specifically 
highlighted Chinese recognition as an encouragement to the Zanzibari people and a 
blow to American-led imperialism.228 The British and American governments delayed 
their recognition of the ZRC and were penalised by Karume. That lapse allowed the 
Communist bloc countries unobstructed access to the ZRC through their attractive 
offers of aid and diplomacy. Yet it was true that the Umma cadres’ subsequent political 
manoeuvring into power greatly facilitated the Sino-Zanzibari relations. Therefore, 
although the space that was opened up by the departure of the British colonial 
authorities allowed new entrants – specifically the Chinese – into Zanzibar, the actual 
scale and speed of Beijing’s engagement in Zanzibar can be attributed more accurately 
to the political divisions and powers struggles between key members of the ZRC. 
Hence Clayton’s analysis that “the foundations of the TanZam Railway, between the 
Zambian Copperbelt and Dar es Salaam, were laid in the streets of Zanzibar City early 
in 1964” is inaccurate insofar as neither the Chinese nor the Umma members had a 
direct hand in the Zanzibar revolution.229 Rather, it could be more accurately said that 
those foundations were laid by the strategic manoeuvring of the Umma cadres in the 
immediate aftermath of the Zanzibar Revolution.  
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iii) Communist countries and the aid vacuum  
The literature on Zanzibar’s post-coup period until the union with Tanganyika 
in April 1964, tends to focus on external relations, implying that the surge in the 
Communist bloc presence was the main influence in the shaping of the ZRC’s domestic 
development strategy. However, the evidence strongly suggests that Zanzibar’s 
domestic policies were not necessarily indicative of the Communist sympathies of the 
majority of leaders in the ZRC.230 
Rather, it was the combination of in-fighting within the ZRC and its financial 
needs which led to a foreign policy heavily tilted towards the Communist powers, 
particularly in the early days of its administration. The ZRC embarked on the 
nationalisation of industry, as well as drives to improve education and the 
encouragement of self-reliance. The irony, as a CIA report pointed out, was that 
“certain of its leaders who were the most radical in their domestic policies were not 
anti-West, while others who furthered Communist bloc interests at the sacrifice of 
Western interests were more moderate in domestic policy.”231 In that early post-colonial 
period, the fight for executive power boiled down to a negotiation between 
personalities. 
Karume lacked formal education, but had risen through his own efforts from “a 
humble, able seaman to the acknowledged leader of Zanzibari Africans.”232 Karume’s 
interests were more focused on consolidating his personal power and, when the 
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Western governments delayed recognition of the ZRC, he reacted with a heavy hand. 
Babu, on the other hand, was regarded by the British as “the only intellectual” in the 
Cabinet whose strengths as a revolutionary leader gave him a significant advantage 
over the “slow, unsure, indecisive” Karume. Babu was – accurately – believed to have 
played a key role in “the international Communist build-up.”233 His objective for the 
ZRC’s new economic policies was for a clean break from the colonial system and to 
install a self-reliant, internally integrated economy based on a mix of local resources 
and foreign assistance.234 For that purpose, he advised Karume to embark on a socialist 
development path and to bring in experts from the Communist bloc.235 
The existing cleavages within the ZRC were reinforced by Sino-Soviet rivalry; 
even after Zanzibar was declared a one-party state, the two Communist powers still 
vied for the loyalties of various Zanzibari politicians. The Chinese government threw 
its support behind the leftist Arab elements – the former Umma comrades – while 
Moscow backed the radical African elements, including Prime Minister Abdullah 
Kassim Hanga from the ASP.236 As mentioned, the protracted delay in the US and 
British governments’ recognition of the ZRC disappointed Karume, who, after waiting 
agitatedly for some weeks, decided to close the US Embassy and British High 
Commission, expelling their respective Chargé d' Affaires.237 Communist aid to 
Zanzibar seemed all the more dramatic when viewed against the concurrent exodus of 
British advisers and civil servants. The British High Commissioner Crosthwait’s 
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valedictory letter from Stone Town described the “almost complete elimination of 
British influence here – a decline which, like many other recent events in Zanzibar, 
must be without parallel in Commonwealth history.”238 The scene that he described 
contrasted starkly with the enthusiastic arrival of the Soviets, Chinese, and East 
Germans in Zanzibar from February 1964 – “like the Three Kings, bearing gifts of 
economic and military aid and opening embassies.”239 Beijing bestowed the timely gift 
of a $500,000 untied grant in hard currency for the ZRC that month.240  
The Sino-Zanzibari relationship grew robustly in this political climate and was 
featured in Chinese information campaigns. The People’s Daily extolled the success of 
the Zanzibar revolution in liberating the impoverished Zanzibari masses, while 
carefully validating Mao’s continuous revolution.241 Yet the outcome of closer political 
ties between Zanzibar and Beijing would probably not have differed dramatically if the 
previous ZNP-ZPPP government had still been in power. The Chinese government was 
intent on fostering strong ties with whichever was the incumbent African government in 
Zanzibar. The Chinese paid little attention to the actual racial and ethnic tensions in 
Zanzibar and, as the CIA observed, “Communist propaganda was at pains to 
demonstrate that the division in Zanzibar was essentially a class one, with Arabs 
representing feudal landlords and the Africans the working population.”242 Moreover, 
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the Chinese sources usually referred to the racial issues in Zanzibar in their criticisms of 
the colonial British policy of divide and rule between Arab and African Zanzibaris.243 
The Chinese emphasised the militant element of the revolution as being indispensible to 
the fight for national liberation – versus the Soviet stance of peaceful coexistence – and 
also identified the Umma party members who were represented in the new 
government.244 In response to the British and American governments granting 
diplomatic recognition to the ZRC on 23 of February, the People’s Daily published an 
article warning the people and government of Zanzibar to be vigilant against imperialist 
plots. The article cautioned that the American and British diplomatic representatives 
were engaged in subversion, interference and corruption.245 The feeling was mutual. 
After the Chinese government formally recognised the ZRC and the ZRC 
appeared to establish itself as a stable government, the Chinese started to highlight the 
symbolism and importance of the Zanzibar Revolution. Chinese media portrayed the 
Sultan of Zanzibar less favourably than it had done earlier. An official expression of 
Chinese solidarity with the people of Zanzibar, targeted at a Chinese audience, was 
published in the People’s Daily three months after the Zanzibar Revolution.246 The 
song, Spring wind blows to the Land of Cloves – dedicated to Zanzibar, published in 
full as Appendix I on page 332, was intended to celebrate and communicate the 
currency of revolutionary struggle around the world. Composed by Zang Kejia (1905-
2004) a celebrated Chinese poet, writer and editor who was an important proponent of 
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socialist literature in the 1960s, the song transposed the events in Zanzibar into the 
CCP’s revolutionary template that emphasised the rural areas as well as armed uprising. 
It was a romantic – yet revealing – account of the Chinese perspective on Zanzibar’s 
transformation from “ancient slave market” to an idyllic workers’ haven; it also 
proclaimed Chinese solidarity and support for the armed revolution. The Chinese media 
did not waste any opportunity to decry “Western weakness” and cravenness in the face 
of the Africans’ revolutionary and anti-colonial spirit.247 These versions did not 
mention the attendant chaos, inter-racial tensions and violence which followed the 
coup. But the fact that the ZRC, with the visible former Umma cadres in its ranks, had 
taken over from the ZNP-ZPPP government intensified Western paranoia and increased 
the external political pressure on Nyerere to take action.  
This section has shown that Karume’s frustration with the US and UK 
governments’ delay in recognizing the ZRC, Babu and Hanga’s connections with 
Beijing and Moscow respectively, led to an influx of aid and experts from the 
Communist bloc countries. Although initially cautious about the ZRC and irrespective 
of its lack of understanding of the racial complexities of the local situation, the Chinese 
government quickly strove to make Zanzibar a revolutionary, anti-imperialist success 
through its aid policy. The new Chinese ambassador, Meng Yinghe, presented his 
credentials to Karume on 9 April 1964, but these events were soon affected by another 
major political development in East African history: The union of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar. 
IV. The union and China’s entry onto mainland Tanganyika 
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The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was formed on 23 April 1964 through an 
agreement between Nyerere and Karume. Although some scholars have suggested that 
it was solely a product of the Cold War, it was also the attainment of African political 
objectives.248 Nyerere and TANU had close ties with the ASP. In his memoirs, Chinese 
diplomat Zhou Boping quoted Nyerere as having identified the Zanzibar question as 
Tanganyika’s biggest problem because of its British-backed Arab monarchy and 
externally influenced politics.249 After the revolution and the Tanganyikan army mutiny 
in January, Nyerere thought it vital to preserve stability in Tanganyika by incorporating 
Zanzibar in its fold. Indeed, he had told the US diplomat Donald Pettersen that “it is 
more important to me than to you that Zanzibar be non-aligned. The Chinese on 
Zanzibar threaten me more directly.”250 More accurately, Nyerere was worried by the 
communist build up and the Western pressure that would ensue. The Tanganyikan 
leader seized the initiative to broach the matter to Karume.  
Karume similarly saw the Union as an excellent opportunity to neutralise his 
opponents. Some accounts attest to Babu’s prior knowledge of and support for the 
union.251 Nabwa insisted that Babu supported the idea, because it would be an 
opportunity to spread Zanzibar’s revolutionary spirit to Tanganyika. However, it 
appears that Babu changed his stance after he left Zanzibar in 1978, criticising the 
union as “a betrayal of the revolution” because, he argued, it succumbed to Western 
governmental pressure to stave off Communist influence.252 This perspective of the 
union as an American-led imperialist plot to quell the progressive forces in Zanzibar 
 
248
 Wilson / Babu 1989.
249
 Zhou 2004, p. 118.
250
 Pettersen 2002, p. 154.
251
 Ibid., p. 30; Interview with the late Ali Nabwa, Zanzibar, 28 November 2006.
252
 Glassman 2011, p. 292.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 86 
was shared by former Umma cadres in their interviews.253 Cold War pressures and the 
Sino-Soviet rivalry inflamed local tensions and emphasised the East-West ideological 
paradigm that was being applied to the third world generally, such as in Laos, Vietnam 
and Cuba. 
After the union was formalised, Karume, now the de facto ruler of Zanzibar, 
quickly concentrated all executive, legislative and judicial power in his office. 
Karume’s political rivals were assigned to cabinet positions in the union government 
based in Dar es Salaam, away from their local support base. After the dissolution of the 
Umma party, this dealt another serious blow to the left wing as an organised political 
force.254 Among Karume’s rivals were the Afro-Shirazi intellectuals with whom he had 
fallen out, such as Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Othman Shariff and Hasnu Makame, as 
well as the former Umma cadres Babu, Salim Ahmed Salim and Ali Mafoudh. In a 
significant diplomatic gesture, Beijing supported the union. This decision had a broad 
impact on the strategic gains that Beijing had made in the region and smoothened the 
way for its subsequent dealings with Tanganyika. The Chinese believed that Nyerere’s 
support for the Zanzibar revolution and the clear-cut implementation of the union had 
led to Tanzania’s greater stability and national strength.255  
In contrast to the fracas surrounding the closing of the West German embassy, 
the Chinese ambassador left Zanzibar on 12 July and the embassy was downgraded to a 
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consulate under Consul Liu Gan.256 The transition went ahead without fuss and had 
little impact on Chinese diplomacy there. To the contrary, the Chinese consulate in 
Stone Town remained important. In his book, Consul Zhou claimed that the consulate 
was unique amongst all the Chinese consulates in Africa because it enjoyed a great deal 
of autonomy; it reported jointly to the home ministry and the embassy in Dar es 
Salaam.257 
The British observed that the inflow of advisors from socialist countries made 
Zanzibar “something of a regional showcase for revolution.”258 Chinese support for the 
islands gained momentum in the months after the union. Numerous delegations from 
Zanzibar also visited China at the invitation of non-governmental organisations, which 
decried US-led neo-colonialism as “the biggest threat facing independent states in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America” and heaped rhetorical support on their Zanzibari 
counterparts.259 Liu Gan and his deputy Liu Qing had a good relationship with Karume: 
They managed the “one country, two systems” arrangement in the union astutely.260  
Again, events were fast-moving with an apparently quick financial reward. On 
15 May the Heping became the first ship from Communist China to call at an East 
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African port.261 The Union Republic’s first high level economic delegation to China, 
led by Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa and including Babu, stole the headlines 
in June 1964, not least of all for the Chinese aid package that was granted on extremely 
generous terms.262 This was Tanzania’s first aid package from China and an Agreement 
on Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed on 16 June for a loan of $28 
million, including arms – a figure that was almost twice the amount of Zanzibar’s 
annual revenue.263 In fact, the sum was large enough to cover the entire Zanzibar 
development plan until 1966, an indication of the importance that Beijing placed on its 
ties with the islands and its desire to escalate its engagement in Africa.264 Cultural and 
educational exchanges followed.265 
As part of a larger national entity, Zanzibar’s actual political value to Beijing 
decreased with the creation of the Union as it was Dar es Salaam which carried the 
mantle of diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Chinese government maintained its ties and 
continued its assistance to the Zanzibar authorities because of the latter’s high symbolic 
value. The coup of January 1964 had imbued Zanzibar with a revolutionary character 
that carried enormous weight in Beijing’s propaganda.266 The passionate 
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pronouncements of solidarity and anti-imperialist invectives in the Chinese media could 
not be more different from the cautious attitude that the British had towards their 
former protectorate, as reflected in an article from the Financial Times: 
To an outsider, the earnest committed looks on the faces of the East Germans 
and Chinese are disturbingly out of place in these indolent, apparently carefree, 
islands. Most Zanzibaris lead undemanding lives and they are less receptive to 
ideologies – Marxism, Moral Rearmament or whatever – than most people.267 
Far from being politically inert and ambivalent, Babu continued to foster close ties with 
the Chinese after the union. 
i) Babu and China 
Babu’s close ties with the Chinese are an example of the importance that 
personal contacts played in the development of the Sino-Zanzibari relationship. 
Beijing’s faith in Babu was well-founded as the Zanzibari’s political skill, intelligence 
and network made him an important ally for the rapid development of Sino-Zanzibari 
relations. Scholars have tended to emphasise the period of his NCNA connection and 
work as Zanews editor as the peak of his ties with Beijing. However, Babu’s 
contribution extended into the initial years of the post-Union period. Nyerere astutely 
appointed him head of the trade delegation that preceded the presidential visit to China 
in February 1965.268 Babu was already an old friend of China by then, having visited 
six times. Chinese records mention his inclusion in the delegation favourably: They 
describe the interaction as positive and the outcome, a trade agreement for £5 million 
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($14 million) a year for five years, mutually beneficial.269 Babu also seized the 
opportunity of his February visit to request for Chinese assistance for the Tanzania-
Zambia (TanZam) rail link.270 
A staunch Marxist intellectual, Babu was charismatic, articulate and affable. He 
believed that socialist aid had the potential to bring about “a complete and authentic 
liberation of Africa” and sought lessons from countries which he considered successful 
socialist countries: North Korea, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and China.271 
Moreover, he thought that Chinese economic assistance, in particular, could help 
African countries through the coordination of their economies to meet shortages in 
specific products. This would eventually allow the African countries to attain the goal 
of independent national economies.272 
An illuminating account of the importance of the informal diplomacy and 
personal aspects of the Sino-Zanzibar relationship is given in Zhou Boping’s memoirs. 
Zhou appeared to have maintained a good relationship with Babu. Babu was interested 
in meeting Zhou because he was the first Chinese official to arrive in Tanzania after the 
launch of the Cultural Revolution; the Zanzibari called on Zhou within days of his 
arrival at the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam.273 According to Zhou, they had an 
informal two-hour meeting and conversed over a meal. Babu spoke highly of Nyerere, 
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whom he said was widely respected in Tanzania and Africa. In contrast to that glowing 
account, Babu described Karume as an uneducated, working-class man who did not 
appreciate learning. However, he acknowledged that although Karume had an 
aggressive manner, he had popular support and was on good terms with Nyerere. 
Moreover, Babu insisted, Karume regarded the Chinese as brothers rather than just 
friends.274 Babu explained that the most negative element in the Tanzanian political 
scene was Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona, who had originally been Nyerere’s aide, 
but now acted self-important and arrogant.275 
However, Karume’s true sentiments towards Babu and the other “leftists” were 
made clear when he effectively removed them from important political positions at the 
first opportunity.276 Furthermore, as Glassman argues, Marxism did not lay deep roots 
in Zanzibar; instead, its main function was as a “language that enabled the ruling party 
to recast its long standing racial rhetoric in terms of class.”277 Once the Umma cadres 
were sent away, there was no significant leftist ideological influence in the ZRC. 
Nevertheless, Zhou felt that Babu’s analyses had proven accurate at the time and had 
contributed to the embassy’s research and understanding of local events. Babu made it a 
practice to call on him (and vice versa) whenever there were new developments and 
consequently he was the Tanzanian minister with whom Zhou had the most contact.278 
Moreover, Babu was also exceedingly helpful with practical matters like assisting the 
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embassy with organising the funeral proceedings and reports for a Chinese expert who 
died in Tanzania. 
In spite of his important role in facilitating relations with the Chinese, Babu was 
frustrated with his new portfolio as Minister of Trade and the limitations he faced 
within the Union government. He often disagreed with the government’s development 
policies and criticised the delegation of major policy decisions to expatriate advisors. 
Not one to remain silent on what he viewed as matters of public interest, he aired his 
opinions in The Nationalist newspaper. His weekly column, titled The Pressman Says, 
regularly criticised the government’s policies and the fundamental errors in its pursuit 
of a socialist model; that Nyerere’s blend of African Socialism did not go far enough.  
However, local rivalries and murky politics in Zanzibar eventually got the better 
of Babu. The events which led to the decline of the Zanzibari Left are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Six. Babu’s thoughts and insights made him a well-regarded 
political thinker in Tanzania and beyond, and he was greatly appreciated by the 
Chinese.279 This example shows how interpersonal connections and personal diplomacy 
were an important component that fed into the understanding of African affairs by 
Chinese officials and policymakers. That strong rapport ensured a relatively smooth 
transition of Chinese policy amidst the quick and at times tumultuous changes in 
Zanzibar’s political dynamics. 
Conclusion: Zanzibar as Beijing’s fast track into Africa 
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This chapter has shown that the Sino-Zanzibari relationship would not have 
accelerated at the speed that it did (nor developed to the extent that it had) were it not 
for individuals such as Babu and Ali Sultan. At a time when China had limited 
diplomatic channels and means, Beijing’s ties with these Zanzibaris created valuable 
opportunities for the Chinese government’s gathering of information, as well as the 
proliferation of propaganda. 
The stellar rise of Sino-Zanzibari relations from 1960 corresponded with the 
heightened interest that Beijing had in expanding its formal diplomacy in the third 
world. Zanzibar played a major role in Beijing’s diplomatic venture into Africa by 
shaping official Chinese perceptions and understanding of local and regional affairs. In 
this way, the islands were transformed from a neglected British protectorate within a 
waning global empire into a crucial stepping stone for deeper Chinese engagement in 
Africa. Babu in particular played a crucial role in cementing Zanzibar’s ties with the 
Chinese. Significantly, he was integral to the projection of Beijing’s “soft power” 
through the facilitation of Radio Peking and Zanews, which received NCNA support. 
These channels increased the accessibility of Mao’s works and fostered an awareness of 
Chinese policies in the region. In this way, both Chinese state-run media and 
propaganda agencies were able to extend their activities beyond Zanzibari shores and 
throughout Swahili-speaking East Africa. 
However, even after Babu was marginalised and possibly set-up – as he claimed 
– by the ZNP, Beijing took a politically pragmatic position and maintained ties with the 
ZNP and the ASP simultaneously. The Chinese government also gave immediate 
recognition to the ZNP-ZPPP coalition when it became the first government after 
independence, even though Babu had established the Marxist Umma Party that had a 
strong pro-Chinese membership. The Western paranoia that erupted after the Zanzibar 
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revolution illustrates the hyper-sensitivity to the possibility of Chinese engagement in 
Africa. 
As the Chinese records show, Beijing took a cautious and measured approach to 
the newly-installed Zanzibar Revolutionary Council: In considering whether or not to 
accord the ZRC formal recognition, Beijing prioritised the opinions of the East African 
governments and important Afro-Asian countries. This demonstrates the importance of 
Afro-Asian opinion for Beijing. Once recognition was accorded, the Chinese acted 
quickly to move in and fill the gap left by decolonisation. Ironically, although China did 
not have a hand in the Zanzibar revolution, its close ties with key Zanzibaris and 
rapidly growing foothold in revolutionary Zanzibar contributed to Nyerere’s decision to 
form the union. The Chinese media began to cite Zanzibar as a bastion of revolutionary 
success. Throughout this time, but to a lesser degree during his incarceration, Babu 
continued to be the main contact point for the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam. 
The creation of the Union Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964 
altered the form of Sino-Zanzibari relations. With the seat of foreign policymaking 
relocated to Dar es Salaam and President Nyerere’s increasingly visible profile as an 
anti-imperialist, non-aligned stalwart, who also enjoyed excellent rapport with the 
Chinese, there was a relative decrease in Zanzibar’s importance to Beijing as a political 
ally. It remained important as a symbol, however. The union also allowed Karume to 
consolidate his power; his subsequent persecution of political opponents scattered the 
Umma cadres and led to the decline of the left-wing in Zanzibar. Karume continued to 
cultivate ties with the bloc countries, but the motivation was more personally than 
ideologically driven. 
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Ultimately, to the Chinese, Zanzibar served its purpose as a strategic bridgehead 
in East Africa through the active cooption of Babu and Umma cadres in the extension  
 
of soft power, through successful Chinese overtures during the crisis of Western 
diplomacy following the revolution, as well as through the islands’ experience of 
Chinese aid that competed against the Soviets. It appears that Chinese diplomacy in 
Zanzibar survived the onslaught of major political developments – from independence 
to revolution and union – and was not beaten off-track. Nevertheless, Beijing’s 
objectives did not address other pertinent issues, such as racial tensions between the 
local Arab and African communities. It is interesting, therefore, to compare the quick 
but relatively short-lived intensification of Sino-Zanzibari relations with the more 
halting start that Beijing had with the Tanganyikan government before bilateral ties 
burgeoned in the latter half of the 1960s. This is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two – China and Tanganyika’s rapprochement, 1961 to 1964 
The previous chapter showed that Zanzibar provided China with a rapid entry 
into mainland East Africa from the late 1950s until 1964. This chapter examines the 
foundation on which Tanganyika’s relationship with China was forged across three 
roughly similar phases to Zanzibar: The nationalist phase from the late 1950s to 
December 1961; the immediate post-independence phase from January 1962 to April 
1964 and the immediate post-union phase until the end of 1965.280 Compared to 
neighbouring Zanzibar, Tanganyika enjoyed a much smoother transition through every 
phase. 
Tanganyika was annexed by the Germans in 1885, during the period of 
European colonisation in Africa. The territory was first a British League of Nations 
mandate in 1922 and later a United Nations trust territory from 1946 under British 
trusteeship. The decolonisation process in Tanganyika was relatively swift and 
peaceful. The British authorities granted full internal self-governing status to the 
government led by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) on 1 May 1961 
and the territory became independent on 9 December that year. 
In the existing literature on Sino-Tanzanian relations the foreign policies of both 
components of the union have mainly been studied separately, with a greater emphasis 
on Beijing’s engagement with the Tanzanian mainland than on Zanzibar. Moreover, the 
scholarship has focused on the post-union period (after 1964), to the exclusion of the 
nationalist and independence periods that preceded the union.  
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A comparison between the experiences of the two East African countries until 
the union of 1964 allows us to draw some conclusions about the impact of the 
Tanganyikan-Zanzibari relationship on relations with third countries, in this case, 
China. The findings thus promote a fuller understanding of Afro-Asian collaboration 
and its evolution as a strategy for political survival against the backdrop of European 
decolonisation. Specifically, as this chapter will show, the pre-union period was 
important for relationship-building between Tanganyika and China. The period was 
also directly affected by local African factors, not least of all the complex dynamics 
between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. 
I. The first phase of Sino-Tanganyikan relations: The nationalist period (late 
1950s to 1961) 
i) The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) 
To understand the specific factors which brought the Chinese and Tanganyikan 
representatives together in the first phase of their relationship from the late 1950s to 
1961, it is necessary to look at the historical background of TANU, the dominant 
political party. TANU was established on 7 July 1954 as a political reincarnation of a 
social entity, the Tanganyika African Association (TAA).281 The party’s rise in 
popularity and importance had much to do with its well-regarded leader, Julius 
Kambarage Nyerere. Nyerere presented TANU’s agenda domestically and 
internationally with great eloquence. An early example of this was his 1955 address to 
the UN Trusteeship Council in New York, when he made a thorough argument for the 
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Council’s members to be mindful of their responsibilities towards Tanganyika. 
Nyerere’s articulate and persuasive speech impressed the UN delegates and accentuated 
his reputation as a rising African statesman; in Tanganyika, it won TANU even more 
supporters.282 
Among the key issues on TANU’s political agenda in the 1960s featured its 
active support for Pan-Africanism and the anti-colonial struggles on the continent. In 
September 1958, TANU hosted the first meeting of the Pan African Freedom 
Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) for nationalist groups from the 
region, although Tanganyika was technically still a British territory.283 Nyerere believed 
in taking a principled position in foreign affairs, although some of these had massive 
repercussions for Tanganyikan foreign policy. TANU pronouncements at the time were 
often described as being “that of war”, as evinced from Nyerere’s declaration at the All-
African People’s Conference in Accra in December 1963 that “freedom is our natural 
right, if you do not give us freedom, we will use force to achieve it.”284  
Yet the British colonial authorities considered TANU the forerunner for leading 
Tanganyika to self-government, in spite of the party’s anti-imperialist stance. There 
were two main reasons for this. Firstly, no serious contenders to TANU’s political 
dominance had emerged. Although the British governor of Tanganyika, Sir Edward 
Twinings, had tried to undermine TANU’s dominance of the nationalist movement by 
establishing the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) in 1956, his efforts failed and TANU’s 
popularity grew from strength to strength. Secondly, from the perspective of the 
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departing colonial government, Nyerere was a strong candidate because he was a 
product of the British colonial system. He completed his tertiary education at the 
University of Edinburgh and was part of Tanganyika’s intellectual elite. In the absence 
of few “genuinely indigenous political traditions” in Tanganyika – as Mayall has 
argued, this was the case in nearly all the newly independent countries at the time – 
Nyerere was likely to put into place policies that were influenced by his Western 
education and values.285 Indeed, Nyerere worked well with the British and 
acknowledged the necessity of the continued presence of British officials after 
independence, particularly in wooing much-needed Western capital for post-
independence development.286 
By mid-1958, the US State Department observed that a self-governing 
Tanganyika was “inevitable”, as Nyerere was “the only African leader of any 
importance and TANU faced no serious rivals.”287 The Chinese government observed 
the political developments in Tanganyika with growing interest, although it had a brief 
dalliance with the Tanganyika African National Congress (ANC), a little-known 
splinter group of TANU, which is rarely mentioned in the historical literature. 
ii) The African National Congress (ANC) 
The Tanganyikan ANC was founded in January 1958 by a disaffected TANU 
official, Zuberi Mtemvu, who lambasted TANU for being too soft on racial issues. 
While he made some headway in raising the party’s international profile, the ANC 
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alienated a majority of Tanganyikans with its racist agenda.288 Although the ANC was 
never a serious political threat to TANU, it warrants some discussion as Beijing initially 
found Mtemvu’s radical Africanism more compelling than Nyerere’s embrace of multi-
racialism, which gives further insight into Chinese assessments of and interaction with 
African political parties.  
According to British records, Mtemvu contacted the China Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Committee (CAASC) and, with its support, led an ANC delegation to Beijing 
in January 1961. At a meeting with his hosts, Mtemvu criticised “the agents and stooges 
of the imperialists” and delivered a “violently anti-British speech and the usual eulogies 
of China”, which echoed Chinese condemnations of the British government for 
fostering a puppet regime in Tanganyika.289 Mtemvu himself basked in the attention 
and took full advantage of the platform provided by his willing hosts. He claimed to 
represent not just the ANC, but also the “ten million Africans who respected the 
Chinese people”, a canny exaggeration of his actual political influence.290 The CAASC 
seemed to view the Tanganyikan favourably and, keen to expand its network in Africa, 
the Committee agreed to sponsor five senior ANC members to attend further 
discussions in Beijing that September.291 Unsurprisingly, Mtemvu was pleased by the 
outcome of the visit, not least by the publicity that it had generated for the ANC, 
although he publicly insisted that his acceptance of Chinese aid did not mean that he 
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subscribed to Communist ideology. The ANC’s moment in the Chinese sun was, 
however, short-lived. 
Within months, Beijing’s favour shifted from the ANC to TANU.292 This shift 
in Chinese attention was obvious from an article in the People’s Daily in May, which 
declared the Chinese people’s sympathy with and support for the people of Tanganyika 
in their independence struggle. Significantly, it described Tanganyika’s self-governing 
status as “an initial victory of the anti-colonialist struggle of the people” and, from that 
point forward, no longer referred to the ANC.293 The Chinese government curtailed its 
support – even rhetorical support – for the splinter party and, on the advice of the 
Chinese embassy officials in Cairo who were reluctant to recommend any further 
assistance, official contact was also limited. The ANC was informed to channel all 
subsequent communication through the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). This was on 
one hand a show of Chinese disinterest in the ANC, as well as an indication of the 
ZNP’s role as a broker for Chinese dealings in East Africa.294 In an interview in 1983 
Babu, the ZNP Secretary General at the time, played down the significance of 
Mtemvu’s visit to China and claimed that the ANC leader had only been given “a cool 
reception.”295 After all, Beijing’s earlier contact with the by then politically-defunct 
ANC was an episode in early Sino-African relations that the Chinese and Tanzanians 
wished to minimise. 
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The ANC subsequently floundered on the weakness of its domestic support and 
Nyerere defeated Mtemvu in the 1962 presidential election, in which the latter obtained 
only two percent of the votes. Thereafter the Tanganyikan government’s determination 
to create a single-party state made it impossible for other political organisations to be 
established or to gain a foothold.296 Compared to the self-professed “radical” and 
“extreme” ANC, TANU exemplified moderation, which underlined the latter’s 
suitability as the party to take over from the British colonial authorities.297  
Yet for all the differences that existed between TANU and the ANC, both 
parties shared a common ground in one striking way: They were associated with the 
Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (AASC) which offered their representatives numerous 
opportunities to interact with fellow nationalist groups and potential donors, including 
the Chinese government.298 
iii) The Afro-Asian Solidarity Council and the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Organisation 
In the years after the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, the Chinese 
government established more channels to facilitate its growing contact with African 
representatives. However, by the end of 1958 it was apparent that “anti-imperialism” 
was not a monolithic or unified force, as Chinese relations with the UAR became 
rocky.299 Beijing’s need for reliable and unwavering African allies was, thus, 
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heightened. The China-Africa Friendship Association (CAFA) was launched at a mass 
rally in Beijing in April 1960, which also marked the fifth anniversary of the Bandung 
Conference. These initiatives were highlighted in the Chinese press as evidence of its 
government’s staunch support for African nationalism and served Mao’s objective to 
combat China’s diplomatic isolation through fostering closer ties in the third world. A 
crucial vehicle for Beijing’s third world diplomacy was the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Council (AASC). 
China’s membership in the AASC Permanent Secretariat gave it easy access to a 
platform on which it could express its positions on international issues. Crucially, it 
also presented opportunities to cultivate contacts with Afro-Asian governments and 
nationalist groups, which it fully exploited.300 According to British records, “well and 
eloquently represented” Chinese delegations were sent to the Afro-Asian events, which 
ranged from the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference at Tashkent (October 1958), to the 
All-Africa People’s Conference in Accra and the Afro-Asian Economic Conference in 
Cairo (both in December 1958).301 These meetings led to Chinese support for a number 
of the southern African liberation movements, as has been discussed by the author 
elsewhere.302  
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, Chinese anti-imperialist rhetoric 
extended beyond the political independence of the colonial territories. In fact, it had a 
strong racial element which aligned it closely to black versus white racial conflicts, 
such as the US civil rights movement. Hence Mao was respected as one of the great, 
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successful revolutionary leaders, with even the great American intellectual W. E. B. Du 
Bois having paid tribute to the transformation in New China.303 Mao later used this 
subtle approach to appeal to Africans as well as African Americans, who faced civil 
rights discrimination in the US, by emphasising China’s non-white solidarity with 
oppressed peoples everywhere. It was also a backhanded criticism of the Soviet leaders 
who “[consorted] with their American opposite numbers”.304  
News stories about Tanganyika and its nationalist struggle appeared in the 
People’s Daily from early 1959, a sign that the East African territory had a rising 
profile in the Chinese government’s assessments.305 At the same time, Chinese 
propaganda literature was sent to Tanganyikan organisations. In one example, a 
pamphlet titled “Shining Example of the Afro-Asian Peoples” carried the key messages 
that Beijing shared a closer affinity with the Afro-Asian peoples and that the Soviets 
were not suited to lead them to Communism.306 The pamphlet was circulated just ahead 
of the Second Congress Meeting of the AASC in Conakry in April 1960, as cracks in 
the Sino-Soviet relationship became more pronounced.307 Domestic propaganda in 
China supported this message with a surge in the number of Africa-related news articles 
that month. The Conakry Conference was covered extensively and included the Chinese 
delegate’s anti-US speech, in which he alleged that the superpower intended to use its 
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political, economic and military presence in Africa to replace the departing colonial 
systems.308  
However, the Chinese government was not the only promoter of AAPSO. 
Smaller third world countries, such as Tanganyika, considered it an important 
organisation that provided fertile opportunities to foster closer ties with the Communist 
bloc countries and other like-minded nationalist groups. Tanganyika was particularly 
well-positioned in its diplomacy, as Nyerere had promoted a non-aligned foreign policy 
– which was articulated even prior to independence – that broadened the possibility of 
bilateral aid, as well as via multilateral agencies such as the UN. In an assertion of its 
political independence, just two months before Tanganyika’s independence, TANU 
launched an initiative to shore up support from the Eastern bloc countries in 1961, 
beginning with its Publicity Secretary Rowland Mwanjisi’s tour of the Soviet Union, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, as well as China, from October that year.309 The 
Tanganyikan government’s openness to forging closer ties with Communist China was 
only one factor that precipitated the development of bilateral relations. Compared to the 
Sino-Zanzibari relationship in the same time period, the first phase of the Sino-
Tanganyikan relationship progressed gradually. However, its rapid growth ensued in 
the face of events which gave the Sino-Tanganyikan relationship new meaning. 
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II. The second phase: The immediate post-independence period, 1962 to April 
1964 
The second phase of the development of the Sino-Tanganyikan relationship 
commenced with Tanganyika’s independence on 9 December 1961 and lasted until the 
union with Zanzibar in April 1964. Tanganyika’s independence had come peacefully 
and quickly – unexpectedly so, in fact – when the British granted the TANU-led 
government self-governing powers in May 1961, ahead of its East African neighbours 
Kenya and Uganda. Yu’s seminal monograph on China and Tanzania attributed the 
development of a strong bilateral relationship to events in the latter half of the 1960s, 
such as Nyerere’s articulation of a socialist development path through the Arusha 
Declaration (1967) and the signing of the first tripartite agreement for the Tanzania-
Zambia rail link(1967).310 However, archival evidence suggests that two earlier events 
were actually responsible for cementing the Sino-Tanganyikan ties: Nyerere’s support 
for the Chinese government’s One China policy and the establishment of the 
Organisation for African Unity’s African Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam in 
May 1963 (the latter point is discussed in detail in Chapter Three on Chinese military 
support to Tanganyika). 
i) Tanganyika and the PRC’s One China policy 
Nyerere’s acceptance of the One China policy as the central tenet of Chinese 
foreign relations ensured that the bilateral relationship began on a high note. Indeed, 
Nyerere had been unabashed in his support for the PRC even prior to Tanganyika’s 
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independence, to the extent that Tanganyika’s impending independence caused 
consternation among those UN governmental delegations which opposed mainland 
China’s bid for membership.311 The British delegation believed that the Republic of 
China (ROC) – which occupied the China seat in the Security Council (UNSC) – was 
likely to veto Tanganyika’s entry because it feared that the African government would 
immediately vote for the expulsion of the ROC. As things turned out, the veto was not 
enacted and Tanganyika became the 104th member of the UN on 14 December 1961, 
leading the British delegation to comment that the growing Afro-Asian bloc at the UN 
had the potential to be a powerful diplomatic force if the respective delegations worked 
cohesively. 
On the eve of Tanganyika’s independence, the incoming Prime Minister told an 
NCNA reporter that he firmly supported Beijing’s One China policy.312 Nyerere and 
Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to Ghana who attended Tanganyika’s 
independence ceremony in December 1961, formally agreed that the bilateral 
relationship would be based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, as well as peaceful coexistence. The publicly agreed guidelines were important 
rhetorical support as they were in full accord with China’s foreign policy mantra, the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.313 Although Tanganyika did not open an 
embassy in Beijing at that time due to funding and manpower constraints, the 
establishment of official relations between the governments was still an important 
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milestone in Chinese diplomacy, as Beijing only had diplomatic ties with nine African 
countries until that point.  
Nyerere’s appreciation of the importance that the One China policy had to the 
Chinese government formed a strong basis for the smooth development of bilateral 
relations and set the positive conditions for China’s eventual relations with other East 
African governments. This point was emphasised in Ambassador Huang Hua’s 
memoirs. During Huang’s meeting with Nyerere at Tanganyika’s independence 
celebrations in December 1961, the latter insisted that the UN would be “a laughing 
stock” if it turned away the PRC, which represented 600 million people.314 Later that 
month the NCNA representative, Gao Liang, was despatched to Dar es Salaam. His 
presence ensured that there would be a steady stream of information and intelligence 
for the Chinese leaders, as well as topical news material for the NCNA. 
International support for Beijing at the UN General Assembly grew slowly but 
steadily throughout the 1960s, buoyed by the entry of the newly-independent, Afro-
Asian governmental delegations. The Chinese leaders continued to emphasise their 
African policy, which was closely tied to their aid programme for friendly third world 
governments and stepped up the deployment of its diplomatic corps, as well as personal 
diplomacy. The PRC kept a close eye on the situation at the UN, with its foreign 
ministry actively soliciting reports from its ambassadors on their respective host 
governments’ position on the issue.315  
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The Chinese Chargé d’ Affaires Li Jun arrived in Tanganyika on 24 January 
1962 and was followed by Ambassador He Ying two months later.316 He Ying was 
particularly well-qualified for the job, having worked in the foreign ministry since 1950 
as consul-general (1950 to 1952) in Jakarta, Indonesia; deputy director-general of the 
Asian department (1952 to 1954); ambassador to Mongolia (1954 to 1958) and director-
general of the foreign ministry’s Department of West Asian and North African affairs 
(1959 to 1962) just prior to his assignment in Tanganyika. He Ying quickly settled into 
his new post and began his diplomatic work in Tanganyika, as well as in the region, 
where there were generally more cautious attitudes towards Communist China.  
He Ying produced a great deal of analysis and astute observations for the 
foreign ministry. He stressed the importance of reiterating the “restoration” of the 
PRC’s UN seat to the friendly Afro-Asian countries, and to discredit all other strategies 
of entry into the organisation, such as the “Two China” position supported by the US.317 
The ambassador was impressed by the Tanganyikan government’s support for the 
liberation struggles in southern Africa, which he believed was evidence of the country’s 
crucial contribution to African politics. Chinese hopes appeared well-placed when the 
Tanganyikan government quickly demonstrated its active support – as opposed to 
merely passive acceptance – of the One China policy at the UN.318 Conversely, it was 
precisely the Tanganyikan delegation’s harsh stance on resolutions involving 
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colonialism, the colonial territories and southern African liberation that triggered 
criticism from the US and British UN delegations.319 
In spite of the challenges and constraints that Tanganyika faced in its foreign 
relations, Nyerere still had “a tremendous faith” in the morality of the international 
community and the UN’s capacity to assist countries in need, if its members behaved 
responsibly.320 He thus took pains to demonstrate that Tanganyika would be a 
principled and engaged member of the global community, despite its own poor 
financial situation. This principle was put into practice on a number of occasions. In 
1963, the Tanganyikan government authorised its UN Permanent Representative to 
purchase of $2,800 worth of UN bonds as a token of its support. The donation was 
intended as “a stimulus to others who could afford to pay better than her, but did not do 
so.”321  
Additionally, the Tanganyikan government made bilateral contributions towards 
disaster relief, such as a $8,400 donation for the Skopje earthquake in Yugoslavia in 
August, $8,400 for relief work in Italy’s Longarone disaster and, some days after, 
$11,200 for relief work in hurricane-struck Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Cuba and 
Haiti. The contributions were modest in value, but rich in symbolism, as Nyerere 
reiterated a similar moral message each time a donation was made, that “giving is 
mercy in the spirit, it is not in wealth” or that “the value of the gift is in the spirit behind 
it.”322 Hence the Tanganyikan government built up its image as a principled and moral 
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actor, a reputation which was reinforced further by its participation in the Afro-Asian 
circuit. 
ii) Tanganyika and Afro-Asian activities  
As Sino-Tanganyikan ties were strengthened through the Tanganyikan UN 
delegation’s active support for the PRC’s One China policy, Tanganyika’s participation 
in AAPSO activities strengthened the bilateral relationship through their shared 
emphases on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. 1960 was a milestone in African 
history, as European decolonisation accelerated across most of the continent. The 
preponderance of nationalist movements agitating for independence at the time meant 
that AAPSO had “reached its zenith at Conakry.”323 The delegations decided to 
convene a second Afro-Asian conference, a decision that was especially important to 
the Chinese, who had made a tremendously successful diplomatic debut in Bandung in 
1955. Unlike AAPSO which was comprised of non-governmental delegations and was 
thus politically less prestigious and effective, a “second Bandung” would be attended 
by governmental delegations.  
Beijing’s rivalry with Moscow drove its active participation in the AAPSO in 
the early 1960s, so that Chinese behaviour at AAPSO events, according to British 
officials, increased in “hostility and intransigence” as polemical arguments were 
volleyed between the two Communist powers.324 Moreover, building on their argument 
that the Soviet Union was not a genuinely Asian country and thus was not entitled to be 
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included in Afro-Asian affairs, the Chinese delegates emphasised the racial element in 
private conversations with other delegates. They argued that the Soviet Union would 
never genuinely be on the side of the anti-imperialist struggle because it was a “white” 
country. 
The political differences between Beijing and the other Afro-Asian governments 
were plainly visible on this issue and the preparation for the “second Bandung” was 
mired in Cold War politics and political rivalry.325 Many of the newly-installed 
independent governments that were represented in AAPSO were frustrated by the 
political manoeuvrings of the larger powers, which overran the third world countries’ 
concerns of domestic development. These open disagreements left many AAPSO 
events in “disarray.”326 Beijing’s anti-Soviet activities from autumn 1962 were “intense, 
uncompromising and unrelenting,” to the displeasure of many of the Afro-Asian 
delegates, who had their own interests and agenda.327  
Nyerere was fully aware of the potentially explosive problems that the Cold 
War and the Sino-Soviet rivalry might bring to the event. Tanganyika hosted the third 
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference in February 1963 in Moshi, a town in the 
Kilimanjaro region. In his opening speech, Nyerere tried to set the tone for the 
conference by criticising both the capitalist and socialist powers for reducing the 
weaker states to pawns in Cold War conflicts.328 The Chinese government placed great 
importance on the conference and on AAPSO events. He Ying was instructed to 
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organise a number of important international conferences in Africa and work with the 
host governments to carry out diplomatic operations.  
In his memoirs, He Ying explained that he and his colleagues would focus their 
diplomatic efforts strategically, often using a careful division of labour to ensure that 
Chinese participation was maximised, because each conference only lasted a few 
days.329 The Chinese press covered the Moshi Conference in detail, with full texts of all 
the major documents adopted being printed in the People’s Daily. This included the 
complete text of a speech by the leader of the Chinese delegation, Liu Ningyi, on 5 
February. Li put forward a number of proposals, the most significant of which were that 
the conference should: 
Appeal to the peoples of Asia and Africa to support the just struggle for national 
independence of the peoples who have not yet attained it, and adopt concrete 
measures to support their struggle; 
Declare that all countries large and small are equal and that their independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacred and inviolable; and 
Strengthen cooperation and mutual assistance among the Afro-Asian countries 
on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Ten 
Principles of the Bandung conference.330 
For the very first time at an AAPSO event, the Chinese delegation dominated 
the proceedings and appeared to gain ground at the expense of the Soviet Union. The 
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CIA attributed the outcome at Moshi to three factors. Firstly, the delegation’s “careful 
preparation”, which reportedly included the distribution of money and other favours to 
African delegates in exchange for their support during the conference sessions.331 
Secondly, the conference chairman and Tanganyikan foreign minister Oscar 
Kambona’s ruling in favour of Chinese motions, such as a resolution condemning the 
ongoing American occupation of Taiwan and “restoration” of the PRC as the legitimate 
representative of China at the UN.332 Thirdly, the fruition of Chinese efforts to 
countervail Soviet-backed international fronts, such as the World Peace Council and the 
World Federation of Trade Unions, through the establishment of rival organisations.333 
One such group was the Afro-Asian Trade Union Organisation that was launched at 
Moshi, which received statements of support from trade unionists in Zanzibar, 
Tanganyika and Angola.  
The Moshi conference was an opportunity for trade unions to formalise their 
overseas links and the Chinese trade unions came in full force to sign communiqués 
with the Tanganyika Labour Federation as well as other groups.334 However, a purely 
geo-political analysis of the conference proceedings tends to minimise an important 
point: Although it appeared that Tanganyika was voting with the PRC on many issues, 
this was more a reflection of the common ground and shared interests, rather than 
China’s swaying of votes or a by-product of the Sino-Soviet competition. The Chinese 
were particularly supportive on issues that were of great interest to Tanzania, such as 
the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Angola, as well as the challenges of 
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economic development in the global South. Moreover, the conflict in Vietnam 
generated a lot of empathy from African governments who supported the revolutionary 
struggle and, as Chinese embassy records show, a great many discussions took place 
between Chinese diplomats and Tanganyikan officials on the situation in Indochina. 
Yet Chinese gains at Moshi were fleeting, as the AAPSO Executive meeting in 
Nicosia, Cyprus, from 9 to 12 September 1963, was attended by a better prepared and 
organised Soviet delegation. Chinese officials continued to hail the success of the 
Moshi conference and, consequently, the Chinese concentrated their energies on 
cultivating the Afro-Asian groups that it had established beyond the AAPSO’s purview. 
During Tanganyikan National Speaker Adam Sapi Mkwawa’s visit to China in October, 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Zhu De declared that 
the Conference had made big strides against “old and new imperialism” in the 
developing world.335 Mkwawa reciprocated positively, adding that the Moshi 
conference had benefited from the Chinese delegation’s contributions.336 The Moshi 
conference may have been a considerably minor event in the overall effect of the Sino-
Soviet dispute on the Afro-Asian movement, but it took place at a crucial point in the 
development of the Sino-Tanganyikan relationship.  
iii) Tanganyika’s rising diplomatic importance  
Chinese foreign policy was not primarily economically driven in the 1960s. On 
the contrary, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, Beijing’s emphasis was on 
diplomatic and political support. Tanganyika had little to offer in economic terms, as it 
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was by no means as rich in resources or commodities as many other African countries 
were. With the exception of diamond mines in the northwest, there was extremely 
limited foreign investment in the country’s economy and infrastructure during the 
colonial period.337 As a new entrant to the African scene and to differentiate itself from 
Western colonial engagements in Africa, the Chinese government portrayed itself as a 
benign power with a common historical experience of imperialist domination and 
oppression. Hence, contemporary bilateral relations were explained as a long-awaited 
resumption of contacts that were prematurely and abruptly disrupted by colonialism.  
The Chinese government took concrete measures to foster the budding Sino-
Tanganyikan relationship. Its priorities were laid out by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who 
briefed He Ying in April 1962 before his departure for Dar es Salaam as head of the 
first Chinese embassy in East Africa. Chen communicated to He Ying that his role was 
especially important because Tanganyika was in the vicinity of many independence 
struggles and, thus, there was much work to be done. He Ying’s tasks would primarily 
be to consolidate Beijing’s position in Tanganyika and to approach the neighbouring 
governments to establish ties. Moreover, Chen reiterated the importance of China’s 
relations with Egypt, Ghana and Tanganyika, because their leaders were influential in 
Africa and also supported the nationalist struggles. In this way, the Chinese government 
hoped to develop ties with other countries and nationalist groups.338 
Chen Yi went on to instruct He Ying not to write off those African governments 
which had recognised Taiwan, as the situation of the newly-independent governments 
was challenging and dynamic. Instead, He Ying should try to influence those countries 
 
337
 Cited in Kilford 2010, p. 173.
338
 He 1993, pp. 301-302. 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 117 
to switch their support to Beijing. The ambassador worked hard to fulfil these 
objectives and, according to his memoirs, made it a point to acquaint himself with the 
leaders of countries on the cusp of independence, in the hope that they would recognise 
Beijing. For example, he would think of a way to meet with Kenyan officials or to 
invite them to the embassy whenever they visited Tanganyika. He at times even 
provided officials with petty cash assistance upon request.339  
The Tanganyikan initiative also drew China further into the mainland, as higher-
level relations were fostered through the frequent meetings between Nyerere and 
Ambassador He Ying in Dar es Salaam.340 Nyerere proved to be a valuable connector 
who facilitated He Ying’s contact with other African leaders. On one occasion, for 
example, Nyerere arranged for a meeting between Hastings Banda, prime minister of 
Malawi, and He Ying at the latter’s request. The meeting took place during Banda’s 
visit to Dar es Salaam, although Sino-Malawian relations remained distinctly cool. 
Nevertheless, Chinese diplomacy in Africa benefitted from Nyerere’s regional 
stature.341 
Tanganyika quickly became the testing ground for China’s new tools of 
diplomacy. Beijing intended to foster a deeper understanding and appreciation of China 
by its African ally, as well as to educate itself about the political situation in Africa 
through mid- and low-level interactions. Tanganyikan officials involved in trade, 
agriculture, national development, culture, labour unions, as well as special interest 
groups such as women or youths, visited China between 1962 and 1963.342 Chinese and 
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Tanganyikan press coverage of these events jointly fostered an awareness of the 
otherwise abstract Afro-Asianism by emphasising the delegates’ shared stance against 
imperialism and sympathy for the African liberation struggles.343 These visits 
incrementally shaped the Tanganyikan government’s attitude towards national 
development policies, mass mobilisation and rural development along socialist lines 
through excursions to famous historical and political sites, as well as to productive 
factories and agricultural communes. Furthermore, in contrast to the inequalities which 
pervaded the interactions between the former colonial governments and African leaders, 
the personal style of the Chinese diplomacy was a strong indication of the priority 
Beijing placed on relations with its new friends. 
The Sino-Tanganyikan relationship reached a new level with an announcement 
in the People’s Daily on 3 December that Nyerere would visit China in February 1964. 
The Tanganyikan government issued a formal invitation on 27 December for Zhou to 
make a reciprocal visit in January 1965.344 These plans clearly showed the good rapport 
between the highest levels of the Tanganyikan and Chinese governments; they were the 
result of Tanganyikan support for the fundamental tenets of Beijing’s One China policy 
both at the UN and the AASC (most notably in Moshi). Thus, for the reasons discussed 
in this section, Tanganyika increasingly became friendly ground from which Chinese 
diplomacy could secure a firmer foothold in the region. This complemented the 
concomitant extension of Chinese soft power through the participation of Zanzibaris 
that was discussed in Chapter One.  
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III. The third phase: The post-union period, 1964 to 1965 
The third phase in the Sino-Tanganyikan relationship was the cementing of ties 
through high-level visits between 1964 and 1965. This phase was actually kick-started 
by the Zanzibar Revolution and mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles which both occurred 
in January 1964.  
i) Zhou’s first Africa trip and the 1964 testing of Nyerere 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi embarked on an ambitious 
tour of Africa from the end of 1963 until February 1964 to shore up its foreign relations 
and to rally support among the African governments. One of Zhou’s objectives was to 
build a united international front against imperialism, including both Africa and Latin 
America. The high-level Chinese entourage travelled to Egypt, Sudan, Ghana, Ethiopia, 
Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Guinea, Tunisia and Somalia. Among the themes that were 
consistently emphasised were anti-imperialism, the support for nationalist movements 
fighting for freedom, Afro-Asianism, as well as the shared experience of suffering at 
the hands of imperialist and colonial aggressors. The historic relations that had existed 
between China and Africa were also revered.345 
The Chinese delegation’s visit to East Africa in January 1964, but was thwarted 
at the eleventh hour by the outbreak of the Zanzibar Revolution and the East African 
army mutinies. Although it was not strictly a Tanganyikan event, as Chapter One has 
demonstrated, Zanzibari politics and national security issues had a great impact on 
mainland Tanganyika. Sino-Zanzibari ties which developed during the Zanzibar 
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Revolutionary Council’s embrace of Communist Bloc assistance were further 
strengthened by the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964. The Tanganyikan 
army mutiny will be examined separately in Chapter Three, under Chinese military 
support. 
At the time, the Chinese government’s prompt and timely support of the union – 
unlike the rumbles of discontent which emanated from its Soviet and East German 
counterparts – allowed Beijing to consolidate its influence on Zanzibar as well as to 
extend its activities in Tanganyika.346 Moreover, Zanzibar’s presence in the union gave 
Beijing the opportunity to laud its revolutionary success as it filled the vacuum that was 
left by the departing Western powers. The low-level visits by Tanganyikans to China 
that had started in 1961 and Babu’s appointment to the union government in 1964 
paved the way for high-level visits. These interactions quickly resulted in mutual 
dividends. 
Although Zhou did not visit Tanganyika or Zanzibar on the occasion of his 1963 
and 1964 trip to Africa, it warrants discussion, because for the first time a Chinese 
leader visited Africa. As such, Zhou’s trip had great repercussions for international 
perceptions of Beijing’s diplomacy. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter One, Western 
perceptions of Chinese machinations in Zanzibar as part of a grand strategy coloured 
the East African security situation for some months.347 Chinese records suggest that 
Beijing had a flexible approach to Zhou’s visit and prioritised the opinions of friendly 
African governments: His itinerary was largely determined by the advice given by the 
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African leaders whom he met.348 Zhou was generally well-respected and was seasoned 
in diplomatic affairs; his trip put Beijing on the African geopolitical map. 
The media accounts of Zhou’s manner and personal diplomacy varied from 
cautionary to celebratory: Some African leaders remained sceptical of Chinese 
motivations, while the People’s Daily emphasised the Premier’s disarming blend of 
humility and modesty, along with the warm welcome that awaited him in each location. 
In Egypt, Nasser hailed Zhou as a great Afro-Asian leader, while the latter explained 
apologetically at a press conference that the “visit is not too early, rather it was long 
overdue.”349 Zhou was met by the revered revolutionary leader Ben Bella in Algiers, 
where he commended the Algerian people for their success in overcoming the colonial 
rulers.350 In Ghana, the first former British colony in Africa to have established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC and China’s important West African partner, Zhou 
called on Kwame Nkrumah. However, Zhou’s visit occurred at an awkward time as 
Nkrumah had just closely escaped an assassination attempt on 2 January.351  
According to the Chinese diplomat Huang Hua’s memoirs, Zhou’s Ghana visit 
went ahead despite the security concerns, because it was intended to demonstrate 
Chinese support for Nkrumah. After all, Nkrumah had been the second African head of 
state to visit China after Guinean president Sekou Toure. A Chinese account described 
a rather more festive welcome in Accra where “the market women and students danced 
and sang with great joy.”352 Yet the British records describe a less than enthusiastic 
 
348
 CFMA, 203-00409-01, 28 December 1963.
349
 Communist Party of China Research Division (CCP) 1997, p. 603.
350
 Ibid.; Yu 1975, pp. 18-19.
351
 Huang 2008, p. 167.
352
 Ibid., p. 179; NA, DO195/200, Chou En-Lai’s Tour of Africa, 19 January 1964.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 122 
affair, with Zhou and his entourage receiving a decidedly cool reception, comprised of 
scattered groups of people rather than the hordes that had packed the streets during 
Nkrumah’s visit to Beijing in August 1961.  
The British observed that “the Chinese bored the Ghanaians” because they took 
their ideological argumentation too seriously. The Soviets were already deeply 
entrenched in Ghana, which was likely to have had a dampening effect on any Chinese 
motivation for closer cooperation. Local African factors also influenced the reception 
and there appeared to be “a certain contempt for Chinese ‘backwardness’”, as Ghana 
was a relatively advanced country, so that the Chinese government could offer nothing 
substantial in terms of aid.353 Nonetheless, in what the British described as “one of the 
few successes of Zhou’s visit,” Nkrumah agreed to support the call for Latin America 
to be included in an international front.354 Nevertheless, Chinese diplomacy still faced 
an uphill struggle. Many suspicious governments gave China more credit for its 
destabilising potential than the latter actually had the capacity to carry out. The 
Nigerian Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa lamented to British officials that 
“Ghanaian relations with Russia had cooled and had been replaced by a new and even 
more dangerous liaison with the Chinese” and that his country was faced with the 
prospect of having a “Cuba on her doorstep.”355 
With Zhou’s African itinerary leaving East Africa out because of the Zanzibar 
revolution, Nyerere’s visit to China, originally scheduled for February 1964, was now 
also postponed. But the Chinese were still able to seize another timely opportunity to 
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engage with the Tanganyikan government. In the aftermath of the mutiny of the 
Tanganyika Rifles, Nyerere overhauled the military and made strides in diversifying the 
sources of his country’s military aid. This created a window of opportunity for the 
Chinese to increase their engagement with Tanganyika. The Sino-Tanganyikan 
relationship was buttressed further by Babu’s appointment to the URTZ cabinet. In 
what proved to be an astute diplomatic move by Nyerere, Babu accompanied all the 
important high-level visits to China, such as that of Second Vice-President Rashidi 
Kawawa in June 1964. Babu’s existing rapport with the Chinese leaders and his 
revolutionary stature made him the ideal candidate for the role. Kawawa’s delegation 
was received with great pomp and circumstance in Beijing and, according to the 
Chinese press, ten thousand people “from all walks of life” gathered to welcome him.356 
Kawawa successfully negotiated an aid package worth £16 million ($44.8 
million) for his government. Additionally, he requested military assistance, which will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. Unlike the Tanganyikan government’s 
post-independence discussions with the former colonial powers, in which its military 
and political development were not prioritised as highly as economic development, the 
Chinese attitude to post-colonial development was the government’s overall 
consolidation of power. Hence, alongside senior military officials, Vice-President 
Kawawa also met Beijing’s Mayor Peng Zhen, who lauded the “excellent revolutionary 
situation” in Africa and declared the Chinese people’s support for the armed liberation 
struggles on the continent.357 
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Kawawa’s departure from Shanghai was equally grand, with a high-profile 
send-off by senior Chinese officials and their national flags flown at Hongqiao airport. 
To the visually compelling scenes of Afro-Asian and, specifically, Sino-African 
solidarity was added a farewell song played by a band, creating a heady atmosphere of 
pounding drums, bouquets, and the shouting of slogans: “Long live the Chinese people 
and Tanganyika and Zanzibar!” and “Long live the great unity of people of the world!” 
The Chinese government offered military aid and officer training for as many cadets as 
needed and Kawawa was reportedly so impressed that he returned with what British 
officials noted wryly as “some rather grandiose ideas.”358 
Indeed, the intensification of official Sino-Tanganyikan contacts was viewed 
sceptically by the British government. Britain retained an influence out of proportion to 
its economic strength, as Whitehall did not plan for “the substance of their relationships 
to vanish with the trappings of colonial rule.”359 The British viewed the United 
Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (URTZ)’s relationship with China as a disturbing 
indication of the dangerous, growing Afro-Asian solidarity, that “dissolved [the 
countries’] individual personalities and identities,” causing them to toe the group line 
and follow the extremists.360 Yet the British government’s intransigence on important 
issues, such as decolonisation in southern Africa, contributed directly to its strained ties 
with nearly all the other groups in the UN.361 Indeed to the British, Tanganyikan 
officials were causing much irritation in New York. After the 1963 UN General 
Assembly, the British UN Permanent Representative Sir Patrick Dean described the 
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Tanganyikan delegation as “quite the most objectionable of all African delegations 
including Ghana and Guinea.”362 He complained to the Foreign Office (FO) that: 
They seldom missed the opportunity to attack us […] they could easily have 
passed for one of the ‘Communist Satellites.’ Though Chief Mang’enya, the 
Tanganyikan Permanent Representative, came to New York with a very good 
chit from those who knew him, he has turned out to be a negative cipher who 
exercises no influence whatever over the members of his delegation and who 
simply delivered what was written for him by the immature semi-Marxists who 
make up his junior staff.363 
To the British delegation, Nyerere and his Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona 
appeared as extreme as the other African politicians on the subject of colonialism; they 
did not change the strong anti-Western direction of the Tanganyikan delegation’s 
performance. Coming shortly after the formation of the union in April 1964, the acting 
British high commissioner suggested that Kambona had probably not yet learnt to 
control his ministry, much less his delegation in New York, even if he had wanted to. 
This was purportedly exacerbated by the appointment of Waldon Ramsey, a West 
Indian known for his Communist sympathies, to draft many of the URTZ delegation’s 
speeches. The acting permanent secretary Chief Lukumbuzya, explained to the British 
that Ramsay only worked for them in a research capacity and that “the fact that he 
might have Communist sympathies was not a great concern as long as he did his job 
properly.”364 Nevertheless, the Tanzanian delegation’s behaviour and positions at the 
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UN, as well as Nyerere’s non-aligned foreign policymaking continued to worry 
Western governments. 
Those negative sentiments were compounded further by reports from their 
colleagues at the UN, that the URTZ delegation was prone to dichotomous behaviour 
because of the demands of Tanganyika’s anti-imperialist role. “Nyerere and Kambona 
have often shown themselves in private discussions as helpful and understanding, even 
over some of our most difficult problems, […] Tanganyika […] cannot afford to display 
in public any sign of being ‘soft’ on colonial matters, particularly in the highly 
competitive atmosphere of New York.”365 In fact, British officials had urged the URTZ 
ministers to ensure that their delegation in New York took “a less deliberately hostile” 
attitude, particularly on matters of the remaining British colonial territories.366 Nyerere 
remarked to UK Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home that the URTZ’s policy of 
anti-colonialism made it inevitable that they should at times disagree, adding that he did 
not believe that the “lack of unanimity on world affairs indicates a lack of friendship” 
between them.367 
The evidence suggests that Nyerere was equally candid in his discussions with 
the Chinese as he was with British officials. After another unsuccessful UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) vote on the PRC’s entry into the UN in late 1965, Nyerere 
suggested to He Ying that the Chinese government consider a change of tack. 
Explaining that the problem for most of the African delegations was the linking of the 
PRC’s representation with the ROC’s expulsion, Nyerere suggested that Beijing pursue 
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a strategy of first getting voted into the UN as a legitimate representative of the Chinese 
people, and then focus on the Taiwan issue on a separate occasion. Nyerere’s idea 
caused the Chinese to question his understanding of the One China policy. In response, 
He Ying insisted that the URTZ government should not be taken in by US machinations 
by splitting the issues, as that would essentially mean recognising the existence of 
“Two Chinas”. The Chinese position was non-negotiable and the ambassador insisted 
that, despite being excluded from the UN, the PRC could still take on the US. He added 
that friendly Afro-Asian countries had already voiced their condemnations of American 
aggression.368 
The Chinese government acknowledged the difficulty that an aid-dependent 
Tanzania had in taking a tough stance in foreign affairs.369 Their unanimous agreement 
on issues was not deemed necessary and the incident did not appear to hinder the 
importance that both parties placed on the bilateral relationship. Meanwhile, Tanzanian 
officials continued to call on the Chinese embassy to exchange their assessments on 
international issues, including the American aggression in Vietnam, the Afro-Asian 
movement, the situation in the Congo, and later, Southern Rhodesia.370 As shown in 
Chapter One, Babu was a key facilitator in this regard. 
ii) Babu and the Tanzanian economic delegation to China, February 1965 
The high-level Tanzanian delegations to China publicly reinforced the 
Tanzanian government’s independent policymaking from the West. Shortly after the 
first Tanzanian ambassador to China arrived in Beijing in February 1965, Nyerere sent 
 
368
 CFMA, 113-00485-15, 27 November 1965.
369
 CFMA, 106-01164-13, 14 August 1964.
370
 CFMA, 106-01164-13, 8 August 1964; CFMA, 106-01169-04, 15 August 1964.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 128 
an important economic delegation to garner more assistance and support for his 
government’s development plans. Until that point, Beijing had only committed modest 
amounts of aid to Tanzania through the loan of $0.5 million in February 1964 and 
another loan of $28 million, half of it in free currency, as part of the agreement on 
economic and technical cooperation in June 1964.371 The economic delegation was also 
charged with another important mandate: To prepare the ground for the first visit by the 
Tanzanian head of state at the end of February 1965. 
Nyerere had – naturally – appointed Babu as head of the economic delegation in 
early February, with the knowledge that the latter had a good rapport with the Chinese 
and that a successful discussion would set a favourable tone for the presidential visit.372 
Not surprisingly, the trade negotiations went very smoothly and the Chinese records 
noted that both parties reached an agreement in half an hour, “faster than a business 
deal.”373 The trade agreement was for $14 million a year for five years, under which the 
Tanzanians were to buy whatever they could afford from the Chinese and the Chinese 
were to buy $14 million worth of goods a year from Tanzania. The Chinese would pay 
cash for the balance not taken up by purchases from Tanzania.374 Such a positive 
outcome suggests that both sides shared similar expectations and objectives, and that 
Beijing was very supportive of the Tanzanians’ requests.375 This view is supported by a 
report from the Chinese External Liaison Office in early March, which cited as the 
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factors contributing to Beijing’s favourable attitude to the trade talks: The invigoration 
of Tanzania’s anti-imperialist stance after the union, the improvement of its domestic 
policies, and a strengthening of the government’s left-wing faction (which Babu 
represented). Therefore the Chinese were willing to accede to Tanzanian requests for as 
long as they were within reasonable limits.376 
The greatest outcome and tangible legacy of Babu’s meetings with the Chinese 
leaders was in laying the ground for Nyerere’s discussion of the Tanzania-Zambia 
(TanZam) rail link. Various foreign and institutional donors had rejected Tanzania’s 
request to sponsor the project. Babu inquired about the possibility of Chinese support 
during his trip, to which his hosts replied that the matter would be raised at the 
Politburo.377 Thereafter Babu returned to Tanzania and was reportedly confident in 
having found a sponsor for the project.378 In conversation with a British journalist, he 
insisted that funding was no longer an obstacle and that the political value of the 
railway as a form of African unity had been emphasised to the sponsor. He added that 
they had promised support, but that he was not at liberty to reveal their identity.379 
Chapter Four will discuss in greater detail the events leading to the formal Sino-
Tanzanian (and Zambian) agreement on the TanZam rail link.  
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iii) Nyerere’s state visit to China, February 1965 
On the back of the strong footing established by Babu’s economic delegation in 
early February, the Chinese press emphasised the significance of the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship, quoting various Tanzanian and African representatives’ expressions of 
support for Nyerere’s visit. The speaker of the Tanzanian National Assembly, Adam 
Sapi Mkwawa, for example, said that Nyerere’s visit to China was important for 
Tanzania as both countries were akin to brothers; they were on the same side in the 
struggle against imperialism and that China’s experience would help to guard against 
colonialism in its various forms, especially the American’s united front. Senior TANU 
official Bibi Titi Mohamed assured that Nyerere would convey the Tanzanian people’s 
warm regard for the Chinese on this visit.380 Undoubtedly Babu’s stewardship of the 
economic delegation’s discussions and its successful outcome paved the way for the 
first visit by Tanzania’s head of state to China. 
 Nyerere visited China later that month. The president was keen to speak to the 
Chinese leaders about their experience because he genuinely felt that their government 
had “found its cause” and owned its development agenda. According to Charles Sanga, 
who served as Nyerere’s private secretary from 1992 to 1999, Nyerere did not see such 
a high degree of “ownership” when he visited Russia.381 Nyerere arrived in Beijing on 
17 February to great acclaim and pageantry. President Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou 
received him at the airport and thousands of people lined the streets in Beijing.382 A 
photograph of the visit reproduced as Appendix II on page 333 shows the entourage 
 
380
 People’s Daily, 17 February 1965.
381
 Interview with Ambassador Charles A. Sanga, Dar es Salaam, 7 December 2006.
382
 Zhou 2004, p. 86.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 131 
entering the capital amid cheers, dancing and fanfare. It was a spectacle that attested to 
the Chinese government’s effectiveness at mobilisation. More importantly, it was 
through such strong visual images that an international audience could witness Sino-
African solidarity in practice. The visit was widely reported in the international press, 
not least because of Tanzania’s role as an important frontline state in the African 
liberation struggle and Beijing’s militant anti-imperialist stance, a point which was 
underscored by the messages of support sent by friendly African liberation groups. The 
South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) leader Sam Nujoma said that the 
warm welcome Nyerere received proved that China and all of Africa were determined 
to resist American subversion. The South African Pan-Africanist Congress’ (PAC) 
Central Committee Member Niaosi pointed out that the joint Chinese-Tanzanian 
communiqué that was issued during Nyerere’s visit was a significant milestone and 
filled with revolutionary spirit.383 
The Chinese offer to construct the TanZam rail link was made by Mao during 
his meeting with Nyerere on 19 February. Although the offer was not announced 
publicly at this stage, the bilateral negotiations in 1965 and 1966 eventually led to 
Beijing’s construction of the railway. In the days after that discussion, Nyerere travelled 
to the southern cities of Nanjing and Shanghai, where he observed the Chinese people’s 
work ethic and diligence; he spoke often – both publicly and privately – of how the 
leaders’ modesty and austerity impressed him.384 The president himself was well-
known for his austerity and modest lifestyle, so that leadership was untainted by self-
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aggrandisement and the accumulation of personal wealth.385 Nyerere’s own faith in the 
necessity of culturally appropriate development appeared entirely feasible when he 
observed that the basic family unit in China appeared to be very strong; just like 
Chinese culture it seemed not to have been negatively affected by the country’s 
development.386  
Nyerere’s trip was a resounding success for the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. It 
culminated in the signing of a ten-year Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship and a joint 
communiqué on 20 February which was made public, as well as the Chinese leaders’ 
tacit commitment to undertake the construction and funding of the TanZam rail link, 
which officially remained secret.387 Calling on He Ying in Dar es Salaam shortly after 
his return from China, Nyerere expressed his satisfaction with the trip and shared that 
he was impressed by the country.388 According to Pius Msekwa who was a TANU 
official at the time, Nyerere implemented some changes based on the observations he 
had made in China.389  
According to Msekwa, the President believed that China offered useful lessons 
in party organisation and governance and that the Chinese leaders were “keeping the 
country together” with a single ideology and understanding of nationhood. For 
example, there was a clear distinction between government and party work in China. 
The former funded projects and focused on national development, while the latter 
communicated the leaders’ messages to the people. In the Chinese system, Msekwa 
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explained, “one word from either Chairman Mao or the Prime Minister and everybody 
would follow.”390 Some of these communication strategies and techniques were quickly 
applied: TANU adopted the CCP’s method of organising and mobilising people which, 
in Msekwa’s opinion, had proven very effective. Nyerere also believed that the Chinese 
leaders genuinely wanted to make a change for their people, their country and the 
world; in this process, Tanzania and all countries of the South stood to benefit. 
Nyerere’s deep impressions from his China visit were partly responsible for the 
subsequent boost in Sino-Tanzanian relations and more Tanzanian officials were sent 
on study tours to “see China doing wonders” in the months and years that followed.391  
Throughout the mid-1960s, Nyerere publicly expounded on the usefulness of 
the Chinese example for development. His radio address to the nation on the first 
anniversary of the Union Republic on 26 April 1965 highlighted, amongst other things, 
that the Chinese government and people were able to provide the funds and technical 
personnel to help Tanzania carry out its national development plan because of their 
frugality.392 Having an actual reference and model made the lesson easier to 
communicate, as the goal then appeared achievable. Nyerere also appealed to the 
people’s sense of national pride and urged them to adopt a similarly frugal attitude as 
the Chinese, because “borrowing money from other countries to carry out what can be 
done by ourselves is very foolish”. Referring to the diplomatic wrangles with the West 
German and British governments, Nyerere reminded the listeners pointedly that “of this 
danger, we are already aware.”393 At the highest levels of government, the Sino-
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Tanzanian relationship appeared poised for even greater things to come. By April 1965, 
US State Department appeared to confirm this when they observed ruefully that Dar es 
Salaam had become the centre of Chinese activity in East Africa.394 
iv) Zhou’s “voyage of reconnaissance” 
The diplomatic stage was finally set for Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Tanzania, 
which the British embassy called a “voyage of reconnaissance.”395 An article in the 
Daily Mail titled “Tanzania puts out the flags as Chou [i.e. Zhou] goes wooing” 
described Zhou’s trip as being “far bigger than any he has made abroad” and reported 
that he would be accompanied by an enormous entourage numbering nearly one 
hundred officers. It went on to describe Tanzania’s strategic importance to China as 
being “her most important sphere of influence in Africa” because of the pro-Communist 
Zanzibar revolution and highlighted that militant figures in the ZRC with extensive 
contacts to China held high positions in the new government. Not surprisingly, Babu 
was singled out for his NCNA connection as well as for being “one of the cleverest 
politicians in East Africa.”396 The anticipation surrounding the trip was marred 
somewhat by the interception by Kenyan forces of a truck convoy of Chinese and 
Soviet arms. The cargo was reportedly bound for Uganda and sparked a minor outcry 
about China’s destabilising influence in Africa, but Zhou’s itinerary continued as 
scheduled.397 
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Zhou arrived in Dar es Salaam on 4 June 1965 and was received by the most 
senior Tanzanian politicians and officials. Over a hundred thousand people reportedly 
lined the streets from the airport to State House, in a scene reminiscent of the welcome 
that Nyerere received in Beijing four months earlier.398 The national media on both 
sides worked hard to publicise the event and successfully captured Zhou’s personal 
diplomacy at its best. The Chinese press lauded the leaders’ interactions and the 
Tanzanian people’s enthusiasm about Zhou’s historic visit. The local Tanzanian media 
constantly reported about the Chinese premier’s itinerary on the radio and played songs 
welcoming him to Tanzania. NCNA correspondent Gao Liang’s monograph on 
Tanzania quotes an example:  
Today is an unforgettable day for the Union Republic 
A world famous luminary is visiting our home 
We welcome you to see our sisal 
We welcome to try our rice gruel 
We invite you to drink the sweet coconut juice.399 
Zhou addressed a mass rally at Dar es Salaam’s 65,000 seat national stadium 
that was filled to maximum capacity and used the rhetoric of the Afro-Asian peoples’ 
shared experience of several centuries of enslavement, oppression and colonisation, as 
well as how they had since wrested control over their own destinies. He rallied that, 
“Africa must belong to the Africans […] Africa must become an independent, free 
Africa.”400 A similarly warm welcome greeted Zhou in Zanzibar, where five thousand 
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people showed up to listen to him.401 Zhou also took the opportunity to meet with the 
Chinese personnel and experts working in Tanzania.402 
When images of his meeting with Nyerere’s elderly mother at State House were 
broadcast on Tanzanian national television, this was a poignant and compelling image 
that resonated on many levels, brimming with the symbolism of mutual respect, family 
ties and friendship. These themes were emphasised by the Chinese press throughout 
Zhou’s trip, which ended in a similarly evocative way – the elderly lady sent him off at 
the airport, but not before presenting him with some African gifts.403 
Aside from the significant gains from publicity, there were important 
strides made in formal bilateral relations from the visit. Zhou and Nyerere held 
five meetings which touched on the challenges facing developing countries, the 
establishment of the Sino-Tanzanian joint shipping company and the TanZam rail 
link. The Premier shared some advice on pro-development policies based on his 
government’s experience. He insisted that frugality was important and that 
developing countries should not compare their situation and standard of living 
with that of the developed countries. Secondly, urban-rural disparity should be 
minimised by dispersing industries throughout the country. Zhou also extended an 
invitation to those Tanzanian ministers who had not yet been to China to visit, 
because ‘seeing something once is better than hearing about it a hundred times.’404  
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Nyerere himself was, by then, more personally convinced of the potentially larger 
role that Chinese aid could play in Tanzania’s development. Following from Nyerere’s 
trip and the signing of the Friendship Treaty, the Chinese presence in Tanzania grew 
steadily, with the arrival of arms, equipment and instructors for Nyerere’s newly 
created Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), along with the construction of 
various productive facilities, such as a large textile mill, irrigation and agricultural 
projects. Contrary to the donor vacuum that was created by the revolution in Zanzibar – 
and which was then swiftly filled by the Communist bloc governments –Tanzania 
attracted bilateral donors from across the political spectrum, which created a contested 
aid market. The Scandinavian countries, for example, were drawn to Tanzania’s strong 
anti-apartheid stand and non-alignment, which made them give impressive volumes of 
aid.405 The perceived increase in Chinese influence at the time, fuelled by the Western 
press, contrasted with the quick recession of British influence in its former territory. In 
reality, Chinese aid to the Tanzanian government by the end of 1965 was still 
“dwarfed” by the total volume of Western aid.406 
Aside from being a major diplomatic milestone in the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship, Zhou’s visit was also part of Beijing’s efforts to marshal support for the 
upcoming second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers, Algeria, in late June. Reflecting 
on the situation, the valedictory letter from the departing British Chargé d’Affaires in 
Beijing referred to Zhou and Chen Yi’s visit to Africa as “the main thrust” of Chinese 
diplomacy, which was “directed at Africa.” The Chargé ruminated upon these activities 
which were “preliminaries to the impending Second Afro-Asian Conference” at which 
Beijing wanted to transform its leadership of “the poor man’s world from a dream to a 
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reality.” He regarded Chinese activities for this purpose as “her greatest disservice to 
humanity and her greatest threat to Western interests.”407  
The Chinese government was keen to have the Soviets excluded from the 
conference and emphasised the racial and geographical elements of Afro-Asianism to 
cut Moscow out of the planned “second Bandung”. It was finally the divided Afro-
Asian opinion which led to the indefinite postponement of the conference, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter Four. As the British foreign office observed, AAPSO’s 
attempt to “usurp the tradition of Bandung” stirred suspicions in “responsible Asian 
circles” but was more effective in the Arab world.408 From that standpoint, Zhou’s tour 
of Africa in June 1965 had failed, but in the specific case of Tanzania, the bilateral 
relationship blossomed. 
Conclusion: Tanganyika and China as anti-imperialist allies  
This chapter elaborates on the existing literature to demonstrate how the 
foundation of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was laid in three distinct phases: The 
nationalist phase from the late 1950s to December 1961, the immediate post-
independence phase from January 1962 to April 1964 and the immediate post-union 
phase from April 1964 to the end of 1965. 
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The Sino-Tanganyikan relationship developed gradually in the nationalist period, 
compared to the rapid development of the Sino-Zanzibari relationship which provided 
the Chinese with a smooth and quick entry into East Africa. In Tanganyika, the Chinese 
government initially had exploratory contacts with the ANC, which ceased when 
TANU was slated to head the first independent government. This was facilitated by the 
important role that the Tanganyikan government – and Nyerere in particular – played in 
international organisations, such as the AASC (later AAPSO). At the AAPSO-
sponsored events, the Tanganyikans often shared similar positions with their Chinese 
counterparts on issues like anti-imperialism and colonialism. However, the polemical 
conflicts between the Communist powers meant that the Afro-Asian solidarity 
associations were less effective sources of economic and development assistance than 
bilateral aid agreements. 
In Tanganyika’s immediate post-independence period, Nyerere built up the 
government’s diplomatic strengths which allowed his country to punch above its weight 
internationally. At the United Nations, the Tanganyikans consistently agitated for the 
restoration of Beijing’s seat on the Security Council. Tanganyika’s non-aligned foreign 
policy allowed it to maintain amicable relations with the UK and other Western 
countries, as well as to extend its contacts to the Eastern bloc governments, including 
China. Moreover, the Chinese delegation to the 1963 AAPSO conference in Moshi was 
buoyed by their positive experience, which reinforced their high regard for the 
Tanganyikan hosts. All these reasons quickly made Tanganyika a good African ally for 
the diplomatically isolated Chinese government. 
Finally, from 1964 to 1965, the Sino-Zanzibari connection which had been the 
bridgehead for the Chinese into mainland Tanganyika and Swahili East Africa  
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remained constant, but decreased in its relative importance as the mainland’s diplomatic 
and political value to Beijing heightened. Nyerere also cannily built on existing Sino-
Zanzibari ties to accelerate the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. The numerous visits made 
by Tanganyikan and URTZ officials to China in those years set the stage for the high-
level diplomatic visits by Nyerere and Zhou in 1965. Both governments fully exploited 
the symbols of good partnership by making visibly grand events of their respective state 
visits, and personal diplomacy between the elite played an increasingly important role. 
As this chapter has shown, each phase of the Sino-Tanganyikan relationship 
built upon achievements from the earlier phases and bilateral ties were mutually 
beneficial. While Tanganyika (and later Tanzania) welcomed the immediate inflow of 
tangible assistance, in exchange it was able to support Chinese influence on the 
international stage without necessarily compromising on its own political objectives. In 
this way, the Tanzanian government successfully augmented Beijing’s engagement in 
Africa in particular. Yet of all the factors mentioned in this chapter, one in particular – 
China and Tanzania’s shared anti-imperialist stance – warrants closer attention and is 
the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three – Tanzania’s post-colonial vulnerabilities and the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship: The construction of a militant friendship, 
1963 to 1969 
An inevitable tension existed between Nyerere’s desire to support African 
liberation struggles and the obvious weakness of his country’s military capability. 
However, this tension helped the nascent development of Sino-Tanzanian relations, 
described in Chapters One and Two, to move to the next level. The expansion of violent 
protests in the south, towards the South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese colonial 
governments in southern Africa, increased the demands of African nationalist groups 
for military aid. The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 
the British Commonwealth were prevented from making significant contributions of 
military assistance because of objections by the Portuguese and South African 
governments. The Chinese and other Communist governments responded to this call. 
As the host country of the Organisation for African Unity’s (OAU) Liberation 
Committee (ALC), Tanganyika – and from 1964, Tanzania – was poised to play a 
crucial role in the facilitation of military support to the liberation movements. Chinese 
military assistance to the liberation movements quickly led to similar assistance to the 
Tanganyikan government, which formally began in the wake of the Tanganyika Rifles 
mutiny in early 1964. As Beijing’s earliest bilateral military transaction in Africa, it 
redefined Chinese strategic engagement on the continent.409  
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As a background to this topic, it is useful to note that the literature on Chinese 
military assistance to African countries in the 1960s generally falls into one of two 
categories. The first category consists of the political science studies from the 1970s 
which viewed China as a belligerent, destabilising factor in the post-colonial African 
context, not least because of the potential for militarisation through the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry. These studies were mainly based on journalistic sources and reports from 
agencies like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). While 
useful as primary sources of that period, their disproportionate emphasis on the geo-
political forces that determined Beijing’s military support overlooked the African 
factors which shaped the Sino-African engagement.  
The second category in the literature on Chinese military assistance to Africa is 
recent historical studies written in the last decade, which draw on a broader range of 
sources that were previously unavailable. These works have shifted the emphasis from 
seeing military assistance as a tool of foreign policy to highlighting its function as a 
pillar for nationalist struggles and post-colonial national security. Westad has 
demonstrated robustly how the “processes of change” in the third world created 
openings for superpower interventions, particularly military ones.410 Historical works 
by Gleijeses and Shubin have also argued that the Cuban and Soviet governments’ 
broader political objectives of Communist internationalism and anti-colonialism were 
subjugated to local political dynamics in their African encounters.411 Not surprisingly, 
this category of work has developed apace with the growing interest of the former 
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colonies in compiling and shaping versions of their own national histories, as being 
distinct from colonial and imperial history.412  
This chapter falls into the second category of literature and takes into account 
the important local African factors. This chapter will show that Chinese military 
assistance to Tanzania met mutual needs, but was not a straightforward development. 
While intended to strengthen Tanzanian military capacity and reduce its dependence on 
British colonial forces, the PRC’s military aid also contributed directly to the 
militarisation of Zanzibar by altering the internal balance of power which, in turn, 
complicated relations with mainland Tanganyika. Yet that difficulty was not 
insurmountable. The militant Sino-Tanzanian friendship was successfully forged in 
three main ways: Firstly, through a shared anti-imperialist agenda that translated into 
practical support for liberation struggles; secondly, by Tanganyika’s post-colonial 
military vulnerability which allowed the Chinese government to deepen its bilateral 
engagement at a critical juncture of Tanganyika’s national-building; and thirdly, against 
a situation of narrowing donor options, Chinese military aid appeared to have the most 
promise for addressing the operational challenges faced by the post-colonial Tanzanian 
army.  
I. A shared anti-imperialist agenda 
African decolonisation in the 1960s was a chequered process that complicated 
foreign aid policies for donor and recipient countries alike. As the sobering demands of 
the post-colonial phase set in, the vestiges of colonial governance structures persisted in 
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the newly independent countries, especially in the areas of technical expertise and 
economic influence. At the same time, nationalist groups in the non-liberated colonial 
territories sought external patrons to support their respective struggles. As this section 
will show, Chinese military support for the African liberation movements preceded its 
bilateral military assistance to the Tanzanian government. This chronology strongly 
suggests a causal relationship, in that Beijing’s prior access to those nationalist groups 
was a crucial factor in the development of its military relations with Tanzania. A brief 
overview of the historical background is therefore necessary to better understand the 
pivotal role that Tanzania played in supporting the southern African liberation 
struggles. 
i) Tanganyika, Nyerere and the African liberation struggles 
Nyerere had been the driving force behind Tanganyika’s support for liberation 
movements since the 1950s. He led the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and 
Central Africa (PAFMECA), formed on 17 September 1958, which strove for a 
common, non-violent strategy for the nationalist movements in British East and Central 
Africa. Furthermore, his political party, TANU, had pledged to support anti-colonial 
struggles even prior to Tanganyika’s independence. The country’s geography and 
political stability made it a good rear base for liberation groups and their military 
training camps. This was particularly true for the Liberation Front of Mozambique 
(Frelimo), as Tanganyika shared an 800 kilometre-long border with Mozambique. 
Tanganyikan borders were also close to South Africa’s cordon sanitaire, which 
included Southern Rhodesia. As a former Tanganyikan diplomat recalled, “we were the 
only independent country closest to the theatre of war. […] We literally had to shoulder 
the responsibility for being the vanguard and spokesperson for the liberation of 
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Africa.”413 Tanganyika’s role was boosted by the OAU’s selection of Dar es Salaam as 
the venue for its de facto war office, the ALC, in February 1963. The Committee’s 
mandate was to coordinate the liberation struggles in all non-independent African 
territories, manage the various groups’ funds and training, as well as to provide 
logistical support.414 As the wave of African decolonisation moved southwards, 
Tanganyika assumed the role that Algiers had previously played as the haven for the 
African liberation movements. 
Nyerere’s decision to support the liberation movements had a direct impact on 
Tanganyika’s security situation. It immediately opened the country to potential 
domestic instability and security risks, as well as militarisation from the influx of arms. 
Yet the president was firm in his support and, through the Tanganyikan government’s 
policies, created a conducive setting for the various groups to operate on Tanganyikan 
soil. Shortly after the ALC was established in Dar es Salaam, the Tanganyikan 
government set up an independent Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The host 
government took its role very seriously and was one of the few African governments to 
have honoured its £30,000 ($84,000) contribution to the ALC’s special fund for 
material and financial aid. Tanganyikan officials were appointed to key positions in the 
ALC, thus creating a very close connection between the host government and the 
organisation’s decision-makers. Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona was the first 
chairman of the ALC and Sebastian Chale, Tanganyika’s representative in the UN, was 
seconded to the committee to establish its secretariat.415 In addition, the Tanganyikan 
bureaucracy provided essential administrative support, training and, where necessary, 
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official travel documents that allowed the representatives of the liberation groups to go 
abroad. This mobility was vital for the groups’ efforts to increase awareness and 
generate more support for their activities.  
Tanganyika’s union with Zanzibar in April 1964 further reinforced its strategic 
frontline role. The inclusion of Zanzibari representatives, considered “successful 
revolutionaries” by the liberation forces, in the URTZ Cabinet boosted the host 
country’s credibility as a beacon of anti-imperialism.416 At the same time, Nyerere 
added a moral dimension to his government’s support by providing the intellectual and 
spiritual grounding for African liberation, which went beyond armed struggle itself to 
incorporate the concepts of freedom from hunger, disease and poverty.417 The liberation 
leaders benefitted from the intellectual climate and political debates about development 
that took place in Tanzania.418 Tanzanian support extended into the field of education 
and offered the liberation forces the possibility of enrolling in academic or general 
education up to secondary level. Officer cadets from the liberation forces were given 
specialised training at the military academy in Mondoli and the General Military 
Hospital in Lugalo offered medical training. Tertiary education was offered at local 
colleges or at overseas universities in friendly countries, such as the Patrice Lumumba 
Peoples’ Friendship University in Moscow and institutions in Cuba, Algeria or 
China.419 
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Tanzania quickly became a “safe and dependable sanctuary” where the 
liberation fighters could recuperate and re-establish themselves after fleeing from 
“various detention centres and jails.”420 These individuals were given formal protection 
under Tanzanian law and were free to organise rallies to promote their respective 
causes.421 As Saul has shown, the leaders of the liberation movements enjoyed the 
status of governments-in-exile as a “league of African presidents” that put them on 
equal footing with leaders like Nyerere and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.422 
Thus Tanganyika’s support for the African liberation movements came from the 
highest level and complemented the country’s geographical location on the frontline of 
the anti-colonial struggle. This was further enhanced by the ALC’s role as one of the 
main suppliers of arms and assistance to the liberation forces. Nevertheless, the 
procurement of weapons was a constant challenge – even for the ALC – because of the 
limited donor alternatives. In this situation, Chinese military assistance presented a very 
desirable option. 
ii) Chinese military support for the African liberation movements 
In China, the government’s shift in emphasis from rural development to the 
heavy industry and military-related sectors was kick-started by the intensification of the 
Vietnam War in late 1964. This “profound transformation” of the national economy 
fostered what Chen Jian has described as “a broad-reaching and intense revolutionary 
popular mentality in Chinese society and politics.”423 As in Vietnam, the Chinese 
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government’s material support to the African liberation groups was used “instead of 
direct military presence to demonstrate to their comrades […] their solidarity.”424 This 
section shows how Beijing developed its initial contacts with African liberation 
movements through political platforms such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council 
(AASC, re-named the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation, AAPSO, from 
1960) into military support channelled via the ALC and the Tanganyikan government.  
One of the earliest opportunities that the Chinese government had to gain 
influence within AAPSO came through the creation of the Solidarity Fund that year, to 
which a Chinese delegate was elected second deputy to the Fund’s Committee 
President.425 The Chinese contribution in early 1961 was a donation of $40,000 worth 
of materials that included scholarships for students, residency for the liberation fighters’ 
medical care (and treatment in sanatoria), as well as visits to China.426 The Chinese 
embassy in Cairo also actively cultivated connections with the representative offices of 
liberation movements that were based there, reportedly entertaining them lavishly and 
publicising their activities on Radio Peking.427 
In China, the Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and People’s Liberation Army 
coordinated the government’s military assistance to African governments and liberation 
groups.428 A dense network of solidarity organisations and associations supported the 
government’s military assistance and relations with the liberation movements. A major 
part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) activities was to educate the Chinese 
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people about the situation in Africa through the state-run media, mass demonstrations 
and declarations. In this way, the party underscored its legitimacy and rallied popular 
support for its “honourable and internationally acknowledged” battle against 
imperialism.429 By late 1963, the Chinese leaders believed that the US and Soviet 
Union had entered into an unholy alliance and, as a result, Beijing considered itself the 
undisputable leader of the revolutionary world.430 As the Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified 
within the AAPSO and its related Afro-Asian groups, the Chinese government shifted 
its attention to the ALC as a more appropriate vehicle for its support of the African 
liberation movements. Compared to the AAPSO, which included representatives from 
across the third world, the ALC focused specifically on African issues and had not, at 
that point, been encroached on by the Sino-Soviet dispute.  
iii) China, Tanzania and the Mozambican liberation struggle 
Senior party officials in Beijing recognised Tanzania’s important frontline role 
and directed the embassy in Dar es Salaam to prioritise the task of organising support to 
the southern African liberation movements.431 The achievement of that goal was 
entirely contingent on maintaining good relations with Nyerere’s government in order 
to improve China’s ability to reach out to the nationalist groups. It should be 
mentioned, however, that the sensitive and confidential nature of military assistance 
meant that there was no single, comprehensive record of the transactions. The ALC’s 
meetings and agreements were carried out with the utmost secrecy to avoid sabotage by 
spies from Portugal or South Africa. This chapter draws on recent work by the author to 
 
429
 Ibid.
430
 Segal 1982, p. 70 and p. 73.
431
 He Ying 1993, p. 309. 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 150 
piece together the important history of international solidarity with the African 
liberation struggles.432 
Chinese support for the Mozambique Liberation Front, or Frelimo (Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique), the dominant nationalist group in Mozambique, was a 
good example of the close cooperation between the Tanzanian and Chinese 
governments.433 Frelimo received Chinese assistance from its formation in 1962 until 
Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975.434 A Frelimo representative first 
called on the Chinese embassy in Cairo in February 1962. Although the Chinese 
mission reported that it had not encountered the Mozambicans before and thus did not 
have a clear understanding of the situation there, British sources estimated Chinese 
assistance at around $3,000 in Frelimo’s first year of existence. Zhou Boping, Consul in 
Tanzania in the 1960s, recalled that the first Chinese military training team sent to post-
coup Zanzibar was for Frelimo and that the team included a military affairs specialist to 
help with Zanzibar’s military development as well, at Karume’s request.435 Chinese 
military assistance contributed significantly to the overall readiness of the Frelimo 
forces, which traversed the Rovuma river on the Tanzanian border with Mozambique 
on 24 September 1964 and began their armed struggle against the Portuguese.436  
iv) The Zanzibar Revolution and the Tanganyikan Army Mutiny 
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Rather than provide large amounts of military equipment or advanced 
technology to create a modern army, Beijing’s production capacity at the time limited 
its contributions to arms, light and medium ground force equipment, which had a 
greater political and symbolic effect.437 These supplies were welcomed by the ALC all 
the same. Playing down the importance of their vintage and level of sophistication, the 
Committee’s longest serving Executive Secretary, Brigadier General Hashim Mbita, 
insisted in an interview that “guns were guns.”438 Although the secondary sources 
suggest that the arms initially sent by the Chinese government were quite old, the range 
and quality began to improve in tandem with the modernisation of the Chinese military 
industry from 1964, after which light and medium artillery were sent.439 The 
transhipment of military supplies via Dar es Salaam reflected the push of the 
decolonisation process in Africa southwards, and hence the city became the main port 
of entry for Easter bloc arms, replacing the traditional hubs of Algiers and Cairo.440 
The first shipment of Chinese arms to Tanganyika arrived in January 1964, via 
Algeria, and reportedly included some military supplies bound for Zanzibar as well.441 
The fragmented archival and published sources suggest that this shipment was the result 
of a deal brokered between Kambona and the Algerian government for the ALC’s 
purchase of £250,000 ($700,000) worth of arms, to be paid in part with coffee, sisal and 
cotton. A British report dismissed the “Algerian arms dump” and its “archaic, large 
quantities of junk”, although it noted the presence of a few more modern and 
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sophisticated weapons from diverse sources, such as 81mm mortars, 60mm Chinese 
mortars and Czechoslovakian rocket launchers.442 
Two dramatic events in January 1964 exposed serious gaps in Nyerere’s power, 
by threatening Tanganyika’s national security and thus the government’s ability to 
properly support the African liberation struggles. The first event was the Zanzibar 
Revolution which, because of the islands’ geographical proximity to Tanganyika, had 
tremendous ramifications on mainland security, as was discussed in Chapter One. In 
response to the coup, Nyerere dispatched his police to stabilise the situation in 
Zanzibar, which inadvertently reduced Tanganyika’s own domestic security forces 
during the second event, the mutiny of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Tanganyika 
Rifles on 20 January, discussed in Chapter Two. The combined effect of the events 
caused Nyerere to reconsider his initial reluctance to maintain a national army.  
Nyerere did not initially consider British military assistance, but with the 
mutineers still in control after he emerged from hiding on 22 January, the president sent 
an appeal to London two days later.443 Six hundred Royal Marines arrived from Kenya 
the very next day and successfully disarmed the mutineers in the Colito, Tabora and 
Nachingwea barracks, with minimal casualties.444 The events in Tanganyika portended 
the eruption of discontent in neighbouring East African countries and within a week, 
the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Uganda Rifles and the 11th battalion of the Kenya Rifles 
succumbed to mutinies as well.445 The region was paralysed by these national security 
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crises and, having erupted so soon after the Zanzibar Revolution, some observers were 
quick to point to Communist bloc machinations behind the unrest.446 
However, as early as 31 January, the British High Commission confirmed that 
there was no evidence of any Communist country involvement in the mutiny, although 
it highlighted the Chinese “campaign of systematic subversion” and anti-imperialist 
propaganda in Tanganyika for having stirred anti-British feelings amongst the 
soldiers.447 Mazrui has argued that the British military intervention that Nyerere 
resorted to was based on a misreading of the situation, as there was no external 
instigation for the mutiny.448 Indeed, the British forces not only disarmed the African 
troops, but went further to forfeit the weapons and ammunition that were collected. The 
British discovered the cache of arms and ammunition purchased from Algeria, bound 
for the Frelimo forces, and stationed a permanent guard over it.449 The incident was a 
terrible embarrassment and loss for both the Tanganyikan government as well as the 
ALC, as the materiel had been so hard to obtain.  
Nyerere immediately called for an emergency meeting of the OAU’s Foreign 
and Defence ministers on 27 January to explain the situation to the other African 
governments and to reassure the liberation movements. Not surprisingly, the latter were 
alarmed by the intervention of a colonial power with deeply entrenched interests in 
southern Africa.450 In his dual role as Tanganyikan Foreign Minister and ALC 
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Chairman, Kambona assured the attendees that his government enjoyed mass support 
and that there should be no doubt about the government’s stability. He affirmed that the 
government’s immediate aim was to replace the British troops with those from East 
African countries, as that would put into place an African solution to post-colonial 
instability and ensure that the integrity of the liberation struggle could be preserved, in 
what he called ”the right kind of solution to this problem.”451 To reinforce that policy, 
Kambona announced that a new national army would be formed.452 All at once the 
Tanganyikan government was in urgent need of a non-colonial source of military 
support for its domestic needs, as well as to secure its commitment to the ALC’s 
mission.  
The Chinese government’s military support was framed in terms that justified 
its collaboration with nationalist groups. The Zanzibar Revolution and the Tanganyikan 
army mutiny occurred just as Mao reiterated the salience of his intermediate zone 
theory at the 10th Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee. This was publicised in 
a People’s Daily editorial on 21 January 1964, which explained the theory as it applied 
to the prevailing global landscape: The intermediate zone had two parts. The first was 
composed of the independent countries and those fighting for independence in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. The second part included Western Europe, Canada and other 
capitalist countries. These latter countries had a “dual character” because even though 
their ruling classes were exploiters and oppressors, the countries themselves were prone 
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to US control, from which they were trying to extricate themselves. US hegemony was, 
thus, a common threat shared with the socialist countries.453 
In practise, this translated into political and ideological training offered to 
African nationalists at military academies in Nanjing, Wuhan and Shanghai. The 
political and ideological training covered aspects of Mao’s works and Communist 
ideology; it underscored the most potent aspect of Chinese guerrilla training – the 
importance of politicising the people prior to launching armed struggle.454 The military 
programmes emphasised tactical rather than theoretical training, covering topics such as 
building up a militia and guerrilla warfare, which could be put into practice quickly 
after the trainees returned to the frontline.455 The presence of these African nationalists 
in China allowed their perspective on the liberation struggles to be featured in the 
Chinese media.456 A number of these trainees taught alongside Chinese instructors 
when they returned to Africa, as they were better able to translate the lessons to their 
local context.457  
As mentioned earlier, the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar enhanced the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship. Dar es Salaam became the departure point for Africans from the 
region to travel to China. The city quickly became the operations centre for the largest 
Chinese presence in the region, as illustrated by the arrival of the 6,000 tonne 
Guangdong-registered freighter Heping at the ports of Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar 
 
453
 Segal 1982, pp. 73-74.
454
 The trainees came from all over Africa, as noted by a press report circulated in West Berlin in June 1964 about 
young Africans from Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cameroon and Congo who were being trained in 
guerrilla warfare in China: Greig 1977, p. 146.
455
 Lin 1978; Zhong / Xu 2008.
456
 For example, Viriato da Cruz worked at the Afro-Asian Journalist Association after his dismissal from the MPLA. 
The Chinese media carried many of his criticisms of the group: Shubin 2008, p. 11.
457
 Gilks / Segal 1985, pp. 39-42. 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 156 
twice in 1964 (May and September).458 The shipments were bound for the Tanzanian 
government and it can be assumed that a portion was for the liberation movements. 
Once again the Tanzanian army played an integral role in providing logistical support 
by unloading and transporting the ship’s cargo to the various destinations. Tanzanian 
port authorities confirmed that ninety percent of the cargo was comprised of military 
arms and equipment, with the balance being agricultural implements, a number of 
civilian vehicles and commercial goods, as part of the £15 million ($42 million) 
agreement on economic and technical cooperation. Part of the cargo was also shipped to 
Zanzibar on a chartered vessel on 8 September, containing a consignment of two trucks 
and 296 cases of medical equipment.459 By 1965 there were more than fifty staff at the 
Chinese embassy and roughly ninety economic technicians, a clear reflection of how 
rapidly the breadth and depth of Chinese engagement in Tanzania had grown.460 
v) Chinese military support and African liberation movements 
Tanzania’s acceptance of Chinese aid and military support for the liberation 
movements put Nyerere’s government in a politically compromising position vis-à-vis 
the colonial powers. The Portuguese government attempted to exploit the situation to its 
own ends by directing the release of two letters in Tanzania in November 1964: The 
first claimed that the Americans and Portuguese were collaborating to bomb the 
Chinese training camps in Tanzania and the second alleged that the US State 
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Department was planning to overthrow Nyerere.461 The “Western plot” surfaced at the 
same time as the dramatic Stanleyville incident in neighbouring Congo, in which a joint 
Belgian-American task force rescued Western hostages held by Congolese Simba 
rebels, and so the passionate Tanzanian response to these “Western plots” reflected the 
general suspicion amongst African governments that “the West could not be trusted.”462 
This extreme caution contrasted with observations from some Western powers. A 
British diplomat attributed the tightening of security arrangements in Dar es Salaam to 
the “post-plot neurosis or spy fever, a xenophobia of a particularly virulent form.” His 
report described the “political schizophrenia” that had “reduced diplomats here almost 
to the role of child psychiatrists, trying to cope with African inferiority complexes and 
persecution manias.”463 Although Nyerere later accepted that the letters were forgeries, 
he stood his ground and did not issue an official apology for his government’s reactive 
accusations, letting the furore gradually subside. 
Instead of the intended effect of causing the Tanzanian government to veer 
away from the Chinese, the “Western Plot” invariably brought both governments closer 
by driving a wedge deeper into Tanzania’s strained relations with the US and British 
governments. On 1 February 1965, Ambassador He Ying proclaimed that China and 
Tanganyika were “forging a militant friendship” that reflected their common military 
support for the liberation struggles.464 At the same time, similar sentiments were voiced 
by the newly arrived Tanzanian ambassador in China, Tewa Saidi Tewa, who declared 
that his government was committed to helping those who still suffered under colonial 
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oppression, until they too become independent. Significantly, he added that the present 
challenge was the risk of “new colonialism”, an unmistakeable stab at the Soviet Union 
that would have been appreciated by the Chinese.465  
Western government officials discussed the reasons for the insidious appeal of 
Chinese assistance – specifically military aid – and its mixed effect on Chinese 
diplomacy in Africa. As a new revolutionary actor entering a decolonising Africa, the 
Chinese government chose to target its assistance strategically. The British High 
Commissioner in Dar es Salaam observed that the Chinese were listened to because 
they were willing to help in areas that the Tanzanians cared about, “particularly arms 
for the Congo rebels and the Mozambique people.”466 This view was reinforced by the 
US embassy’s First Secretary Terry McNamara, who complained that while the Ford 
Foundation shouldered the cost of schooling Mozambican refugees in Tanzania, the 
Chinese and East Europeans overshadowed them because they were supplying arms to 
the Mozambican, Congolese and Tanzanian forces. He added wryly that, “education 
doesn’t rate with machine guns.”467  
In addition, Western concerns about the growing Chinese engagement in Africa 
were fanned by rumours that Beijing had offered to sponsor the Tanzania-Zambia 
(TanZam) rail link, the massive project which intended to strengthen Zambia’s frontline 
role.468 During his stop-over in Zanzibar in June 1965, Zhou Enlai praised the islands’ 
role in the pursuit of anti-imperialism and national liberation, calling the January 1964 
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revolution a “marvellous achievement.”469 These comments unleashed further British 
criticism of Nyerere’s special relationship with China, in spite of the Tanzanian 
president’s insistence that his country was non-aligned. He found it increasingly 
difficult to reconcile non-alignment with the need for military assistance in a climate of 
general domestic and regional insecurity. 
Yet Chinese military assistance and support for the African liberation groups 
elicited mixed reactions elsewhere in Africa and the Chinese government suffered a 
number of diplomatic crises in 1965. The government of Burundi declared Beijing’s 
support for the Congo rebellion interference in its internal affairs and expelled all 
Chinese diplomats and NCNA staff from the country, which had been the base for 
Chinese aid operations to the Congo in February 1965.470 The severance of its supply 
channel to the Congo was a disappointing setback for the Chinese government. The 
Sino-Soviet dispute also took a toll on China’s relations with the liberation movements 
and is discussed further in Chapter Six.  
At the same time, Nyerere successfully consolidated his political power through 
instituting a single-party system. The Chinese looked favourably upon these and other 
developments in Tanzania. Consul Zhou Boping listed seven positive steps taken by the 
Tanzanian president: The first three were the installation of an incorrupt style of 
governance, the promotion of better inter-racial relations, and the abolition of tribal 
privileges (Zhou had likened black Africa’s tribalism to Chinese feudalism). More 
significant were the fourth to seventh measures: The abolishment of the multi-party 
system for a single-party one; the enactment of laws to prohibit strikes and to prevent 
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malcontents from seizing power; Nyerere’s appointment of two faithful aides – 
Kawawa and Sarakikya – which allowed him to eliminate threats from Oscar Kambona 
and the army, the two “concealed dangers”. Finally, Nyerere had improved stability and 
national strength by supporting the Zanzibar revolution and implementing the union.471  
In contrast, Nyerere’s consolidation of power has been criticised by some 
authors. Saul argues that Nyerere’s political primacy and the low tolerance for debate in 
Tanzania led to authoritarianism in its handling of the liberation movements as well. 
The Tanzanian state’s imprisonment of SWAPO members who “dared to ask 
embarrassing questions of their leaders at Kongwa” in the mid-1960s laid the ground 
for SWAPO’s authoritarian practices and draconian treatment of its dissidents in later 
decades. Indeed Saul coined the term “club of presidents” to describe the group of 
national leaders and liberation movement leaders whose common objective was to 
“stifle, often in the most brutal possible way, the seeds of any dissent that could grow 
outside a very limited circumference of acceptable discussion.”472  
Moreover, it appears that the Tanzanian government treated its favoured 
liberation movements preferentially: In the 1960s and early 1970s, only a small 
percentage of the arms that were allocated to Zimbabwe’s African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) and South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) were actually handed 
over to them, as the bulk of weapons were distributed to the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU), the PAC and the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique 
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(Coremo), which were groups that Beijing also supported.473 The Chinese were not 
unhappy.  
II. Tanganyika’s post-colonial vulnerability 
Running parallel to Nyerere’s support for the southern African liberation 
struggle was the development of the Tanganyikan armed forces and military capacity, 
the urgency for which was made clear by the army mutiny in January 1964. Nyerere 
appealed for foreign assistance to build up a stronger military that would preserve 
domestic stability and security, as well as assist the liberation forces in their cause. This 
section examines how Chinese military assistance was incorporated as part of Nyerere’s 
attempt to control domestic unrest and external threats. 
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i) The army mutiny and Nyerere’s fundamental insecurity 
To better understand the military context in Tanganyika prior to the mutiny, a 
brief overview of its history is necessary. The colonial Tanganyikan army originally 
functioned as a component of the King’s African Rifles and included battalions in 
Uganda and Kenya. The Tanganyika Constitutional Conference decided in March 1961 
that the country should have its own army after independence.474 It also recognised, 
however, that the army’s supporting units could not be assembled in time for 
independence at the end of 1961. Hence the cost of maintaining those units thereafter 
was left open to further discussion, a reflection of the British and Tanganyikan 
governments’ perception of the low level of threat to the territory’s national security. 
Moreover, Nyerere wanted to maintain the possibility of a future federal arrangement 
with Kenya and Uganda at the time and thus did not commit to any specific defence 
policy arrangements. It was only during the National Assembly’s budget session in 
mid-1963 that the Tanganyikan government’s defence policy and military budget were 
revealed for the first time, presumably driven by the country’s importance as a haven 
for African liberation movements.475 
Prior to the mutiny, Nyerere had been confident about the loyalty of his British-
led soldiers. After the Congolese army mutiny on 5 July 1960, he declared that the 
Congo did not have TANU’s strength and organisation, adding that there was “not the 
slightest chance that the forces of law and order in Tanganyika [would] mutiny.”476 
That faith was misplaced. The generally accepted cause among scholars of the 
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Tanganyikan Rifles mutiny was the soldiers’ frustration with the slow rate of 
Africanisation in the army, which was outpaced by changes in the police force and civil 
service. The King’s African Rifles was re-named the Tanganyikan Rifles but, in reality, 
only one rifle company at Colito Barracks had an Africanised command structure.477 
Another contributing factor was Kambona’s portfolio at the Ministry of Defence. The 
Minister had locked horns with the departing Commander of the Tanganyika Rifles, 
Brigadier Patrick Sholto Douglas, on the changes within and future direction of the 
army.478 The High Commission criticised Kambona’s policies which undermined the 
army’s discipline; records show that the mission believed that his abolishment of the 
Special Branch ultimately led to a dangerous combination of discontent and a 
governmental lack of intelligence about developments on the ground.479 Yet it did not 
appear that British influence would be entirely removed. 
A significant British presence remained in the Tanganyikan army, with the High 
Commission’s Defence Advisor continuing to play an important role after Douglas’ 
departure in May 1964. Moreover, Tanganyika was still heavily reliant on Britain for 
supplying the backbone of its officer corps.480 This situation coloured the Chinese 
embassy’s perception of Nyerere’s leadership, as the latter’s “slow action in cutting out 
British influence in the Tanganyikan army after independence created the conditions for 
the mutiny, a mistake which very nearly cost him party and country.”481 Thereafter 
Nyerere’s strategy to consolidate his power and minimise the threat of military 
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insubordination initially had two prongs: First, the restructuring of the army and 
training for Tanzanian troops and, second, the enhancement and expansion of the 
army’s military arsenal.482 Foreign assistance was necessary for both. 
ii) The Tanganyika People’s Defence Force (TPDF) 
To achieve the first aim of restructuring the army and training the URTZ troops, 
Nyerere first disbanded the army to start on a clean slate. He then structured its 
successor along the lines of a limited national service programme. Nyerere envisioned a 
politically-rooted vanguard for nation-building purposes; a loyal and efficient 
“development militia” that could be trained to meet the special circumstances of the 
country, be integrated into national life and attuned to the political system.483 This 
organisation was clearly inspired by the Chinese People’s Army. TANU political 
officers were assigned to positions in the hierarchy and the army would also be 
represented in the TANU National Executive.484 The eligibility criteria for recruits 
included Swahili and English language literacy in addition to the standard physical 
fitness test.485 There was a preference for candidates who were members of TANU, 
ASP and their respective Youth Leagues, the last being a measure to redress the earlier 
situation when soldiers were barred from political party membership.486 The training 
plan for recruits involved a three-month period of nation-building activities, followed 
by six months of training in the army or police.487 
 
482
 Ibid., p. 117.
483
 Quoted in Pachter 1982, p. 598; Mazrui / Rothchild 1967. 
484
 NA, DO213/13, Press Release: Mr. Kawawa Addresses New Army, 24 June 1964. 
485
 Kilford 2010, p. 175
486
 NA, DO213/13, Press Release: The United Republic’s Military Forces, 18 June 1964.
487
 Kilford 2010, p. 175.
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 165 
The Tanganyika People’s Defence Force (TPDF) was officially established on 1 
September 1964 with 1,300 recruits.488 Brigadier General Mirisho Sam Hagai 
Sarakikya, a trusted and loyal aide to Nyerere, was appointed to head the new army. 
Significantly, the new army’s mandate was to preserve domestic and national security, 
which was a pressing concern because of the high concentration of freedom fighters in 
Dar es Salaam and refugees from the Congo and Mozambique. Thus a strong army was 
needed because the deluge of people across those borders attracted spies from the 
hostile governments of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal.489 Furthermore, 
the TPDF played a major role in supporting the liberation movements. The TPDF was 
tasked with training the liberation forces, ensuring their security and at times even 
escorting soldiers into the liberated zones to fight alongside them in combat zones.490  
Nyerere actively approached various donors to achieve the second objective of 
building up the army’s military hardware. The Chinese offer of military assistance for 
the TPDF was the first to be publicly accepted.491 From 1963 until 1965, the country’s 
list of military donors included Israel, Canada, West and East Germany, the Soviet 
Union, Nigeria and Ethiopia, as well as China. Nyerere’s attempts to create a non-
aligned framework of military assistance raised many practical problems, not least of 
all political disagreements between the donors and differences arising from their 
military systems, which determined the leadership, discipline, training, equipment and 
culture of the national army.492 Sarakikya’s own military training at the Royal Military 
Academy at Sandhurst meant that he was more familiar with and inclined towards 
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British military assistance in the first instance, as the British records show. Zanzibar’s 
autonomous military development posed a further challenge to the uniformity of 
Tanzanian military development, a situation that was worsened by the high and 
oppressive cost of maintaining the Nigerian battalion and the Ethiopian air contingent, 
which were the “African solution” to Tanganyikan military weakness after the mutiny 
of the Tanganyikan Rifles in January 1964.493 
iii) Chinese military assistance to Tanzania  
As discussed in Chapter Two, Second Vice President Rashidi Kawawa visited 
China in June 1964. In addition to negotiating with the Chinese for development aid, 
Kawawa appealed for military assistance for the URTZ. Premier Zhou Enlai responded 
with the advice that although military materiel was necessary, it was the government’s 
political power that was paramount.494 Kawawa left Beijing with an offer of military aid 
and officer training for any number of URTZ cadets, which pleased him greatly.495 
Throughout his visit the Chinese press lauded the “excellent revolutionary situation” in 
Africa and declared the Chinese people’s support for the armed struggles for national 
liberation in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique.496 
Soon after Kawawa’s trip, Sarakikya made a fact-finding tour to China in July 
1964. Despite his initial scepticism, as he toured factories, communes and military 
establishments, the Tanzanian commander was impressed by the industriousness of the 
Chinese people, the scale of activity and the massive size of the Chinese army. He later 
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told British officials that the Chinese standard of military training was roughly 
equivalent to the basic training standards in Western armies, but that he considered its 
political background unsuited for Tanganyika, because of the lack of distinction 
between officers and other ranks.497 As had been promised to Kawawa a month earlier, 
the Chinese government was prepared to “offer the moon” and train up to 2,000 
Tanzanian military cadets.498 This overwhelming Chinese offer would make it difficult 
for Nyerere’s government to reject Chinese help, especially as there were few donor 
options and growing military needs. Sarakikya intimated to the British that he was 
compelled to accept some form of Chinese military aid, a point that Kambona also 
reiterated, because “the Tanganyikan government regarded the Chinese as friends and 
could not reject their help without causing offence.”499 Sarakikya eventually requested 
British support to minimise any threat of Chinese military interference by helping to 
develop a corps of well-trained, loyal Tanganyikan officers through availing more 
places at England’s Mons Officer Cadet School.500 
Nyerere pursued Chinese military assistance and approached the Chinese 
ambassador directly with an ambitious request to send all Tanzanian army officers to 
China for training. In response, Zhou Enlai suggested that sending Chinese instructors 
to Tanganyika instead would be more appropriate and easier to coordinate.501 In 
August, Nyerere announced that an eleven-man, six-month Chinese military training 
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mission was planned.502 The Chinese viewed the refashioned Tanzanian army led by 
the party as having essentially adopted the direction taken by the Chinese people’s 
army.  
iv) The Western response to Chinese military assistance 
The US State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs was caught by surprise by 
this move and quickly urged the British and Commonwealth countries to offer 
Tanzanian officers places at their military academies; it also encouraged the West 
Germans to expedite their contributions to the police training programme.503 In fact, 
only Canadian military assistance was offered as the British and American governments 
impelled Ottawa to countervail the growing Chinese presence in Tanzania.504 The East 
African governments had mixed reactions to Nyerere’s announcement. Martin Kaunda, 
a distant cousin of the Zambian president, was concerned that a significant physical 
presence of Chinese military personnel would provide a base for operations to influence 
or overthrow existing governments.505  
When Nyerere commented on the reports of Chinese military assistance to 
Tanganyika in an interview, he explained to visiting journalist Colin Legum that the 
Chinese were “so much more understanding” to Tanganyikan sensitivities than other 
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donor countries like the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany.506 The president 
added that the Chinese did not try to drive “too hard a bargain” and, on the contrary, 
were quick to respond to Tanzanian requests. They were generally more positive than 
the West in helping in the areas that the Tanzanians wanted.507 This point was raised by 
Sarakikya, who confessed to being “astonished” by the speed at which the Chinese 
could respond to requests for aid, often within a month, while Western countries 
generally took at least half a year or more.508 Such a quick response time was 
particularly important for the liberation forces battling at the frontline. 
Furthermore, Nyerere complained to Legum that he was annoyed by the 
brouhaha surrounding his acceptance of Chinese help and the insinuation that the 
Tanzanian government would somehow become a Chinese pawn or satellite as a 
result.509 He felt justified in approaching the Chinese for specialist military training in 
the face of limited alternatives.510 The departure of the Nigerian battalion, scheduled for 
September, was imminent. At a hurriedly summoned press conference on 30 August, 
Nyerere was observed to have been “particularly vociferous” in registering his anger 
publicly, especially at Western countries, for attempting to arm-twist his government 
into rejecting Chinese military aid.511 He emphasised that the Communist countries had 
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never attempted to dissuade his government from accepting Western aid and stated his 
objection to any interference in his government’s business.512 
Nyerere finally confirmed publicly that the Chinese team would comprise only 
seven instructors and four interpreters, and that the contract was for a limited period of 
six months. He insisted that Beijing had no intention of encouraging military 
dependency or of entrenching itself as a major, long-term military donor. In fact, 
Nyerere added, it was the Chinese themselves who had insisted on the maximum 
training period, with no provision for either an extension or enlargement of their role. 
Moreover, the President insisted that the mission’s task was based on existing 
commitments and was limited to instruction in the use of Chinese and similar pattern 
weapons which had arrived even before the Zanzibar revolution.513 
Meanwhile, ships from the Eastern bloc and China continued to unload arms 
and military supplies in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar through the remainder of 1964.514 
Excluding Western donors, very substantial quantities of small arms and ammunition 
and some heavier military equipment were given by Algeria, the Soviet Union, East 
Germany and China that year.515 In addition to the Heping, another Chinese ship, the 
Laodong, docked in Dar es Salaam in November 1964. Its cargo was conveyed to the 
nearby Colito barracks under strict security.516 The Chinese contribution was restricted 
to training missions and the supply of relatively small amounts of infantry weapons, 
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ammunition and military stores.517 British estimates put the total value of Chinese 
military aid at the time at under $15 million, as no sophisticated equipment, heavy 
weapons or large military missions were provided.518  
Yet at more than six hundred tonnes, the shipments were the most substantial 
deliveries made by China to any African country. Sarakikya observed that, unlike the 
Soviet government, which had supplied vintage weapons to Zanzibar, the Chinese 
government provided new weapons, uniforms and webbing equipment.519 The shipment 
supported the commander’s plan to incorporate elements of different military systems 
to suit his army’s needs as an extension of Nyerere’s non-alignment policy. For this, the 
standardisation of vehicles would follow the advice from a Canadian military survey 
team and be along British lines. Hence the Tanzanian government submitted a request 
to the British government in September for a list of vehicles for the army, which they 
hoped would be financed by a grant or loan, at the cost of £300,000 ($840,000).520 Of 
the Western governments, the Canadians were particularly supportive of the URTZ’s 
military development process. Canadian Colonel Price was an important advisor to 
Sarakikya, so much so that his training team drafted the new Tanzanian Defence Act.521 
Moreover, the Canadians helped to address the practical limitations to Chinese military 
aid, such as in the drafting of English-language drill manuals for Chinese weapons. 
Sarakikya planned for one battalion to be armed and equipped entirely on Chinese lines, 
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although he admitted to being sceptical of the quality of Chinese arms in comparison to 
British ones.522  
v) Tanzania’s limited alternatives 
Although Tanzania looked increasingly to China for sophisticated military 
equipment and training, there were never any Chinese officers in the TPDF or the 
Tanzanian Army. Instead, the Chinese government sent military trainers to instruct the 
local instructors on the use of Chinese-made weapons. A team of Chinese military 
instructors arrived in Tanzania in October 1964 and were later sent to Frelimo camps in 
southern Tanzania; the Portuguese government was aware of their presence from 
1965.523 The trainers taught military tactics, technical planning, guerrilla warfare, the 
use of Chinese weapons, the establishment of rural revolutionary bases and ambush 
techniques.524  
The Tanzanian government’s diminishing budget ran counter to its increasing 
military needs. Whatever materiel was received was quickly absorbed into the army, 
such as the majority of the Soviet and Chinese military, comprised of twenty armoured 
personnel carriers, a small number of field and air defence guns, small arms, mortars 
and ammunition.525 Tanzania’s relations with its key Western donors became 
increasingly strained and the already limited sources of military assistance shrank 
further. The formation of the union had a direct and immediate impact on Tanganyika 
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and Zanzibar’s relations with West Germany, which was one of Tanganyika’s major 
donors. The West German government’s Hallstein Doctrine barred it from having 
official relations with third countries that recognised East Germany. Up until that point, 
the West Germans had demonstrated their support for Nyerere and independent 
Tanganyika, with assistance including a variety of economic, cultural, science, trade 
institutes and scholarships for local students. 
Yet Nyerere stood his ground in response to the West German government’s 
threat to withdraw its military assistance, because of the establishment of an East 
German consulate in Dar es Salaam. He went further by demanding that all West 
German projects be terminated. The withdrawal of Bonn’s support from Tanzania was a 
considerable loss, as West German military support included assistance to the air force 
that amounted to £4 million ($11.2 million), as well as personnel for the air force and 
navy. NCNA correspondent Gao described this as the bullying of weaker countries by 
stronger ones.526 In April 1965 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
concluded that in order to reinforce Nyerere’s position by keeping the communists at 
bay, the best way to support him and prevent the Chinese from making influential 
inroads was to provide expatriate staff and aid for the army and, to a lesser degree, the 
air force.527 But it was the Canadians, not the British, who provided that assistance. 
Nyerere’s decision to reconstruct the Tanzanian military was a political one 
intended to safeguard the country’s national security at a time of incomplete 
decolonisation in Africa. Despite having fallen back on British forces during the 
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mutiny, Nyerere acknowledged that bilateral assistance could only be a temporary 
measure at best, because it impinged on the recipient government’s sovereignty.528 
There were a number of complicating factors due to the few donor options, the political 
repercussions which each new donor entailed, as well as the long shadow of Britain’s 
post-colonial legacy in East Africa, which had defined the structure and organisation of 
the army until that point and affected practical considerations in re-vamping military 
hard- and software. The end result of Nyerere’s efforts in reconfiguring the army was a 
politically embedded, Chinese-inspired people’s army.  
III. The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar 
Nyerere’s staunch support of the African liberation struggles opened the country 
to the risk of rapid militarisation, as Dar es Salaam became an important centre for the 
transhipment of arms. On the mainland, the comparatively more disciplined and well-
managed TPDF proved able to manage the logistics required of their role. In Zanzibar, 
however, there was a significantly different outcome. At the same time as Nyerere 
sought foreign assistance to intensify his government’s support for the liberation 
movements and to develop the Tanzanian military capacity, a serious problem arose on 
the islands.  
First Vice President Abeid Karume’s power in Zanzibar was boosted by the 
creation of the union in April 1964 and he quickly embarked on a rapid build-up of the 
Zanzibar People’s Liberation Army (ZPLA)’s arsenal. Although the Zanzibari troops 
were nominally under the Ministry of Defence in Dar es Salaam, they were de facto 
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under Karume’s control. Karume used the arms and supplies from Communist bloc 
sources to buttress his rule, which brought him into inevitable conflict with Nyerere. 
The Sino-Tanzanian connection, a growing “military friendship”, contributed to these 
tensions and the militarization of Zanzibar through Chinese competition for influence 
with the Soviet Union and East Germany. This section examines the three specific 
issues which led to the Chinese monopoly of military training in Tanzania from 1969: 
Firstly, Nyerere’s challenge of how to manage the clash between the mainland and 
Zanzibar without undermining the cohesiveness of the union; secondly, Karume’s 
exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry for his personal ends; and thirdly, Nyerere’s 
search of a single, integrated source of reliable military aid.
i) A clash between Nyerere’s and Karume’s plans for military development 
In contrast to the challenge that Nyerere faced in breaking the mainland army’s 
inherited British military hierarchy by constructing an entirely new armed force, the 
military development in Zanzibar was markedly different, both in form and objectives. 
The ZPLA was created by the ZRC almost immediately after the Zanzibar Revolution 
in January 1964 and was styled along Communist lines rather than the British military 
system of the colonial East African armies. The ZPLA’s recruits were trained locally, 
except for a handful who was sent to the Soviet Union, Indonesia and China.529 The 
ZPLA’s hardware was confined to mainly Soviet- and Chinese-supplied anti-aircraft 
guns and some small arms, although a steep increase in the supply of arms into Stone 
Town harbour was noted in March, large quantities of which originated from China. In 
accordance with the Articles of the Union, the Tanganyikan and Zanzibari military 
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forces were merged in April, and defence matters were put under the jurisdiction of the 
Parliament and Executive in Dar es Salaam. Significantly, the union government 
announced that it would honour all the existing military agreements that the ZRC had 
made with Eastern bloc countries. This policy would have serious repercussions on the 
islands’ political and military development for years to come.530 
Instead of dampening Zanzibar’s very separate military development trajectory, 
the union hastened it by protecting Karume’s political position and personal fiefdom. 
Military materiel from the Communist bloc governments streamed into Zanzibar and 
the prevalence of these arms gave rise to lawlessness and an arbitrary judicial system. 
In a stunning display of its newly-acquired weaponry and mobilising power, the ZPLA 
marched at Zanzibar’s May Day parade in 1964 brandishing Soviet arms. Zanzibar 
appeared promising a Communist foothold in East Africa. The North Korean, 
Vietnamese and Chinese government delegations were also present, to demonstrate 
their governments’ solidarity and support for the Zanzibari authorities.531\ 
The official merger of the Tanganyikan and Zanzibari armed forces only 
officially took place on 14 July and formed the United Republic Military Forces 
(URMF), nearly three months after the union itself was created. Sarakikya’s plan for 
the integration of the two armed forces ran against the currents that were taking place in 
Zanzibar. The General intended to enforce uniformity by standardising the military 
equipment and mixing the recruits from across the union. Additionally, he wanted a 
reasonable military presence stationed on the islands and one joint training depot in Dar 
es Salaam. Roughly one third of the nine hundred to a thousand Tanzanian recruits 
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would be former ZPLA personnel from Zanzibar; the recruits would undergo training 
for three months and subsequently form the core of the 1st battalion of the Tanzania 
Rifles in Dar es Salaam. Indeed, Sarakikya wanted the bulk of the joint army to be 
stationed on the mainland, to be eventually deployed with the 1st battalion in Dar es 
Salaam and the 2nd battalion in Tabora, leaving only around four hundred troops in 
Zanzibar.532 In theory, it seemed a rational and straightforward means to create a new 
national army that would represent both components of the union. However, the 
military integration process faced insurmountable obstacles in Zanzibar.  
Sarakikya was not unaware of the difficulties that he would face in trying to 
implement changes in Zanzibar. In a meeting with Defence Advisor Colonel B. G. Pugh 
in July, the URTZ Commander criticised the ignorance of local Zanzibari politicians in 
military matters, citing the latter’s determination to raise a brigade of three infantry 
battalions as quickly as possible. Karume had no regard for the long-term consequences 
of such actions, which would greatly compromise standards and result in an 
inadequately trained officer corps. Moreover, Sarakikya was not impressed by the 
calibre of the individual ZPLA soldiers and considered their officers “a lot of lazy, 
drunken layabouts.” He informed Pugh that a number of mainland officers were with 
the ZPLA on Zanzibar being trained in the use of Soviet and Chinese weapons. The 
mainland officers had an additional purpose, which was to maintain the URTZ’s close 
link with the ZPLA. Sarakikya joked that, given the opportunity, “the fifth column 
could, with the assistance of the visiting Ethiopian air contingent, take Zanzibar within 
a fortnight!”533 
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ii) Sino-Soviet competition and the militarisation of Zanzibar 
Zanzibar enjoyed a high degree of military autonomy. Observing the situation in 
Zanzibar closely, the British noted in November 1964 that the ZPLA seemed to be 
under Chinese and Russian influence. The consulate warned that a complete 
Communist take-over was close, which could possibly oust Nyerere and the moderate 
elements in his government or force them onto a more radical track. The Soviet 
rationale for availing military support was Zanzibar’s strong anti-imperialist stand, with 
the Sino-Soviet competition being a contributing factor.534 A few months later, another 
report indicated that Moscow’s main objective was to disrupt Chinese influence 
through its military assistance in Zanzibar.535 The Canadians, likewise, observed that 
unless ways could be found to meet at least the most serious deficiencies of the 
Tanzanian army from Western sources, there was the danger of a drift towards 
standardisation along Communist lines, which would erode the effectiveness of any 
future Western military assistance.536 
However, Karume’s plans were narrow and appeared to revolve around the 
fortification of his leadership in Zanzibar, rather than any closer engagement with 
the mainland. His policies show mainly a domestic interest and, as one 
unimpressed British official commented, “the problems of Rhodesia, arms for 
South Africa […] that affect United Kingdom relations with Nyerere so vitally, 
 
534
 Author’s correspondence with Professor Vladmir Shubin, Soviet scholar and former Secretary of the Soviet Afro-
Asian Solidarity Committee and Head of the Africa Section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) 
International Department, 18 May 2010.
535
 CFMA, 109-03645-10, 11 August 1965.
536
 Note from the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs on 9 December 1964, quoted in NA, DO213/14, 
Tanzanian Request for Grant or Loan for Purchase of Vehicles for Army, February 1965. 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 179 
passed [Karume] by.”537 The ZPLA only formally changed its name to TPDF in 
March 1965, almost a year after the union. Karume tried to exploit the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry to his personal benefit. During Ambassador He Ying’s visit to Stone Town 
in April 1965, the First Vice President appeared receptive to Beijing’s policies and 
was critical of the Soviets. He insisted that he had little confidence in Moscow’s 
words and deeds, adding that the Soviet Union opposed China because it was 
threatened by the latter’s development and rise as a great power. Moreover, he 
added, the Soviets were afraid to confront American imperialism for fear that it 
might benefit China.538  
Yet the Chinese consul in Zanzibar was quick to report that Karume had 
neither a clear pro-Chinese nor pro-Soviet position. The consul closely monitored 
the activities of the Soviets and East Germans, noting that Soviet activity was 
concentrated in the army through Yusuf Himid, the ZPLA Commander, and Ali 
Mafoudh.539 Both men were still open and responsive to Chinese overtures, 
although Karume himself was inscrutable and appeared undecided. The consul 
concluded that the East German areas of greatest influence were in the news 
media, public finance and trade; their main proponents included Abdul-Aziz Ali 
Twala, Ahmed Badawi Qullatein and perhaps Karume. Chinese relations with 
these individuals were good overall and the consul speculated that their ties would 
not be compromised simply because of connections with East Berlin.540 The 
former Umma comrades such as Ali Sultan were more obviously amenable to 
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Chinese support, having established close relationships from before. Ali Sultan, 
who was Minister of Education, Youth and Culture at the time, recalled that: 
Here the Chinese were backward, they wanted to develop their country first, but 
still they helped. Here the Russians were advanced with Sputnik and everything, 
and yet they were meagre. They were very mean and arrogant, I can say.541 
Karume managed his relations with the Chinese and Soviet governments 
shrewdly, using the Sino-Soviet rivalry as a catalyst for the solidification of his 
absolute power in Zanzibar. To avoid any messy confrontations, the respective 
military instructors from the Soviet Union and China were assigned to work with 
different segments of the ZPLA.542 Thus Zanzibar successfully received military 
assistance from both Communist powers.543 The islands’ rapid militarization and 
the ZPLA’s more modern and sizeable army than the TPDF, resulted in “an army 
within an army.”544 The disparity was untenable. 
By August 1965 there were between one and two thousand recruits in the 
Zanzibari army, far surpassing the four hundred that Sarakikya had originally planned 
for.545 Nyerere was certainly aware of these festering tensions between the mainland 
and Zanzibar, which was a topic of discussion during his meeting with the Nigerian 
Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in June 1965. Nyerere explained that 
Zanzibar posed a special problem which required “delicate manoeuvring” and too anti-
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Chinese a line might lead to the islands’ secession.546 Nyerere acknowledged that the 
developments in Zanzibar were not ideal, but that the preservation of the union – a 
higher goal for national and regional stability – was at stake. Hence his hands were tied 
when it came to dealing with domestic issues within Zanzibar.  
On a different occasion, the Tanzanian leader illustrated the deep-seated 
problem of Karume’s arbitrary and authoritarian rule to Canadian Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson by way of an “incredible story”: Following the diplomatic disagreement 
between the Tanzanian and American governments over the “Western plot,” Tanzanian 
ambassador Othman Shariff was recalled from Washington D. C. in February 1965. 
After the dust had settled in June, Nyerere wanted to improve relations with the 
Americans and issued a directive for Shariff to return to his post. However, the 
diplomat had been arrested and imprisoned by the Zanzibari authorities for being one of 
Karume’s detractors; Shariff’s assignment in the US was intended to exclude him from 
domestic politics. The ZRC only agreed to Shariff’s release after Nyerere had 
negotiated with them for “two days and two nights” and on condition that he did not 
return to Washington.547 Despite the serious domestic constraints that were illustrated 
by this anecdote, Nyerere insisted that the “process of gradualism”, his preferred 
approach to the situation in Zanzibar, was taking effect, albeit slowly.548 
Nevertheless, Nyerere’s non-action in regards to Zanzibar’s rapid militarisation 
resulted in serious repercussions there. The presence of such a large stockpile of arms 
beyond the union government’s control posed a dangerous internal security problem. 
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Consequently, there was a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and fear; even government 
officials were not immune to arbitrary punishment or execution at Karume’s behest.549 
Part of Nyerere’s solution to the problem was to engage more deeply with the Chinese. 
The evidence bears this out. 
iii) The search for a single source of military aid 
From Nyerere’s perspective, he had few choices for military donors as the 
Western governments were not willing to support the liberation movements. As noted 
earlier, West German military assistance was withdrawn in February 1965, following 
the application of the Hallstein Doctrine. Therefore, the Communist governments were 
the main options for arms and training; according to Kilford, they were “welcome […] 
out of pure necessity”.550  
The Canadians had expected that the Tanzanian government would request an 
extension of their military training mission which had nearly ninety advisors and which 
had progressed smoothly since inception. But Canada’s refusal to provide the 
Tanzanian government with fighter aircraft, which Nyerere wanted against the 
Portuguese, ushered in the end of its military assistance.551 Although the Canadians 
surmised that “little by little, the Chinese would also chip away at [their] military 
assistance efforts”, it still came as a surprise when Nyerere terminated the programme 
in 1968.552 The Canadian Military Assistance Committee concluded that, in spite of not 
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having kept the Chinese out of Tanzania, they had kept a Chinese military monopoly at 
bay until the Tanzanian forces were stronger, better organised and more able to manage 
any potential subversion.553 The last bastion of Western and Commonwealth military 
assistance to Tanzania had fallen. 
Compared to the other bilateral donors, the Chinese government appeared more 
willing to help the Tanzanians with the requested military hardware, which the TPDF 
deemed necessary to defend its borders from Portuguese or South African attacks. 
Beijing assisted with the organisation of a tank squadron and gave fourteen T-62 light 
tanks with maintenance support. The problem of military standardisation and 
integration between the mainland and Zanzibari armed forces persisted. Nyerere told a 
visiting Chinese naval study mission in April 1969 that the Tanzanian military faced 
many problems because of its multiple supply sources. He therefore proposed to solve 
this by integrating military development according to Chinese standards. Moreover, 
Nyerere said he was pleased with the police and military training by Chinese 
instructors, expressing his hope that naval and, potentially, air force training would 
proceed as smoothly.554  
Shortly after, China donated two patrol boats and prepared the ground for the 
establishment of a navy trained by Chinese instructors, “thereby putting an end to 
Tanzania’s lack of navy capabilities.”555 Beijing sent a training team led by Deputy 
Commander of the 42nd army Maoshe and Military Political Commissar Xunli, both of 
whom had extensive military experience and were respected veterans who had 
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participated in the CCP’s anti-Japanese resistance. China later gave air defence 
weaponry and training of the mainland army by the third batch of military instructors 
pushed Tanzanian military capacity another step ahead. Thus the Sino-Tanzanian bond 
was further sealed through China’s response to Tanzania’s post-colonial weakness on 
the military front in the context of ongoing liberation struggles. 
The Chinese army’s lack of hierarchy that Sarakikya had observed during his 
trip to China was also evident in the trainers’ residential compound.556 In their leisure 
time the experts cultivated vegetables and fruit trees. The team leader worked alongside 
everyone else and carried out duties such as collecting manure (which was used as 
fertiliser), fetching water and other manual tasks. That scene of an economically 
productive army resonated deeply with Nyerere’s own wish for an army that could 
participate actively in nation-building. Indeed, prior to the mutiny of the Tanganyikan 
Army, he too had planned to have soldiers cultivate their own food and help with public 
works projects.557 When the Tanzanian soldiers reported to Nyerere what they had seen 
their Chinese instructors do in their spare time, the president surprised them all by 
joining in. He subsequently asked his senior generals and government ministers to 
participate in the training when they had the time. Therefore Nyerere’s decision to 
rationalise military development along Chinese lines eliminated any further, 
uncontrolled accumulation of arms on Zanzibar and smoothed the way for more 
standardisation between the mainland and Zanzibari armed forces.  
Nyerere also prioritised highly his country’s non-alignment, explaining in an 
interview some years later that, “I couldn’t ask the West […] I was trying to rig out the 
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British. So I got the Canadians. I trusted the Chinese, they could train our army which 
would be ours.”558 With the departure of the Canadians from mainland Tanzania and 
the cessation of the Soviet and East German presence in Zanzibar, China became the 
sole provider of military aid and training to Tanzania in 1969.559 Nevertheless, local 
power structures in Zanzibar persisted until Karume was assassinated in 1972. 
Continued pronouncements by Chinese and Tanzanian officials affirmed the 
militant friendship publicly. At the celebration of the Union Republic’s fifth 
anniversary in 1969 in Beijing, Tanzanian ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim emphasised 
that: 
In our struggle against imperialism and colonialism, old and new, the African 
people have constantly enjoyed the firm and solid support of the great Chinese 
people and their government. This support has been of singular importance and 
has tremendously assisted in accelerating the liberation process of our continent. 
The African people are sincerely grateful to their Chinese friends for their 
valuable support.560 
Chinese military assistance had increased Tanzanian military capability, 
confidence and reputation. This was clearly demonstrated when the ousted Ugandan 
leader Milton Obote – a respected friend of Nyerere’s – sought Tanzanian assistance for 
the removal of Major General Idi Amin who had led the military coup in January 1971. 
Confident of a military victory against the Ugandans because his troops had been well-
trained and equipped with Chinese assistance, the Tanzanian president approached 
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Consul Zhou Boping to request that the Chinese instructors join the troops at the 
frontline. But Zhou was less than enthusiastic about Chinese participation. He replied 
that although Obote’s return to power would benefit the other countries in Africa, it 
would be inappropriate for Chinese trainers to participate in a mission that was beyond 
their agreed scope of duty.  
Still Nyerere insisted that the matter be raised to Premier Zhou Enlai. But the 
premier declined Chinese participation in the military venture, citing the possibility that 
it would provoke a retaliatory attack from the British air force stationed in Nairobi. The 
premier reiterated that the protection of Tanzania’s stability was paramount. By that 
time, the Chinese government was recovering from the devastating Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution and had already committed to constructing the Tanzania-Zambia 
rail link. Nyerere finally accepted Zhou’s advice and abandoned the plan, offering 
Obote sanctuary instead.561 That incident was a prelude to the Uganda-Tanzania war 
(1978 to 1979), which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Conclusion: The consequences of Chinese military aid  
Chinese military assistance to Tanganyika from 1964 was a breakthrough in 
bilateral relations which, as Chapter Two has demonstrated, was limited to ministerial 
visits until that point. As this chapter has shown, the growth of the committed Sino-
Tanzanian militant friendship can be attributed to a convergence of three factors. First, 
Tanganyikan (and Tanzanian) support for the African liberation struggles, as well as the 
country’s key role as host of the OAU’s ALC. Tanzanian support came from the 
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highest levels of government, with policies that ensured the liberation groups would be 
protected and have a conducive environment to carry out their respective missions.  
The second factor which contributed to the growth of the Sino-Tanzanian 
militant friendship was the erosion of the colonial military legacies in both Zanzibar 
and Tanganyika following the outbreak of the Zanzibar Revolution (discussed in 
Chapter One) and the mutiny of the Tanganyika Rifles in January 1964. The mutiny 
and its subsequent suppression by British Royal Marines exposed the fundamental 
vulnerability of Nyerere’s government and posed grave security risks for the liberation 
movements in Tanganyika. Western military aid was constrained in both of these 
instances because the process of European decolonisation in southern Africa was 
incomplete. China, in particular, was timely and strategic in its response to the 
Tanzanian government’s military requests.  
Moreover, Beijing recognised that good bilateral relations were of paramount 
importance in order to facilitate its military assistance to the liberation groups that were 
based in mainland Tanzania. Hence, the Chinese government’s provision of arms, 
military supplies and training to the Tanzanian government had the dual purpose of 
supporting the southern African liberation movements based in Tanzania, as well as 
strengthening Tanzanian military capacity to maintain national security. These 
objectives were mutually reinforcing, as a better trained and equipped Tanzanian army 
was better able to protect and train the liberation troops, while safeguarding the 
country’s internal stability. They also redefined Chinese engagement in Africa’s geo-
political landscape by linking Beijing directly to the anti-colonial armed struggles in 
southern Africa.  
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From the perspective of military development, the creation of the union 
introduced the problem of standardisation between the armed forces. Karume 
successfully exploited the Sino-Soviet rivalry and there was an impressive build-up of 
arms on the islands. The military stockpile buttressed his personal power and, at the 
same time, stonewalled Zanzibar’s military integration process with the mainland. With 
the options for military assistance quickly narrowing, the third contributing factor to the 
Sino-Tanzanian militant friendship was the high potential that Chinese military aid 
presented for solving the challenges of military standardization, minimising the Sino-
Soviet rivalry in Zanzibar and learning from the nation-building qualities of the Chinese 
people’s army. Moreover, Nyerere was inspired by elements such as the army’s 
embeddedness within the political party, as well as the protection and support of 
liberation groups in Tanzania.  
While mainland Tanzania had received military assistance from a number of 
other governments as part of Nyerere’s non-aligned policy, that approach exacerbated 
the challenge of standardisation. Yet in spite of these difficulties, Nyerere prioritised 
the preservation of the Union above all, believing that a successful Union would 
contribute to a broader stability in the region. Later on, the intensification of the 
liberation struggles in southern Africa led to Nyerere’s decision of selecting Beijing as 
its sole source of military assistance from 1969. Therefore, as this chapter has shown, 
Chinese military support filled an important gap in Tanzanian military development 
that would otherwise have been difficult to address in a post-colonial and continuing 
colonial landscape. With a militant friendship now firmly established, Beijing’s most 
ambitious and visible anti-imperialist undertaking would come next: The iconic 
TanZam rail link. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four – Laying the tracks for the TanZam rail link, 1965 to 
1967 
The militant friendship that had steadily developed between the Tanzanian and 
Chinese governments throughout 1964 prepared the ground for a dramatic 
demonstration of Beijing’s desire to enlarge its role in Africa. The Chinese government 
made an offer to President Julius Nyerere in February 1965 to construct the Tanzania-
Zambia (TanZam) rail link, which would be its largest overseas project at the time. 
Together with Beijing’s military assistance to the African liberation movements that 
was discussed in Chapter Three, this new development marked a new juncture in the 
Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship and had ramifications on both countries’ foreign 
relations.  
The TanZam rail link has mostly been presented as the hard evidence of China’s 
grand African strategy during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 
1976, when Chinese foreign policy took an ultra radical turn. But the decision made by 
the Chinese leaders to sponsor the TanZam rail link took place in early 1965, before the 
start of the Cultural Revolution. Nyerere and his Zambian counterpart Kenneth Kaunda 
were at first unsuccessful in their attempts to find a donor for the project. Yet when the 
Chinese government threw down the gauntlet to the West in February 1965 by offering 
to make the rail link a reality, it was received hesitantly by both African leaders. The 
aftermath of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November 
1965 set in motion a turn of events and the tripartite (Chinese, Tanzanian and Zambian) 
agreement on Chinese sponsorship of the TanZam rail link was signed in 1967.  
As this chapter will show, there were numerous conflicting currents below the 
surface which have not been sufficiently taken into account in the historiography of the 
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TanZam rail link negotiations. It examines the important pre-history of the TanZam rail 
link from 1965 to 1966 in three parts: Firstly, the new importance and significance of 
the TanZam rail link; secondly, the distractions and obstacles to Chinese sponsorship; 
and, finally, the impact of Rhodesia’s UDI. 
I. The new importance and significance of the TanZam rail link 
The history of railway development in Africa is, by nearly all accounts, a 
history of colonial expansion and incursion into the heartlands. This was certainly the 
case in German East Africa and in Northern Rhodesia (colonial Zambia), which had 
their rail infrastructure built to suit colonial German and South African regional mining 
interests respectively, in the late nineteenth century.562 The idea of the TanZam rail link 
between independent Tanzania and Zambia evolved from one that was originally 
designed to generate colonial profit, to one that would further the cause of African 
political freedom and economic development. 
i) A nationalist rail link 
The idea of building a rail artery through central Africa to the Indian Ocean first 
emerged during the colonial era. The German and British authorities in Tanganyika had 
ruminated upon the possibility of a dramatic route cutting through mountainsides and 
large tracts of jungle, connecting the lucrative Northern Rhodesian copper belt to a sea 
port on Africa’s eastern coast. The British colonial authorities combined Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) with Nyasaland (colonial Malawi) to form the 
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Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 in defiance of popular black African 
opposition.563 Both the pre-war Labour government and its Conservative successor 
under Prime Minister Winston Churchill intended for the federation to usher in greater 
economic advantages for the three colonies, as well as to strengthen relations between 
the UK government and white settler communities. Northern Rhodesia was mineral-
rich, its most lucrative resource being copper exports. However, the landlocked country 
was heavily reliant on rail and sea trade routes through the neighbouring countries for 
its exports, as well as for essential imports such as oil and coal.  
The colonial railway infrastructure was organised into the southern and eastern 
African rail networks that functioned on differently sized gauges – the distance between 
the inside of the rail heads – which determined the direction and destination of trade 
traffic. The priority was to serve colonial objectives, with little consideration for local 
economic and social development.564 The idea of the TanZam rail link took on new 
significance in the 1960s when the newly independent African governments sought to 
undo colonial power structures and to solidify their economic independence. In 
Northern Rhodesia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), formed in 1959 
and led by Kenneth Kaunda, raised the issue of the TanZam Rail link as a major 
political point in its agenda. Kaunda’s reasoning was compelling. Northern Zambia’s 
key export line ran south from Lusaka and kept the country economically integrated 
with southern Africa.565 The possible coastal options were Lobito in Angola, Durban in 
South Africa, Lourenço Marques and Beira in Mozambique – all of which were under 
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white jurisdiction. Hence Northern Rhodesia’s existing export infrastructure left it 
vulnerable to the rapidly escalating political and racial tensions in southern Africa.  
After the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 31 
December 1963, Kaunda was elected Zambia’s first prime minister in January 1964. He 
was installed as its first president at the independence ceremony on 24 October 1964. 
Among his most immediate objectives was to minimise Zambia’s dependence on its 
hostile neighbours. Dar es Salaam held great promise as a major sea port in an 
independent, stable, African-controlled country. Moreover, Nyerere and Kaunda had a 
close personal rapport. The Tanzanian leader was extremely supportive of the proposal 
for the interstate rail link. He believed that it would not only lighten the heavy colonial 
footprint in African railway infrastructure by promoting domestic development and 
regional cooperation, but also fulfil the government’s promise to the people that was 
made before independence.566 Moreover, the rail link would promote development in 
Tanzania’s undeveloped south-western region.  
Fronted by Kaunda and Nyerere, the TanZam rail link idea shed its original 
colonial connections and became instead a symbol of pan-Africanism, black African 
nationalism and liberation.567 The newly proposed TanZam rail link promised to 
strengthen Zambian frontline support to the southern African liberation struggles 
through protecting the Zambian economy and its precious copper exports from hostile 
neighbours. The rail link would run along a similar route to the one envisioned in the 
colonial period, but its new political importance was highlighted by its popular name as 
the uhuru (Swahili for freedom) railway. The UN and the World Bank each conducted 
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a major survey on the TanZam route between 1963 to 1964. But their reports reflected a 
strong institutional reluctance to view the project beyond economic terms.568 In spite of 
that, both African leaders appealed to the international community for support in 1965, 
emphasising the broader developmental benefits that the investment in railway 
infrastructure would generate. But the potential donors divided the issue into the 
economic and political aspects, what Monson has described as a “false dichotomy” as 
railway construction was historically driven by a combination of economic and political 
objectives, particularly because of the high investment of capital, resources and 
expertise required.569 They repeatedly emphasised the project’s economic cost and 
unfeasibility.  
The arguments by the newly independent African governments held little 
appeal for the British, who profited from their dealings with the colonial 
administrations in southern Africa and were reluctant to upset the existing order. 
The TanZam rail link idea was perceived as a direct threat to those incumbent 
political and commercial powers. Zambia’s lucrative commodities in particular 
were the target of vested Western commercial interests, which responded to the 
new nationalist climate by cultivating Pretoria’s cordon sanitaire – a southern 
African bloc within which South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia were able to 
demand black political compromise from the abutting independent governments in 
return for white expertise and capital.570 Persuaded by the reports that emphasised 
rational economic decision-making, in contrast to Nyerere and Kaunda’s more 
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political objectives, the British, Soviet, American and Japanese governments, as 
well as the World Bank, rejected the TanZam rail link proposal.571 A third survey 
in 1963 yielded a more optimistic report. The London and Rhodesia Mining and 
Land Company Ltd. (Lonrho), registered in 1909, had established itself in the 
metals and mining sector before diversifying its portfolio in subsequent decades. 
Unlike the two earlier reports, the Lonrho survey was more positive about the rail 
link’s potential economic yield. However, as a profit-based private entity, Lonrho 
requested a monopoly over Zambian copper movements to the coast and was 
rejected by the Zambian government.572 
The TanZam rail link proposal further underscored Tanzania’s rapidly changing 
role from that of a more moderate East African actor to one of prominence in the 
southern African racial and political conflicts. Racial tensions in southern Africa were 
exacerbated by the Conservative British government. A high proportion of the 
Conservative members of parliament had business connections in Africa, which tilted 
the party towards the private sector.573 Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home put off 
making a difficult decision on Rhodesian independence because of the impending UK 
general election in October 1964, fearing that it would incense the OAU, UN and 
liberal elements.574 The Labour party defeated the Tories and won the election by the 
narrowest of margins – four seats.575 The Labour party was considered a more likely 
opponent of white Rhodesia, hence this change in British leadership raised the hopes of 
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black African nationalist governments who wanted more political pressure put on 
Rhodesia. Consequently the Tanzanian and Zambian governments also hoped that the 
new Labour government would be more supportive of the rail link project.  
ii) Tanzania’s request and China’s response 
The Chinese government was not a preferred donor for the TanZam rail link 
project. Until early 1965, Beijing had only delivered modest amounts of military 
assistance and development projects to the Tanzanian government. The Tanzanians 
were also fully aware that, as a developing country, China’s financial, material and 
technological capacity were very limited compared to that of the affluent countries and 
multi-lateral organisations. But the combination of very visible Chinese interest, with 
the narrowing of options because of the palpable Western disinterest in the proposal, 
led to the Chinese government’s entry as the unrivalled sponsor.  
Babu was once again an important broker of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship, 
this time by broaching the rail link proposal during the Tanzanian economic 
delegation’s visit to China in February 1965. His exploratory request was received 
positively and prepared the ground for Nyerere’s formal request later that month. 
Indeed, when Babu returned to Dar es Salaam, he appeared confident that funding for 
the project was no longer an obstacle. He explained blithely to a British journalist that 
the political value of the railway had been emphasised to its sponsors, who had 
promised their support.576 Although Babu did not reveal their identity, the timing of his 
statement provoked much well-founded speculation on Chinese interest in the 
sponsorship of the TanZam rail link. 
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Consul Zhou Boping’s account of the Chinese government’s reaction to Babu’s 
request is illuminating and offers an additional perspective to the less enthusiastic 
Chinese attitude which Monson describes.577 Upon receiving the Tanzanian request, the 
Chinese officials acted swiftly. The matter was dealt with and monitored at the highest 
levels of government. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Chen Yi sought 
opinions from the relevant Chinese ministries on the TanZam rail link project. Premier 
Zhou took great interest in their reports and called a meeting with Chen, representatives 
from the Foreign Economic Liaison Committee and the Ministry of Railways. 
Throughout the session, the economic implications of the railway project were not 
raised as an issue. Indeed, Beijing’s priorities in the 1960s were not primarily 
economic. The TanZam rail link project was an opportunity for the Chinese 
government to upstage its rivals and detractors, such as the Soviets, who had 
constructed the Volta dam in Ghana and the Aswan dam in Egypt, as well as the 
Western governments’ aid programmes. The Chinese strove to outshine Taiwanese 
efforts, which were mainly modest agricultural projects.  
The five considerations which were discussed are important in understanding 
the Chinese government’s motivations for offering to sponsor the project. The officials 
first acknowledged the political impetus and urgency of the rail link project for both the 
Tanzanian and Zambian governments. Both African leaders supported the liberation 
struggles in southern Africa in spite of intimidations from the white minority regimes, 
which made the project a high priority for the Chinese government. Moreover, the 
officials agreed that Nyerere’s request be met as he would be making the appeal in 
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person.578 The second consideration noted in the report was that the Chinese 
government was financially and technically capable of undertaking the project. The 
estimated construction cost of the rail link was several hundred million Yuan – difficult 
to bear in a lump sum – but, spread over time and taking into account China’s economic 
growth in those eight to nine years, the annual sum was affordable.579 The group noted 
that Kaunda had not decided whether to request Chinese help and so the construction of 
only the Tanzanian segment of the rail link was definitely feasible.  
The third consideration was that the impact of and influence from such a large-
scale project would outweigh the effects of many smaller, scattered projects. The 
Chinese government’s participation in making the black African nationalist railway a 
reality would visibly demonstrate its commitment to anti-imperialism and anti-
colonialism, as the route was “not just physical, but also ideological”.580 Mao’s mantra 
of anti-imperialism and continuous revolution still had broad appeal in Southern Africa 
and, if his government undertook the TanZam rail link project, the Chinese government 
could claim to have consistently supported nationalist struggles against the intransigent 
racist and colonial regimes.581  
Nevertheless the officials recognised the challenges of implementing a large, 
transnational project in a distant, tropical location, the fourth consideration raised at the 
meeting. They cited the many unfamiliar issues and problems, which ranged from 
colonial intrigues to practical dangers. Hence, cautioned the report, “we cannot lower 
our guard” as the management of those issues could be either a sources of great pride or 
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embarrassment for the Chinese government.582 The meeting recommended that a survey 
team be sent to investigate the conditions along the route and to design an 
implementation plan. Finally, the group predicted that a Chinese offer to construct the 
rail link would create panic in some Western countries and might even trigger a 
counter-offer: Nyerere could then use the Chinese offer as a trump card to oppose any 
conditions that other donors might stipulate.583 Mao and the Party Central Committee 
agreed to the five points that were raised by the group. A great deal of effort and 
political will was directed towards getting an answer that would allow the Chinese 
leaders to be able to respond to Nyerere positively.  
While Nyerere was in Beijing, the tone of the bilateral discussions about the rail 
link was encouraging and the Chinese leaders appeared sincerely interested in the 
TanZam project. In contrast to Nyerere’s discussions with Western donor governments, 
his Chinese hosts focused considerably less on the project’s economic profitability and 
appreciated the political underpinnings of the request.584 President Liu Shaoqi advised 
that the Tanzanian section be finalised first, after which an implementation plan could 
be confirmed and, if Kaunda were to request for the Zambian section subsequently, the 
same process would apply.585 Consequently the Chinese government made an offer to 
sponsor the entire rail route, including the Zambian section, and assured that full 
ownership would be given to both Tanzania and Zambia upon completion, along with 
the relevant technology and equipment.586  
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Yet both the Chinese and Tanzanian governments viewed the TanZam rail link 
as a huge undertaking and there was a mutual understanding that the Tanzanians would 
wait to see if other donors might emerge, wanting to outpace possible Chinese influence 
from such a large project.587 The evidence suggests that Nyerere intended to use the 
Chinese trump card quietly, rather than to draw unnecessary attention. Unknown to the 
Chinese, however, Nyerere he had told Kaunda before the trip to China that he would 
avoid committing Tanzania irrevocably to China, because Kaunda preferred other 
donor options. Nyerere was fully aware that there was no perfect donor, as the TanZam 
rail link project was replete with vying political, economic and developmental interests. 
It was imperative that he appeared independent, because Tanzania was a haven for 
liberation movements. Upon his return to Dar es Salaam, Nyerere put his trump card to 
the test. But the bargaining process was a tortuous one and the reasons for the long-
drawn-out delay are examined next. 
II. Obstacles and distractions for the Chinese offer 
The Tanzanian and Zambian governments maintained cordial relations with the 
British government even after independence. Nyerere acknowledged the necessity of 
continuing relations with the former colonial power because of their historical ties and 
the need for British aid. But the Chinese government’s possible entry as the sole 
sponsor of the TanZam rail link increased the external political pressure on both 
African governments and threatened to fragment the Tanzanian government from 
within. This research shows that three significant obstacles emerged and prolonged 
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Nyerere’s deliberation about Liu’s offer: Firstly, the Zambian government’s constraints, 
in particular Kaunda’s reservations about Chinese involvement in such a strategically 
important undertaking; secondly, the external pressure on both the Zambian and 
Tanzanian governments; and thirdly, the divisions within the Tanzanian government. 
i) Zambian constraints 
Unlike Nyerere, who was able to throw his full energies behind the rail link 
proposal, Kaunda had to moderate his public position on the issue due to a number of 
constraints. The reason was partly economic. Zambia, with its mineral wealth was 
considerably more affluent than Tanzania. In 1965, Zambia’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita was more than double (239%) that of Tanzania. More significantly, 
Zambia’s GDP per capita that year was one-and-a-half times more (162%) than that of 
China.588 From that perspective, it followed that China – itself a developing country – 
was a less attractive donor to the Zambian government for the TanZam project than the 
technologically advanced and well-resourced Western countries. Hence Kaunda was 
extremely reluctant to accept the Chinese government’s sole sponsorship of the rail 
link. 
Yet Chinese contact with representatives from Northern Rhodesia had begun on 
cordial terms even before independence, so that by 1964 more than half of the senior 
UNIP party officials had visited China. Kaunda frequently visited Tanganyika, and 
Ambassador He Ying claims to have met him nearly every time. Furthermore, the 
evidence shows that Kaunda was keen to establish good relations with the Chinese. He 
invited He Ying to visit Zambia in June 1964 and arranged for him to meet ten other 
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department heads, all of whom reiterated their government’s recognition of One 
China.589 This support was clearly demonstrated by the immediate establishment of 
official ties and the exclusion of the ROC from the Zambian independence celebrations 
in October 1964, in spite of a request from ROC Vice Foreign Minister Yang Xikun. 
Such favourable early developments notwithstanding, the Chinese embassy reported a 
stagnation of bilateral ties in Zambia’s immediate post-independence period.590 The 
Zambian government had planned to send a delegation to China in late 1964, which did 
not take place because of an administrative delay and plans for another visit were put 
on the backburner.591 There was a subsequent lull in relations until August 1965. 
Vested business interests wanted to preserve the status quo and subvert the 
proposal for the TanZam rail link. The Northern News, a newspaper acquired by 
Lonrho in 1963 to promote its business agenda, roused popular anti-Chinese sentiment 
by reporting in February 1965 that the Chinese government would sponsor the 
Tanzanian segment of the TanZam rail link and was awaiting Kaunda’s decision on the 
Zambian segment.592 The publication of the article was strategically timed, just ahead 
of the Tanzanian presidential visit to China. The Zambian government swiftly 
dispatched foreign minister Simon Kapwepwe to Dar es Salaam, ostensibly to persuade 
Nyerere against having sole Chinese sponsorship for the project. Kapwepwe held a 
press conference upon his return to Lusaka to allay any fears about the reported Chinese 
interest in the rail link and declared that Chinese assistance for the project was 
impossible. News of the Chinese offer was restricted even within the Chinese 
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government, to the point that no official information had been sent to the Chinese 
Embassy in Lusaka about the matter – the announcement had caught them by 
surprise.593   
There were also constitutional constraints which affected Kaunda’s show of 
support for any Chinese sponsorship for the TanZam project. As a joint owner of 
Rhodesia Railways, a break in the 1963 agreement with Southern Rhodesia would 
mean a loss of revenue and stiff penalties. Kaunda preferred instead to explore 
multilateral or Western options. He and Nyerere met with the other members of the 
East Africa Railways and Harbours Corporation, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta and 
Ugandan President Milton Obote, on 12 March 1965 to rally more regional support for 
the project. The leaders agreed to establish an Inter-governmental Ministerial 
Committee (IMC) to oversee the project’s terms of reference and financing.594 Once 
again the Tanzanians appeared to be very interested in going ahead with the project, but 
the Ugandan and Kenyan governments were undecided. Hence the issue remained 
unresolved.  
The Chinese government correctly observed that the Zambian government’s 
insecurity about its offer for the rail link was due to the looming possibility of 
Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence.595  Zambia offered safe havens for 
the Zimbabwean liberation movements, but walked a tight rope.596 Tanzania’s 
uncompromising stance on anti-imperialism made that pressure even more acute.597 
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Kaunda felt that the TanZam rail link was a strategic project and that it would allow the 
Chinese access to too dangerous a source of influence.598 Yet the Zambian government 
did not dismiss the possibility of other areas of Chinese assistance. In a discussion 
between Finance Ministry official Mwyinga and the Chinese Ambassador, the former 
explained that his government wanted to fight imperialism – including American and 
British colonialism – but was unable to do so at the moment. That was a major reason 
as to why the two governments differed in their approach to the Chinese offer of 
sponsorship. When Mwyinga shared that Zambia’s biggest problem at the moment was 
its poorly developed infrastructure, the ambassador interjected that a team would be 
sent to Tanzania to survey the Tanzanian segment of the rail ink and that it could also 
travel to Zambia, if Kaunda so wished.  
Mwyinga deflected the suggestion and asked for military assistance instead, 
explaining that the Zambian army only had two battalions. But the Chinese ambassador 
was non-committal and suggested that the Zambian government approach Tanzania and 
other friendly African countries to provide military assistance instead.599 The Zambians 
persisted with courting the Chinese government and a few weeks later, on 12 May 
1965, they raised the possibility of Kaunda visiting China in June. This plan did not 
materialise because allegations of Chinese interference in Zambia’s domestic affairs:600 
A Chinese diplomat had reportedly given cash to a local trade union official. This 
incident pushed the Zambian government to cap the size of all diplomatic missions in 
Lusaka, a ban on several Communist publications (including the World Marxist Review 
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and those by the British Communist Party) and resulted in Kaunda’s subsequent 
coolness towards overtures from the Chinese embassy.601  
Meanwhile in Tanzania, He Ying met Nyerere in early May 1965. The 
ambassador suggested that the rail survey team be delayed until Nyerere decided on the 
donor and, if Tanzania should decide to go with the West, then the Chinese government 
would withdraw its offer. The ambassador then added that the withdrawal of China’s 
offer would start rumours about its intentions. Not wanting to put the Chinese 
government in a difficult situation, Nyerere then decided that they would proceed with 
the original plan from February, with Chinese assistance for the Tanzanian section of 
the railway. Nyerere clarified that if any Western governments were interested in 
making a counter-offer at that point, he would explain to Kaunda to let them carry on 
with the Zambian segment. Finally, he added his hope that the survey team would come 
soon.602 
Kaunda was unabashed in lobbying for British support for the rail link. Zambia 
was considered an example of successful British decolonisation policy and it 
maintained friendly ties with moderate Commonwealth governments. Undeterred by 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s lukewarm response to his earlier appeals for 
assistance, Kaunda implored the former to do everything possible to support Nyerere, 
and to re-consider financial assistance for the TanZam rail link.603 The Zambian leader 
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even tried to raise the stakes by pleading for a British rescue operation to save Tanzania 
from Communist Chinese domination.604  
ii) External political pressure on the Tanzanian government 
Another obstacle in the way of Nyerere’s acceptance of the Chinese offer to 
construct the TanZam rail link was external pressure.605 He recognised that the project 
was a large commitment and reasoned that, if the British government or a multilateral 
donor could be found, then the Chinese government could save its scarce resources and 
assist his country in some other way. However, Nyerere intimated that he still held 
reservations about “Western sincerity” and requested that the Chinese survey mission 
proceed; thereafter, should the deal with the West fall through, the decision would be 
clear.  
Anglo-American discussions on the problems of Rhodesia and South Africa 
centred on how British aid monies could be presented to African leaders, because the 
US government viewed East and southern Africa as being primarily a British 
responsibility. Washington was more focused on developments in Vietnam, where they 
were pitted against the Chinese-supported Vietcong in protracted guerrilla warfare, than 
on out-bidding Beijing for an expensive infrastructure project in Africa. “The US 
government doubted the feasibility of the rail link, which could take ten years to build, 
by which time the Rhodesian issue might be resolved and the efficient southern routes 
would be open to Zambia, rendering the railway to Dar es Salaam unnecessary.”606 
 
604
 NA, CAB148/46, Copy of a letter from Mr. J. O. Wright, Prime Minister’s Office, to Mr. C. Adams, CRO, 25 
February 1965; NA, CAB148/46, Aid to Tanzania: Note by the Secretaries, 9 March 1965.
605
 CFMA, 106-02154-05, 10 May 1965.
606
 Wood, p. 326. 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 206 
Furthermore, the US government preferred a wide consortium approach to joint 
development in the region, which would get the African leaders to focus on domestic 
development by “[turning] African minds inward and away from external irritations.”607 
The State Department’s African Affairs Bureau and its portfolio ranked very low in 
President Lyndon Johnson’s priorities.608 Hence the impetus for any major assistance or 
intercession rested on the British government. Its main reason for wanting to minimise 
Chinese influence in Zambia was to safeguard the substantial British investment in the 
copper belt, because a spill-over of Chinese influence from Tanzania would weaken 
Kaunda’s ability to restrain foreign interference in the trade unions.609  
But the Chinese trump card soon took effect. When fears arose that Premier 
Zhou would make a formal offer for the rail link project to Nyerere during his state visit 
to Tanzania in June 1965, the State Department’s African Affairs Bureau was finally 
given approval to propose a road transport package to the Tanzanian and Zambian 
governments, a move calculated to countervail the Chinese presence from the “major 
Chinese Communist bridgehead in East Africa” and affect Western interests”.610  Zhou 
visited Tanzania in June 1965 and, as anticipated, discussed the Tanzania-Zambia rail 
link project. The Chinese government’s commitment to the project was clear, as Zhou 
informed Nyerere that a comprehensive survey group would be despatched in August or 
September to survey the rail route.611 To make full use of its capacity, the team would 
also take the opportunity to study other geological aspects along the line, such as coal 
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mines, iron ore deposits and hydrology.612 Once again there was no official disclosure 
of the Chinese government’s offer construct the TanZam rail link, although American 
intelligence knew that the matter had been discussed and that Zhou had offered 
assistance in building 1,000 miles of the railway, partly with Chinese labour.613 The 
Sino-Tanzanian relationship was already proving to be one of the successes of China’s 
African policy, but Chinese diplomacy faltered elsewhere in the region. After Premier 
Zhou’s visit to Tanzania, he was unable to visit the other East African countries. The 
other East African leaders did not extend invitations for Zhou to visit and gave him the 
cold shoulder. Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta had gone to the extent of barring 
Zhou’s plane from making an hour-long refuelling break in Nairobi.614  
Shortly after Zhou’s visit, Nyerere attended the 14th Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Conference in London. Prime Minister Harold Wilson tried to convince the 
Commonwealth leaders to support a Commonwealth mission to attain peace in 
Vietnam. Kaunda was supportive of the idea, but Nyerere was the main antagonist of 
the British position. Observing that Nyerere seemed to argue for the Chinese 
government’s position in Vietnam, Wilson surmised – incorrectly – that Nyerere had 
“sold himself out to the Chinese” and was too weak to stand up to the strongly pro-
Chinese Zanzibaris in his delegation.615 Barbara Castle also rued that “Julius was either 
afraid of his own extremists or was not being honest about his own ideologies”.616 On 
Rhodesia, Nyerere was the main antagonist of the British position and declared that the 
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only condition for independence was universal suffrage.617 He condemned the UK 
government’s failure to intervene and called for a military intervention to quell the 
Rhodesian Front rebels.618 Even Kaunda complained that Nyerere took “too simple and 
moralistic a view of international relations” when he should be more concerned with 
the articulation of his policies.”619 Nyerere’s presentation of his case may have 
appeared “naïve”, yet he tried to abide by a principled position of non-alignment based 
on his understanding of what would be acceptable to the Chinese government.620 After 
all, he had great access to the Chinese leaders and spent many occasions discussing 
their analyses of international affairs.621 Throughout this time, Ian Smith was in the 
wings, decrying Tanzania as being under the control of Communist China.622 
However, the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was negatively affected by the 
Chinese government’s response to the coup which ousted Algerian President Ben Bella 
on 19 June. The Defence Minister H. Boumedienne seized the government on the eve 
of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, which was to have been hosted in Algiers. 
Owing to a misreading and poor analysis of the situation by the Chinese ambassador in 
Algiers, the Chinese leaders pushed for the conference to proceed as planned. The “fatal 
blunder” caused a backlash among many African governments.623 Nyerere was 
unabashed in calling the Chinese response “a betrayal and disgusting”; thereafter, he 
grumbled bitterly to Kaunda that the Chinese, “like everyone else outside, did not 
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understand Africa.”624 Nyerere went on to support the proposal by the Commonwealth 
Afro-Asian prime ministers to postpone the Afro-Asian conference and that delay was a 
huge diplomatic setback for the Chinese government.625 At the same time, the Kenyan 
and Zambian governments were alarmed by the circulation of seditious pamphlets that 
called for revolution in Africa. These were presumed to be of Chinese origin, but were 
really produced by a third party to discredit the Chinese at a particularly vulnerable 
time. He Ying informed the Foreign Ministry and expressed his hope that the Tanzanian 
and other African governments would not be fooled by those forgeries, but the damage 
had already been done.626 
The months following the Algerian coup severely eroded the unity and 
solidarity of the Afro-Asian countries as the preparatory meetings were beleaguered by 
politicking between the major Afro-Asian governments and Sino-Soviet tensions. The 
Chinese lobbied to have the conference in Algiers materialise – it was postponed to 
November 1965 – and to bar Soviet participation in it.627 But Nyerere was still 
affronted by the Chinese government’s attitudes towards the Algerian coup. Nyerere 
reiterated to He Ying that Ben Bella was a true African revolutionary and that his 
absence from the Afro-Asian conference would be a huge loss. As such, Nyerere 
informed the ambassador that there was no reason for a Tanzanian delegation to attend 
the event.628  
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These sentiments were indicative of the general dissatisfaction that many third 
world governments felt at being dragged into geo-political rivalries that did not concern 
them and, worse, which displaced more pressing and relevant issues. In a private 
meeting with the British High Commissioner to Kenya, Malcolm MacDonald, Nyerere 
claimed that Zhou had gone much too far with his criticisms of America and the West 
in his speeches and had “brought the Cold War to Tanzania.”629 When the Chinese 
government finally accepted that they had scant support among the delegates, it did a 
volte face by supporting an indefinite postponement and, finally, the Conference was 
adjourned indefinitely. This huge rebuff for Chinese diplomacy in the Afro-Asian 
movement was quickly followed by the liquidation of the Indonesian Communist Party, 
the strongest pro-Beijing Communist party in the world, by President Suharto’s army. 
The Chinese government’s support and legitimacy within the divided Communist bloc 
was weakened even further. 
The Zambian delegation to the Commonwealth conference was caught off guard 
by yet another revelation. Kaunda was aware of the Sino-Tanzanian discussions for 
some months, but only found out then that Nyerere had actually accepted the Chinese 
offer. Nyerere explained that the Chinese government had only committed to building 
the railway if their survey indicated that the project was feasible, but Kaunda was livid. 
With the news of the Chinese government’s offer to construct the TanZam rail link no 
longer a secret, the media went into a frenzy. The absence of a consensus between the 
Zambian, Tanzanian and Chinese governments was reflected in the confusing press 
coverage. The Guardian reported on 2 July that the Chinese Government had made a 
firm offer of tied aid to the governments of Tanzania and Zambia, worth £75 million 
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($210 million) and £150 million ($420 million) respectively to enable them to build the 
railway line. The article claimed that Beijing was increasing its pressure on Nyerere, 
especially after Kaunda had spurned a direct offer from the Chinese embassy in Lusaka. 
On 3 July, Zambian press and radio carried reports of the Chinese government’s offer 
of a free survey for the Tanzanian section of the rail link and the construction of that 
section on terms to be negotiated after the Chinese survey. Less than a week later, 
however, Nyerere reportedly postponed his decision on the Chinese offer.630 
Nyerere was frustrated by the British and American governments’ portrayal of 
Chinese sponsorship of the rail link as an ideological, Cold War battle. He also bristled 
at the drama over the Sino-Tanzanian relationship; a fuss that he described as 
“sometimes funny, sometimes irritating, and always odd.” Nyerere complained bitterly 
to British officials that the Western governments implied that he and Kaunda would be 
“committing a crime” if they accepted money from the Communist world to build the 
rail link and yet they themselves presented no alternatives.631 According to Nyerere, the 
Chinese and Russian governments were less high-handed in their dealings with African 
leaders and did not tell him to reject Western funding because “they would not dare say 
so”.632 Nyerere summed up the unpleasant situation that he faced: 
If I had Tanzanian money I would use that. Unfortunately money has taken up a 
position. There is Red money and there is Blue money – all the money in this 
world is either Red or Blue. I do not have my own Green money, so where can I 
get some from? I am not taking a Cold War position. All I want is money to 
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build [the rail link]. I do not want another survey without an implied 
commitment to build [it].633 
Kaunda, on the other hand, remained adamant about establishing an 
international consortium to fund the project via the African Development Bank (ADB). 
As the political situation in Rhodesia worsened, the Tanzanian and Zambian 
governments decided that a feasibility study be commissioned immediately.634 Nyerere 
approached the British High Commission on 22 July to request a British-Canadian 
feasibility study.635 At an interview with a British newsman, Nyerere revealed how he 
had approached the Chinese and elicited an offer of a survey. The president appeared 
pleased at having successfully played off East against West in having elicited the offer 
of a survey from Britain through revealing his approach to the Chinese.636 Nevertheless, 
Cudlipp also believed that Nyerere preferred a railway constructed by the West rather 
than the East because the former would do a better job.637 But for all the external 
pressures that bore down on Nyerere, a major deciding factor which affected his 
government’s capacity to see through the negotiation process were the divisions within 
the Tanzanian government.  
The historiography of the TanZam rail link negotiation process has generally 
neglected the effect of internal fissures within the Tanzanian government. Coming in 
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the post-independence phase and so quickly after the union of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar, the Tanzanian government was divided on a number of key issues relating to 
Chinese sponsorship of the TanZam rail link. The First Vice-President Abeid Karume 
favoured a joint exercise with Zambia in which the Zambian government would be 
accountable for a higher proportion of the cost; Kambona preferred each country to 
build its own segment, with China constructing the Tanzanian part.638 However, 
Nyerere felt that Kaunda would not agree to either option.  
Additionally, Babu was unable to guarantee his government’s outright 
acceptance of Beijing’s offer. He met with Foreign Minister Chen Yi in August 1965 
and insisted that the rail link would support Zambian policies that would also benefit 
Tanzania and thus strengthen the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. Furthermore, it would 
prevent Lusaka’s dangerous drift towards Southern Rhodesia, Malawi and South 
Africa.639 Those governments viewed the TanZam railway as “the most ominous 
portent of black aspirations and Communist influence.”640 Babu explained to Chen that 
the British government was putting pressure on Kaunda to reject the Chinese offer, and 
that the Zambian government was primarily concerned that Chinese sponsorship would 
diminish American and British interest in the project, thus running the risk of both 
African governments being left empty-handed.641 A lack of consensus within Nyerere’s 
government about the Chinese offer was evident from Tanzanian reactions to the arrival 
of the seventeen-strong Chinese survey team in mid-August, which was akin to a 
dramatic comedy. 
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The objective of the survey team’s visit was to provide the Chinese government 
with a sound basis for evaluating the project, should the Tanzanian government decide 
to submit a formal request at a later stage. Economic Affairs and Development Planning 
Minister Paul Bomani informed British officials that he and most of his colleagues at 
the Treasury had known absolutely nothing about the arrivals; Nyerere had apparently 
been so livid that he refused the team’s courtesy call. The Tanzanian ministers, added 
Bomani, then rushed to convene urgent meetings to decide on how this embarrassing 
matter should be handled.642 The British suspected that the experts had come without a 
specific invitation from the Tanzanian government and that the “general vagueness” 
about their activities pointed to Nyerere’s own reluctance to close off other alternative 
offers for rail link sponsorship. Yet Nyerere was fully aware of the Chinese survey 
team’s visit.643 The terms of the survey been agreed upon with the Chinese, no doubt 
with his knowledge, and he had mentioned the team’s impending arrival to British 
representatives on a number of occasions.644 It was also possible that Nyerere did not 
want to disclose information about the survey team to too many people. 
Observing these events from Lusaka, Kaunda believed that Nyerere faced the 
risk of being removed from office if he did not take a hard line against the West, 
especially the United States and West Germany. The more he pushed that line, 
however, the less aid those countries gave and the more attractive Chinese aid became. 
Kaunda reportedly felt that Nyerere’s position was uncertain and that he would be 
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“very lucky” to remain in control much longer, particularly as Babu as “the ideas man” 
was entirely pro-Chinese. Furthermore Babu’s growing influence on Kambona made it 
imperative for Nyerere to go along with both Tanzanian officials, in order to keep the 
government united.645 Therefore Kaunda hoped that the British government would 
initiate a private dialogue with Nyerere. The Zambian leader looked to Whitehall to 
support a Tanzania-Zambia development project in order to create a zone of stability 
between the two countries. This would have the additional benefit of giving Kaunda the 
means to exert more effective influence over Nyerere and divert attention within 
Tanzania from external political problems to domestic economic ones.646 
However, Kaunda had overestimated the effect that his appeal would have on 
the British government. The latter was thoroughly absorbed by its balance of payments 
crisis; the ongoing debates about aid in parliament; and the thorny situation in Southern 
Rhodesia. The CRO considered the effect that an increase in British aid to Tanzania 
would have on the other East African countries and warned that that would antagonise 
Kenya and Uganda while providing no guarantee against the Tanzanians’ continued 
cultivation of the Chinese. The report argued that the best way to support Nyerere and 
prevent the Chinese from gaining any influential inroads was to provide expatriate staff 
and aid for the army and, in lesser measure, the air force.647 However, as Chapter Three 
has shown, Nyerere turned down any further military support from the British in favour 
of reconstructing the army as a politically embedded people’s militia, organised along 
similar lines to the Chinese army. 
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The British government’s strategy vis-à-vis the rail link was to manage the 
African leaders’ expectations and to use delaying tactics in the hope that the demands 
would run out of steam. In this way it would help Kaunda hold onto the situation 
without implying any commitment. The objective was to minimise political 
repercussions in the region in the short run that might further complicate British 
interests there. Hence, the Minister for Overseas Development, Barbara Castle, was 
sent to Tanzania in response to Kaunda’s plea, with a limited offer in hand. She 
explained to Nyerere that the British government’s proposal to finance £10 million ($28 
million) until 1970 was as much as the Treasury would allow because of its own 
balance of payments problems. But, she added, there was the possibility of a £75,000 
($0.21 million) contribution towards a joint British-Canadian feasibility study – known 
as the Maxwell Stamp survey – for the railway. Thus, the Chinese trump card was 
having some effect and Nyerere now had a possible survey on the table. 
Nyerere did not mention Zhou’s offer in any of his discussions with Castle, 
because he did not want to be seen as blackmailing the British into making a counter-
offer. Nevertheless, Nyerere’s non-disclosure later led to criticisms of his under-
handedness, compared to Kaunda who, in Whitehall’s eyes, had “played the game 
straight.”648 The British noted that if Nyerere accepted the Chinese offer, the left-wing 
elements in Zambia would have grounds to exert pressure on Kaunda to demonstrate 
comparable support for Zambia from the West.649 
Nyerere had to play his cards well, as the Tanzanian national election was on 30 
September. Although he was popular with the masses, his supporters were relatively 
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under-represented in TANU’s Central Committee. The disagreements within the 
Tanzanian government, together with Kaunda’s intransigence on the Chinese offer, 
made it crucial for him to solidify his position before raising the matter with the 
cabinet. Hence the election outcome was decisive for Nyerere’s strategy and solidified 
his position through the nationwide referendum. A positive outcome empowered 
Nyerere to act more decisively. 650 
As this section has shown, although the Chinese government offered to finance 
and construct the rail link, numerous obstacles hindered Kaunda and Nyerere’s 
wholehearted acceptance of that proposal. These were the Zambian government’s 
constraints and preferences for a multilateral donor, the external political pressures on 
the newly independent African governments and the divisions with the Tanzanian 
government.  
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III. Acceptance of the Chinese Offer  
This section sets out the main factors that finally pushed through the tripartite 
agreement on the TanZam rail link signed in 1967. The argument is presented in three 
sections: Firstly, the thaw in the Sino-Zambian relationship from August 1965; 
secondly, Southern Rhodesia and the unilateral declaration of independence; and 
thirdly, the tripartite agreement on Chinese sponsorship of the TanZam rail link. 
i) A thaw in Sino-Zambian relations 
The protracted negotiation process with the African governments about 
TanZam frustrated the Chinese diplomats. On one occasion, the Chinese embassy 
in Lusaka reported sardonically that China’s foreign exchange situation was 
difficult enough as it was, so that forking out such a large sum for the project was 
well nigh impossible.651 Kaunda’s stance on the Chinese offer remained unclear in 
August. The embassy observed drily that, “for the sake of domestic development, 
Kaunda is even willing to reach for the unattainable (‘things on Mars’), although 
he is still undecided as to the source of that assistance.”652 Although Kaunda 
continued to pursue the British-mediated option for as long as possible, there was 
nonetheless a perceptible thaw in Sino-Zambian relations. This took place behind 
the scenes and the Chinese embassy in Lusaka reported Zambian efforts to rally 
support against Rhodesia. The Zambian government also requested economic 
assistance and – in a conciliatory move – indicated their willingness to discuss 
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significant international issues such as the Afro-Asian conference, the African 
Union and the southern African liberation struggle.  
In addition, the Zambian government acceded to a number of requests that 
had been raised by the Chinese embassy, and Kaunda twice expressed his 
intention to visit China. The Zambian media increased its reporting on China and 
even broadcasted Beijing’s condemnations of British policy on Vietnam and 
American imperialism. The Chinese embassy attributed the Zambians’ more 
amenable attitude, in part, to Nyerere’s influence, Tanzania’s positive experience 
with Chinese aid and Nyerere’s ability to communicate its merits to Kaunda. The 
embassy concluded that, although both African leaders had expressed their 
determination for the TanZam rail link, they did not intend for it to be done with 
Chinese help alone.653 But the Chinese rejected any suggestion of joining an 
international consortium. It viewed the Zambian government’s emphasis on it as 
simply “playing for time”; to obtain a token Chinese offer as a fall-back option 
should Western aid fall through.654 Nevertheless, the Chinese embassy 
acknowledged that the other TanZam projects (the highway and pipeline) would 
increase much-needed opportunities for Zambia.655 
Indeed, Chinese records suggest that the government prioritised its relationship 
with Tanzania, a proven partner, and had only a moderate level of interest in deepening 
its relationship with Zambia, until the latter was deemed a genuine ally. Even though 
Zambia was a mineral-rich country, Chinese records show that the Chinese government 
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considered Tanzania’s financial position stronger. Beijing assisted Zambia through 
practical projects such as water irrigation and pest eradication, but trade relations 
remained a low priority because of the Zambian government’s close relationship with 
Britain. The Commercial Representative of the Chinese embassy appeared “obviously 
embarrassed” when approached by a British representative on 2 October about the 
status of the Chinese offer for the rail link. Li Feng, the Chinese official, denied any 
firm commitment and the Chinese ambassador gave a similarly non-committal reply, 
adding that his government was willing to build the railway if they were asked to do it, 
but emphasising that “we are not a rich country like [Britain].”656 In its correspondence 
with its embassy in Lusaka, the Chinese Foreign Ministry continued to emphasise the 
vital political value of the rail link in enabling both African governments to resist 
imperialism and consolidate independence, as well as its potentially significant 
contribution to promoting economic development.  
The embassy postulated that Zambia’s strategy might result in Chinese 
sponsorship of Tanzania’s railway, with perhaps a highway from the US, while Zambia 
would be left “with both hands empty”.657 In its analysis that reflected the prevailing 
Cold War realpolitik, the West might intentionally delay a decision on the highway if 
Zambia was given Chinese help; conversely, should Beijing not assist Zambia, Lusaka 
could then tell its people that it was not seeking Chinese assistance and justify its 
continued appeal to the West. In order to “further Zambia’s independent development 
and economic nationalisation,” the Chinese embassy and foreign ministry agreed to 
approach this challenge by letting Kaunda know that Zambian requests were being 
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seriously considered and any further action would then be up to them.658 An indication 
of its inability to influence Zambian opinion on the matter, the Chinese foreign ministry 
resigned itself to the fact that the negotiations would continue and the project would be 
difficult to implement, at least in the short run.659 
Unfortunately Nyerere’s gamble did not yield immediate results and, by 
September, no counter-offers for the rail link had been received beyond the British-
Canadian feasibility study, leading him to vent that “there [was] more talk about the 
railway, more political hot air, more Cold War rubbish than actual development.”660 On 
21 September, Nyerere confirmed that the Chinese offer to construct the TanZam rail 
link was the only definite one that had been received. To add some political weight to 
that otherwise disappointing news, the Tanzanian leader added that if the British 
negotiated an independence deal with the white minority in Southern Rhodesia, 
Tanzania would withdraw from the Commonwealth.661 This pronouncement pointed 
some international attention to British inaction and passivity on the explosive political, 
economic and human rights situation in Southern Rhodesia.  
ii) Southern Rhodesia and the UDI 
The external pressure on Zambia mounted as Anglo-Rhodesian discussions on 
the conditions for Rhodesian independence proved intractable. Ian Smith, representing 
the white settler Rhodesian Front, reminded Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the 
failure of British decolonisation in the region, which had resulted in Tanzania becoming 
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“little more than a Chinese puppet” and Zambia’s similarly “worrying” situation.662 
Smith ranted that “any premature hand-over to African rule would be to Communism, 
because […] there was no doubt from where the money, training, ideas and planning of 
the African nationalists was coming from.”663 Indeed, Soviet, Cuban and Chinese 
military support was being channelled to the liberation groups including ZANU and 
ZAPU.664  
A Zambian cabinet meeting was convened on 15 October to explore other major 
infrastructural options, such as an upgrade of the Benguela railway through Angola, but 
the ministers decided not to antagonise Rhodesia by taking any drastic measures.665 
Although there was always the possibility that Rhodesia could unilaterally declare itself 
independent, Kaunda believed that the British would intervene decisively in that event. 
However, Wilson’s apparently weak and vacillating stance towards Ian Smith’s 
“government” was proof enough that the Zambians could not count on the British to put 
down the rebellion. Indeed, a month later, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, Wilson capitulated and declared that the use of force 
could not be ruled out. Without a firm British stance on UDI, Kaunda knew, the 
problem was likely to be a protracted one. The Chinese government observed these 
developments closely and noted that, unlike the Tanzanian government which was more 
outspoken in its foreign relations and was a reliable ally, Zambia did not want to escape 
from the British “hook”.666 
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Rhodesia unilaterally declared itself independent on 11 November 1965.667 The 
event was the main “catalyst for [Zambian] disengagement” from southern Africa, 
because it triggered the progressive invalidation of factors that had delayed Kaunda’s 
decision on the Chinese offer.668 Predictably, Rhodesia stopped Zambian oil imports 
through its territory and ceased coal shipments soon after. The effects were felt 
immediately in Zambia, as emergency supply lines were set up via airlift and along the 
treacherous roads and terrain through southern Tanzania to the copper belt – the aptly 
named “hell run”.669 
Keen to underscore the robustness of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship at this 
particularly tense moment, He Ying invited First Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa to 
visit China after the latter’s trip to North Korea later that month.670 The Tanzanian vice-
president arrived in Beijing on 22 November and was greeted with a characteristically 
rousing welcome from hordes of Chinese workers, the People’s Liberation Army and 
students, all in a grand show of mass solidarity. Premier Zhou thanked the Tanzanians 
for their delegation’s support to restore Beijing’s seat in the UN; more importantly, he 
reiterated their close bilateral ties and pledged China’s ongoing support, specifically 
after Rhodesia’s UDI. Kawawa complimented the Chinese experts for their principled 
behaviour (especially in mentoring their Tanzanian charges) and requested for more 
assistance with factories and experts.671 Although these requests were considerably 
small in value, they were important for building mutual confidence in the Sino-
Tanzanian bilateral relationship, particularly at a tumultuous time in southern Africa.  
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iii) The tripartite agreement 
The Chinese government’s sole sponsorship of the TanZam rail link appeared 
less “dangerous” to the Zambian government in the post-UDI context. Although the 
external political and economic factors promoted closer Sino-Zambian ties, more work 
needed to be done to nurture the bilateral relationship. This time, however, it was the 
Zambian government which took the initiative to create opportunities for more frequent 
contacts with the Chinese, through requests for general economic assistance and small-
scale projects. The Zambians sent a governmental delegation to China in July 1966 to 
study China’s experience with large-scale national projects, followed by some lessons 
in credits and loans for infrastructural projects, the development of bilateral trade and 
an exchange of thoughts on international issues, such as the situation in Rhodesia and 
Vietnam.672 A high-level Zambian delegation led by Vice-President Reuben Kamanga 
visited Beijing shortly after, in mid-August 1966, in another important step towards 
building up mutual trust and rapport. His trip was also a test for the Zambian 
government to gauge Western reactions to the Sino-Zambian rapprochement.673 Indeed, 
Zambia’s needs were urgent. Kamanga requested help to fill the vacuum left by the 800 
of the 1,400 British railway personnel who had left for Rhodesia. Premier Zhou replied 
that China would try its best to assist and would send personnel who could speak 
English.674 
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The Chinese survey team finally submitted its report on the Tanzania-Zambia 
rail link project in October. It was a purely technical report which concluded that the 
construction of the rail link was feasible from an engineering perspective. There was no 
mention of the project’s economic prospects.675 The post-UDI context, coupled with the 
judicious encouragement of personal diplomacy and small-scale engagements (through 
the Chinese development projects) by the Tanzanian, Zambian and Chinese 
governments finally brought all three parties to the table. All three recognised that the 
TanZam rail link was, above all, a project of political necessity.676  
Indeed, throughout the entire process – from President Liu Shaoqi’s verbal offer 
in February 1965 until the signing of the preliminary tripartite agreement in 1967 – 
“only principles were discussed”.677 It was a level of commitment to a project of 
unprecedented scale that could only have been possible with a high level of political 
trust between the leaders; an impressive step forward in Sino-African relations overall. 
Nevertheless, the Zambian and Tanzanian governments still kept up their efforts to 
contact other potential donors, hoping that the Chinese trump card might still garner 
other options. They circulated the Maxwell Stamp report after the agreement with 
Beijing was signed in 1967, announcing publicly that offers for the project were “still 
open.”678 
No other offers came, however, and the Chinese government eventually granted 
988 million Yuan ($401 million) in interest-free loans to finance the railway. By the 
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time construction began in 1970, Nyerere had successfully consolidated his political 
power on the mainland and in the union’s foreign affairs. He managed to successfully 
overcome the fragility of the post-colonial African state, which allowed the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship to flourish in the late 1960s, in spite of external pressures from 
the Western countries and the radicalisation of Chinese diplomacy through the Cultural 
Revolution, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.679 The rail link was 
completed in 1975 and was the most impressive of China’s projects in Africa. PRC 
officials and media emphasised the Chinese thread that ran through the history of 
Tanzania’s rail infrastructure, which dated back to the German colonial era when 
indentured labourers were brought in from Qingdao, Shanghai, Fujian and Guangzhou 
to toil alongside the local African workers who constructed the first German East 
Africa railway.680 That shared historical experience of colonial exploitation provided 
the useful, moral ammunition for the Chinese government in the 1960s, which 
underscored the country’s long-standing ties with Tanzania. 
At the inauguration of the rail link, Nyerere highlighted the positive aspects of 
Chinese assistance: 
To say the very least, the Chinese people are not planning to make a profit from 
this railway. Indeed, they are making a gift to us, for it would be very expensive 
to borrow this amount of money at commercial rates of interest […] and – I 
repeat – the Chinese have not asked us to become communists in order to 
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qualify for this loan! […] they have never at any point suggested that we should 
change any of our policies – internal or external – because of their help with this 
railway. They have simply offered us generous terms in money and in men.681 
Most accounts of the TanZam rail link as a natural symbol and easy 
development in a deepening Sino-Tanzanian friendship begin from this point but, as 
this chapter has shown, the journey to the tripartite agreement was not a straightforward 
one. The lack of enthusiasm, the long months of bargaining and uncertainty about the 
TanZam project owing to the precarious domestic position of the nationalist leaders 
have remained unmentioned in much of the literature.  
Conclusion: The Tanzanian-Zambian consensus on Chinese sponsorship for the 
TanZam rail link 
This chapter has explained the new importance and significance of the TanZam 
rail link project, from that of colonial control and profit, to one of African freedom and 
development. The rail link promised to strengthen Zambia’s capacity as a frontline state 
in the southern African liberation struggle. But sponsorship for the rail link was hard to 
come by and the Chinese government presented the only offer to finance and construct 
the project.  
The second section in this chapter showed that there were numerous distractions 
and obstacles surrounding the Chinese offer to sponsor the rail link. The Chinese offer 
to the Tanzanian government was genuine; however, it was a loaded proposition for 
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Nyerere, because accepting it entailed high political risks for his country. Beijing’s 
offer to undertake the massive project was ostensibly an ambitious demonstration of its 
principles as a revolutionary force, and a strategic move by a diplomatically isolated, 
third world power. The Chinese leaders and Nyerere were aware that an offer from Red 
China would provoke international attention on the region and inject momentum into 
the search for a serious sponsor. Nevertheless, when it became clear that there would be 
no other donors for the project, the Chinese government started to question the delay in 
the Tanzanian and Zambian decision.  
As the chapter has shown, the Zambian government was bound by constitutional 
constraints. Additionally, as a newly independent government under increasing pressure 
from Rhodesia, it was insecure and did not want to further complicate the regional 
situation by agreeing to sole Chinese sponsorship of the project. The Tanzanian 
government was not spared from the intense external pressure from the Western 
powers, but Nyerere continued to pursue a non-aligned policy based on principles. 
Moreover, the diplomatic path to the decision was long and complex, as this research 
has shown. The Chinese offer of assistance also led to divisions within the Tanzanian 
government over the kind of trilateral arrangement that would be required. These 
internal difficulties were mitigated to an extent by Nyerere’s successful re-election. 
Finally, the third section of this chapter demonstrated that the Chinese 
government’s offer to sponsor the TanZam rail link finally came through a convergence 
of important internal and external factors. Kaunda’s reluctance to accept Chinese  
assistance for the rail link remained the most intractable obstacle, but things finally 
came to a head with Rhodesia’s UDI on 11 November 1965. In the post-UDI landscape, 
the factors which had made Kaunda reluctant to accept the Chinese offer were no  
 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 229 
longer valid. A progressive thaw in the Sino-Zambian relationship prior to Rhodesian 
UDI set the stage for an accelerated rapprochement post-UDI, and the signing of the 
tripartite agreement in 1967. The negotiation process for the TanZam rail link had a 
combination of reinforcing factors: external pressures, internal consolidation and 
bilateral engagement through personal diplomacy and foreign aid.  
The Chinese trump card eventually worked: While there was no counter-offer 
for the TanZam rail link, the Western powers pulled together to deliver two additional 
projects, a highway and an oil pipeline, which plied generally along the same route. 
Certainly the impetus for their construction would not have arisen – at least not as 
quickly – in the absence of a Chinese-constructed railway. The Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship that began modestly at the start of the 1960s had, by the middle of the 
decade, attained the character of a militant and anti-imperialist friendship that yielded 
developmental, political as well as diplomatic dividends for both governments. The 
rhetoric of solidarity that bolstered the bilateral relationship was intensified further by 
the increase in Chinese development aid to Tanzania, as demonstrated most clearly by 
the arrival of the Chinese medical experts, the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five – Chinese medical teams in Tanzania, 1964 to 1970 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the Sino-Tanzanian relationship 
had, overall, generated mutually beneficial dividends. Chinese aid differed from other 
governments’ foreign aid at the very fundamental levels of political ideology, foreign 
policy objectives and historical experience. These differences determined the structure 
and implementation of the Chinese aid programme, as well as influenced how it 
engaged with the Tanzanian bureaucracy, local power structures and communities.  
Using Chinese medical aid as a case study, this chapter builds on the argument 
that European decolonisation in Africa allowed China to make significant gains from a 
relatively modest aid programme because of the legacy of colonial neglect. This chapter 
has been informed by the literature on European-African colonial encounters in 
healthcare, such as Iliffe and Vaughan’s works on the socio-political factors that shaped 
the healthcare systems of the East African countries.682 More importantly, the study 
pushes further the analysis of the theory and implementation of Chinese aid.683 It does 
so in three areas: Firstly, the geopolitical, ideological and historical context which 
shaped Chinese aid policy; secondly, the link between the politicisation of the Chinese 
medical system in the 1960s and China’s health diplomacy in practise; and thirdly, how 
the combination of the first two factors converged with local African factors – such as 
Nyerere’s emphasis on self-reliance and socialism – to make possible the positive 
outcomes of Chinese medical aid, especially in the rural regions of Tanzania. 
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I. Chinese aid policy  
The earlier chapters have shown in detail the geopolitical context surrounding 
Chinese engagement in Africa in the 1960s: The continent was under great political 
pressures from European decolonisation (Chapters One and Two), incomplete 
decolonisation and Cold War rivalries (Chapters Three and Four), as well as post-
independence economic pressures (Chapter Four). The African environment was 
generally hostile and wary of the Communist Chinese government. Yet where the PRC 
was able to make diplomatic inroads, it strove to strengthen those fledgling ties through 
the commitment of aid monies and development projects.   
This section sets out the background and context to Chinese foreign aid in 
three parts: Firstly, China’s own experience as a formerly aid-dependent, 
developing country. Secondly, the aid rivalry between the PRC and the ROC 
governments and, thirdly, the essence of Chinese aid policy as spelled out in the 
Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic and Technical Aid to Other 
Countries.  
i) China and foreign aid 
The Communist Party of China (CCP) came to power in 1949, but 
remained on the periphery of international diplomacy well into the next decade. 
Beijing’s priority in those initial years was to consolidate its power and closely 
align itself with the Soviet Union, which provided valuable industrial and 
economic assistance. Beijing’s inchoate conception of development operated 
within the communist framework of internationalism and solidarity. China had 
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benefitted greatly from foreign aid, which came mainly from the Soviet and 
Eastern European countries. According to Cheng, it constituted one of the largest 
technology transfers ever and rivaled the American Marshall Plan which assisted 
Western Europe after the Second World War.684 Soviet assistance enabled the 
Chinese to develop a sizeable domestic metallurgical and machine-building 
capacity.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders felt that the Soviet government used the 
provision of aid as a tool to control their decisions. Most of the Soviet projects in 
China were financed by low interest loans, although the Chinese government was 
under pressure by the Soviet government to repay them for items which it felt 
should have been free. The repayment of the Soviet loans began in 1954 and 
payments came to $200 million per year between 1955 and 1960. Chinese 
dependence on Soviet assistance lasted until the Sino-Soviet dispute finally 
erupted and 1,390 Soviet specialists were recalled from China in July 1960.685 The 
effect of that human, financial and technical drain on China was immense, as 343 
contracts and supplementary agreements concerning experts, as well as 257 
scientific and technical cooperation projects were all annulled within a month.686 
When relations turned icy in 1962, the Chinese government pushed ahead and 
settled their repayments worth about $1.75 billion. The Sino-Soviet dispute and 
the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China poisoned official memories of 
bilateral relations for years.687 
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The negative experience with Soviet aid left the Chinese leaders very 
bitter. The rhetoric of third world solidarity replaced that of Communist solidarity 
and was consistently used by the PRC officials to third world governments, along 
with references to their shared history of colonial subjugation and exploitation. 
Hence the precepts of national sovereignty, reconstruction and socialism were 
anchored deeply in the ethos of Chinese aid and, from this perspective; Chinese 
military assistance to the African liberation movements validated the 
government’s “principled” approach to international relations.  
Chairman Mao’s assurance given to Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda during 
the latter’s first state visit to China in June 1967 is typical of the way PRC aid was 
presented and also emphasised the important contributions that Tanzania and Zambia 
made to anti-colonial struggles: 
When Tanzania and Zambia gained independence, both countries supported the 
liberation struggle in southern Africa. China became independent more than ten 
years earlier, so when Tanzania and Zambia encounter difficulties, China has an 
obligation to assist. This is also a support for China herself, so there is no need 
to speak of thanks.688 
The Chinese government thus presented its foreign aid as influenced by its 
ideological motivation of internationalism, as well as its bittersweet experience as a 
recipient of Soviet bilateral aid. Both factors distinguished the PRC government from 
the other bilateral donors.  
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ii) PRC aid and ROC aid 
The Chinese government’s main political rivals in Africa were the Soviet Union, 
Western donors (the US and the former colonial powers) and the Republic of China 
(ROC). The Sino-Soviet rivalry was discussed in detail in Chapters Two and Three; the 
Chinese government’s competition with the Western donors was examined in Chapter 
Four. To understand the PRC-ROC rivalry in foreign aid provision, a brief discussion 
of the background to the ROC’s aid programme is necessary.  
The ROC’s aid programme was on a significantly smaller scale than the PRC’s 
and was mostly limited to agricultural assistance. Nevertheless, as the ROC presented 
itself as the sovereign government of China, this made it the PRC’s prime adversary in 
the battle for legitimacy and international recognition. The ROC launched its 
International Cooperation Programme in Africa in 1959 with a focus on agricultural 
assistance and small peasant farming systems. These ventures were part of the ROC’s 
aid projects that operated in tandem with its diplomatic outreach to the newly 
independent African governments.689  
However, the ROC aid programme was not purely a bilateral transaction, as its 
source of funding flowed from the US government, through an arrangement called 
Operation Vanguard.690 The US government’s interest in subsidising the ROC’s 
technical programmes was a means of diluting mainland Chinese influence. It was 
“indirect and disguised to avoid giving ammunition to the Chicom [Chinese Communist, 
PRC] propaganda machine” and to provide “a useful contrast with the Chicom warlike 
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activities.”691 The programme was initially a success and was extended in 1961 to 
encompass the Middle Eastern, Asian and Latin American countries, but this success 
also was contingent on keeping the US support a secret.692 Between 1961 and 1970 a 
total of 922 ROC technicians were sent to Africa on 23 missions; while over 400 
African technicians travelled to Taiwan.693 These programmes successfully boosted the 
ROC’s stature amongst its allies and sustained its participation in international 
organisations, much to the chagrin of the PRC government.694  
Nevertheless, ROC funds were far surpassed by the PRC’s resources overall. As 
an illustration, Operation Vanguard’s budget in the 1964 fiscal year was $1.4 million, in 
contrast to the PRC’s loan offer of $4 million to the Central African Republic (CAR) 
alone. The ROC’s Operation Vanguard received US funding for its local currency 
expenses, which were partially met from counterpart grants generated by US economic 
assistance to Taiwan. The Taiwanese government provided the requisite foreign 
exchange.695 This huge discrepancy in financial capacity led to the ROC government’s 
attempt to negotiate for greater US financial support in the mid-1960s. The former 
argued that the increase was necessary so that it could position itself more directly 
against the PRC by assisting the Africans in areas such as industry, in which its 
Communist rival was active.696 However, foreign aid did not necessarily guarantee 
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political loyalty from the recipient government. As was the case with the TanZam 
railway project, discussed in the previous chapter, the African governments had their 
own political agenda and developmental priorities, which they sometimes furthered 
through playing off the PRC and ROC against each other – or against Western donors – 
to increase the contribution of foreign aid.  
The US government considered Operation Vanguard’s programmes “helpful, 
but not decisive” in achieving its foreign policy objectives.697 Its ultimate objective of 
keeping the PRC’s influence at bay became dramatically less important when 
eventually the international political climate changed and sobering of the PRC’s foreign 
policy position in the late 1960s – after the initial years of the destabilising Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six – led to 
the installation of the PRC government as the legitimate China representative at the 
United Nations at the ROC’s expense. 
iii) The Eight Principles 
The ideological foundations for the Chinese aid policy were officially 
articulated as the Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic and Technical Aid to 
Overseas Countries (for short, the Eight Principles). Unveiled by Premier Zhou Enlai 
during his tour of Africa from December 1963 to early 1964, the policy presented the 
broad mission and overall objective of its assistance in an instructional and contractual 
way: 
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1. The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and 
mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as 
a kind of unilateral alms, but as something mutual. 
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects 
the sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or 
asks for any privileges. 
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans, 
and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten 
the burden on recipient countries as far as possible. 
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is 
not to make recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark 
step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic 
development. 
5. The Chinese government does its best to help recipient countries complete 
projects which require less investment but yield quicker results, so that the 
latter may increase their income and accumulate capital. 
6. The Chinese government provides the best-quality equipment and materials 
manufactured by China at international market prices. If the equipment and 
materials provided by the Chinese government are not up to the agreed 
specifications and quality, the Chinese government undertakes to replace 
them or refund the payment. 
7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see 
to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology. 
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8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in recipient countries 
will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. 
The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy 
any special amenities.698 
Emphasising equality, development through self reliance and mutual benefit 
were terms that appeared very equitable to the recipient countries; as such, the Eight 
Principles were a strategic diplomatic tool. They leveraged on the areas of concern to 
the developing governments and offered a pragmatic, alternative foreign aid 
relationship, one that did not perpetuate the north-south, colonial relationship. This was 
in stark contrast to the policy prescriptions offered by the Western and more affluent 
countries in the 1960s, many of which were anchored on the precepts of modernisation 
theory, where the preference was for an apolitical process of development rather than 
nation-building, a financial burden and the requisite application of the prevailing 
development ideologies of the day.699  
The Chinese aid programme was articulated in political terms. The principles 
were provocative – even revolutionary – for declaring the donor-recipient relationship 
as one between equals, as well as for committing the Chinese government (and its 
experts) to what it perceived as a fair and correct code of conduct. For example, the 
Eight Principles did not advocate or make provisions for Chinese advisors or 
consultants within the host country’s ministries. Although that was an indication of 
Chinese respect for its partner governments’ sovereignty in decision-making, it also 
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limited the extent to which the Chinese aid projects or any lessons could be integrated 
into existing policy. In the case of Tanzania, it was the visits by official delegations to 
China and the demonstration effect of the Chinese experts in the field which 
contributed to ordinary Tanzanians’ perceptions of Chinese aid. They also covered the 
technical form and administration of that aid, such as the procurement and handing over 
of equipment, as well as the remuneration of the Chinese experts.  
The Eight Principles were articulated in a way that positioned Chinese foreign 
aid in direct opposition to Western aid, which it criticised for being an extension of the 
post-colonial relationship that perpetuated the discriminatory international economic 
order.700 Unlike aid from other Communist governments, Chinese aid promoted self-
reliance and not primarily the export of capital goods.701 Additionally, the Chinese 
government offered grants and loans with relatively long repayment periods with no 
interest and the additional flexibility of loan extension without penalty. The funds could 
be used for local costs within the supported project, an arrangement which few other 
donors allowed to the same extent. These differences were highlighted by Chinese 
officials more frequently as the Sino-Soviet rivalry worsened.  
Chinese aid had a very strong symbolic value because of its own successful 
national liberation struggle and socialist revolution. Moreover, the country’s difficult 
economic situation and immense capital needs made it clear that any diversion of its 
resources was a direct sacrifice and was marshalled domestically, relying heavily on the 
use of Chinese workers. Labour-intensive methods were necessary because of China’s 
lack of capital funds, which was both a strength and weakness. The level of technology 
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and skills transfer was appropriate for a developing country context, but the influx of 
Chinese labour gave rise to concerns amongst recipient countries which preferred 
staffing projects with locals.  
The Chinese government was quick to mobilise its internal resources and 
personnel for its overseas projects, but at times it took up to two years before the 
protocol to an aid agreement was signed if there was a delay on the recipient’s side.702 
The Chinese government placed only minimal administrative requirements on the 
recipient governments. There was considerably less paperwork and reporting than what 
was needed by the Western and institutional donors. These multiple bureaucratic 
requirements from a myriad of donors using different systems further strained an 
overstretched Tanganyikan civil service. As Nyerere shared with a visiting British 
journalist in March 1965, “Tanzania [was] not good at answering questionnaires” and 
its officials were not entirely familiar with the techniques of securing aid and so the 
country was getting less than it might have otherwise.703 Furthermore, most donors did 
not finance the local project costs, which then added to the Tanzanian government’s 
financial problems. 
This section has shown that the Eight Principles addressed the key areas in 
which Chinese aid was different from that of other donors. As a policy, the Eight 
Principles were intended to achieve political aims by portraying the Chinese 
government’s aid regime as being fair and practical for its recipients. Hence Part I has 
demonstrated how the ethos and presentation of the PRC aid policy had been influenced 
by China’s own experience as an aid recipient, as well as the political competition 
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between the PRC government and its rivals in Africa. An important component of 
Chinese aid policy was medical assistance, which will be discussed next.  
II. Chinese Health Diplomacy 
This section will show that Chinese health diplomacy was an essential 
component of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. The main studies on Sino-African and 
Sino-Tanzanian engagement in medicine are by Hsu, whose work focuses on the effect 
of Chinese medicine in East Africa.704 This chapter focuses primarily on clinically 
trained doctors who were sent on state-sponsored overseas missions; traditional Chinese 
medical practitioners were sometimes included in the group, but were in the minority. 
This section will demonstrate the importance of local African factors in three areas: 
Firstly, the domestic revolution in Chinese healthcare; secondly, a historical assessment 
of the Tanganyikan healthcare system; and thirdly, Zanzibar and Chinese medical aid, 
which facilitated the extension of Chinese health diplomacy to the mainland. 
i) China and the revolution in healthcare 
The ideological foundation for the PRC healthcare system had been spelt out by 
the National Health Congress in the early 1950s. This was the basis for the country’s 
medical strategy and health policy, summed up as four priorities: Firstly, to serve the 
workers, peasants and soldiers; secondly, to focus on preventive medicine over curative 
medicine; thirdly, to promote the collaboration between practitioners of traditional 
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Chinese medicine and practitioners of Western medicine, and fourthly, to integrate 
health work with mass movements.705  
However, the government was unable to address the growing inequality between 
health service provision in the rural and urban areas, a trend which was further 
reinforced by Soviet medical assistance, which weighed in heavily with consultants, 
technology, hierarchical structure and urban focus.706 Public health issues in rural China 
were overseen by fairly autonomous and self-supporting units, the CCP union clinics. 
These clinics were responsible for preventive medicine, maternal and child health, 
health training, as well as the training of health workers and midwives.707 The two 
separate but related medical systems were hard hit in the late 1950s. The Great Leap 
Forward (1958 to 1961) campaign depleted the communes’ resources and the 
withdrawal of Soviet assistance in 1960 worsened the brain drain from the cities. This 
took a severe toll on the Chinese healthcare system. Rural incomes gradually recovered 
after the economic catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward and peasants were soon able 
to allocate a small sum of earnings to medical care, which enabled the rural healthcare 
system to regain its footing.708  
Mao’s increasing emphasis on ideological loyalty and the deepening of societal 
control after the loosening up during the economic recovery years resulted in the 
incorporation of socialist lessons into the medical physicians’ training in early 1965, the 
objective of which was to mobilise and politicise the medical profession by reducing 
the rural-urban gap. The barefoot doctor policy was launched and had political, social 
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and educational objectives. The CCP used political education repressively, as “the most 
important and effective way to reshape educated youth ideologically and morally; the 
first few months were spent studying Mao’s works on serving the people.”709 It was a 
governmental effort to re-organise the medical system in order to stir and mobilise the 
population for “revolutionary” action: In essence, to nurture good citizens who were not 
just healthy in body, but productive, community-minded and above all, politically loyal. 
A barefoot doctor trainee recalled from his lessons that: 
We would rather have a doctor with a Red heart and little skill than a doctor 
with a White heart and better medical skills. A Red heart will take care of 
everything else. You must be revolutionaries first, doctors second. You must 
never forget this.710 
In the rural areas, the barefoot doctor programme mobilised medical teams, 
trained youths from the communes for between three to six months in the treatment of 
minor illnesses, immunisation, sanitation, maternal and child health services.711 They 
were generally primary school leavers who received identical wages to the peasants and 
juggled their work in the fields with medical tasks. Medical education in the cities was 
radicalised. At the universities, medical students underwent the same compulsory 
political education as other students and were required to do manual labour while living 
and working with the peasants.712 This process of integration between the urban youths 
and peasants through physical work had the explicit rationale of helping the medical 
trainees better connect theory with practice, as well as to spread medical knowledge 
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among the masses. Moreover, those sent to the countryside were usually intellectuals – 
the strata of the population for which Mao had the strongest disregard. The immediate 
result of that migration of expertise was a strain on human resources at the hospitals 
and medical schools which, from 1966, was exacerbated by factionalism and the 
departure of numerous highly trained overseas Chinese physicians to their home 
countries. The combination of these factors wrecked the Chinese urban healthcare 
system.713 
Although the barefoot doctors were a domestic phenomenon driven by factors 
very particular to the local political dynamics in China, the policy still had an important 
role in foreign perception and understanding of Beijing’s health diplomacy. 
Furthermore, it had practical value as a usable model for extending basic preventive 
medicine and healthcare provision to remote rural areas. The domestic revolution in 
Chinese healthcare and education coincided with a great need for medical expertise in 
the developing world.714 Thus the Chinese government had an important resource at its 
disposal. Fully qualified medical personnel gave it the means to embark on health 
diplomacy in 1963 as a less contentious way to fulfil its third world policy and 
internationalist duty.715  
Once the Chinese government signed a bilateral agreement with a recipient 
country, a provincial health ministry was delegated the responsibility for overseeing 
and executing the project. Hence the coordination of Chinese medical projects was not 
centralised within the Ministry of Health, which concentrated more on overseeing 
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domestic health policy and setting the more politicised tone for its operations. Rather 
than emphasising ideology as it did in the domestic medical system, the PRC sent 
qualified doctors of urban extraction to treat their third world brethren.  
These medical professionals were clinically-trained, with tertiary qualifications, 
good professional recommendations and at least four to five years’ relevant 
experience.716 The ideological precept of equality, laid out in the Eight Principles, was 
reflected in their salaries, which were equivalent to the wages of their local counterparts 
of a similar grade. Hence the Chinese physicians were comparatively cheaper to engage 
than other foreign personnel. Unlike in the Cuban government, which also sent medical 
personnel to Africa in the 1960s, the Chinese medical system did not train a surplus of 
physicians to be sent overseas to generate foreign exchange. Hence the departure of 
Chinese medical personnel on these overseas missions was a real loss to China. 
At a personal level, the overseas assignment was attractive to some of the 
Chinese experts, as life in China at the time was not necessarily any easier and the 
opportunity to “serve the country overseas” came at a time when travel to Africa (and 
other parts of the world) was rare. The physicians themselves volunteered for these 
overseas assignments because they were aware of the recipient country’s need and 
wanted “to do something for China” by participating in a humanitarian mission which 
demonstrated the spirit of internationalism.717 Nevertheless, the overseas assignments 
were not without risk.718 There were casualties from tropical diseases to attacks from 
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wild animals. But for the most part the Chinese medical personnel carried on with their 
tasks without undue interruption. They provided medical consultation, worked 
alongside the local staff and also carried out more elementary tasks such as injecting 
patients, administering medication, folding gauze and cleaning. Compared to the Soviet 
and Western medical systems, there was very little hierarchy within the Chinese team.  
The Chinese experts tried to minimise their linguistic handicap through 
translators who travelled with the teams. The experts spoke little English and even less 
Swahili, and Chinese (or any of its dialects) was an incomprehensible foreign tongue 
for the locals. In an anecdote from mainland Tanzania, British records describe one 
instance disclosed to them by Minister for State Development and Planning Nsilo Swai. 
During the bilateral negotiations with the Chinese about the construction of the 
Friendship textile mill, discussions apparently stretched on for weeks on end before an 
agreement was reached. Swai complained that, by that point, “[his] Chinese was nearly 
perfect.”719 A British finance manager at the Tanzanian National Development 
Corporation similarly found his interactions with the Chinese ponderous and time-
consuming because “not only did the Chinese speak no English, but the English of their 
interpreter had been barely adequate.”720 Yet the evidence suggests that the Chinese 
medical experts were effective and strategic in meeting these local challenges.  
Chinese medical aid, as guided by the Eight Principles, was an effective 
instrument to further Beijing’s foreign policy. The politicization of the Chinese 
healthcare system along ideological lines from 1965 produced a hybrid barefoot doctor 
model for reaching out to poorly resourced rural areas, which converged with the 
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demand for medical expertise in the developing world. Health diplomacy, as a far less 
contentious form of foreign aid because of its direct humanitarian impact, was thus a 
very natural evolutionary path for Chinese foreign policy in Tanzania. In this way, the 
PRC government was able to differentiate itself from its key political rivals as it carved 
out a niche area through its foreign aid. Once again Zanzibar played an important role 
in bringing the Chinese and Tanzanian governments together. However, from 1966, the 
Chinese were entirely preoccupied with the effects of the Cultural Revolution as Mao 
intensified his efforts to flatten the medical hierarchy and dispatched physicians to the 
rural areas in China. Political loyalty and trustworthiness became additional criteria in 
the selection of the medical experts bound for projects overseas, such as whether a 
physician came from a “good family” – that is, a politically reliable one.721 The overall 
effect of that campaign on the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship will be examined in 
detail in Chapter Six. 
ii) Zanzibar and Chinese medical aid 
Zanzibar’s healthcare system was heavily dependent on foreign assistance and 
funding. The Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964 sparked an exodus of local doctors 
to the Middle East and the UK. Nearly all of those who fled were of Arab descent and 
had been disproportionately targeted during the unrest because of their ethnicity. In 
response, the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council (ZRC) actively sought the assistance of 
the Eastern Bloc countries to fill the vacuum in its healthcare system.722 This was in 
line with the ZRC’s overall approach to the Eastern bloc countries and included 
military assistance and development aid, as the previous chapter showed. The islands 
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retained much of their autonomy and kept their own Ministry of Health after the union 
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964.  
From 1964 the provincial authorities of Jiangsu province were tasked to manage 
and provide medical aid to Zanzibar.723 Soon after, the arrangements were finalised 
during a visit to China by senior physicians from the V. I. Lenin Hospital (Stone Town) 
in 1965 and the first Chinese medical team arrived in Zanzibar shortly after. In line with 
the Eight Principles, the Chinese government paid for the team’s salaries, including 
travel expenses, from its loan amount, while the local government was responsible for 
the experts’ food expenses, pocket money, accommodation, medical expenses, local 
transportation, facilities and stationery.724 The team’s entitlement during their period of 
service was a month’s leave following eleven months of uninterrupted work, plus 
official local and Chinese public holidays. The Chinese experts and technical personnel 
were also legally obliged to observe the local laws and regulations, as well as keeping 
work-related data confidential. Upon the completion of their assignments, certificates 
were issued by the Zanzibari government stating their period of service and their work 
performance. 
The Chinese medical team was divided into two groups: The first was stationed 
at the Lenin Hospital and the others were assigned to Mkoani Hospital on Pemba 
Island.725 In addition to sending medical personnel, the Chinese government also 
allocated funds for the establishment and equipment of a small facility that 
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manufactured a variety of injections. This helped to promote self-reliance at the 
institutional level by reducing the need for imported drugs. By July 1965, the injection 
preparation room – the first of its kind in Zanzibar – had produced nearly one million 
cubic centimetres of over thirty kinds of injections and solutions for use at hospitals and 
clinics across the islands.726 
Although the Chinese were only one of many donors of medical aid to Zanzibar, 
the latter’s pressing needs gave the Sino-Zanzibari (and later Sino-Tanzanian) 
relationship new importance. The vacuum created by the departure and shrinkage of 
Western sources made other options necessary. The Chinese medical team operated 
within local administrative structures and with local professionals. Anecdotal accounts 
suggest that the doctors were reputed for their expertise, reliability and diligence.727 Ali 
Sultan Issa, Minister of Education, Youth and Culture, insisted that the Chinese doctors 
were “more akin to us” and were therefore more easily accepted than the Soviets.728 
East Germany contributed a substantial amount of medical assistance, including 
staffing the Lenin Hospital and a number of new health clinics. In his memoirs, US 
doctor Swift recalled that a Zanzibari health official found the East Germans arrogant in 
their dealings with local Pemba staff and behaved like “prima donnas”.729 Yet the 
competition and animosity between various medical teams was a considerably small 
price for the Zanzibari authorities to pay for the valuable services and skills they 
received. The problem was mitigated by assigning the various groups to different 
regions and projects to minimise the chance of any direct confrontations. 
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The generally positive effect of Chinese medical aid to Zanzibar from 1965 
made the Chinese government a serious option when Nyerere considered alternative 
sources of foreign support for mainland Tanzania’s healthcare system. In addition to the 
pressures of the external environment in the post-UDI period (discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four), the changes in the Chinese healthcare system, the deepening of the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship in other important areas (such as military development) the 
amenable terms of the Eight Principles and the availability of highly qualified Chinese 
medical personnel created a fortuitous situation for this new aspect of the bilateral 
relationship.  
III. Tanzania and Chinese medical aid 
The development of the Tanganyikan healthcare system is important in 
understanding the way in which Chinese medical assistance was later able to intervene. 
This section will show how the combination of external factors, discussed in the earlier 
sections, converged with local African factors to make possible the positive outcomes 
of Chinese medical aid, especially in the rural regions of Tanzania. The argument is 
developed in three parts: Firstly, the colonial legacy in mainland Tanzania’s healthcare; 
secondly, socialist aid and the Chinese experts; and thirdly, the effects of Chinese 
medical aid in Tanzania.  
i) Colonial legacy and healthcare in Tanganyika 
Colonial medicine in British East Africa underscored methods and practices that 
were crucial to the workings of colonial authorities, including “constructing ‘the 
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African’ as an object of knowledge”.730 Colonial Tanganyika had no real rural 
healthcare system at the national level and the extent of colonial neglect meant that 
even modest amounts of foreign assistance could be absorbed by the local system. Most 
existing rural hospital and dispensary services were run by missionary societies and 
voluntary groups, while some mine and plantation owners with vested economic 
interests in their workers’ productivity also offered rudimentary medical services.731 
Moreover, the access to education was race-based, so when independence was granted 
in 1961, few black Tanganyikans possessed the necessary educational qualifications to 
staff the government administration. Only a small percentage of youths went to school, 
which did not even offer a medium-term solution to the shortage of skills.732 At 
independence, Tanganyika only had seventeen African doctors (twelve registered 
doctors and five interns). The situation was exacerbated by the high global demand for 
qualified healthcare personnel, as well as the long training period and highly specialised 
nature of the field.733 Moreover, the Tanganyikan system was an extension of the 
colonial medical system that was heavily weighted towards curative medicine, with a 
strong urban bias.  
To chart the way forward, Tanganyikan Health Minister Derek Bryceson 
commissioned a study by social policy expert Richard Titmuss in 1964. The Titmuss 
report recommended that the focus of health policy be on preventive medicine, rural 
health centres, the training of rural medical aides and shorter doctor training by creating 
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new category of doctors, amongst other things.734 Yet the Tanzanian government was 
acutely aware that the result of the colonial legacy on its healthcare system necessitated 
foreign assistance for staffing, as well as the provision of medication and equipment. It 
was a situation that would continue for some time. The absence of a national integrated 
healthcare structure meant that the country was able to absorb a large amount of 
assistance from various donors but, as was the case with military aid, the government’s 
challenge would be to standardise the diverse medical treatments and healthcare 
systems nationally.735  
Coming at a time of Tanzania’s budget crisis due to diplomatic fall outs with its 
major donors – West Germany, the UK and the US – between 1964 to 1966, Nyerere 
observed the positive impact of the Chinese medical team in Zanzibar.736 On 1 June 
1966 the Tanzanian Minister of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Paul 
Bomani, requested assistance from China to replace the medical support that the UK 
had withdrawn.737 Ambassador He Ying supported the minister’s request and explained 
to the Foreign Ministry that Tanzania was having a difficult time economically and was 
under great pressure from the West because of its nationalisation policies and growing 
ties with China. He Ying recommended that the Chinese government approve the 
request, as it would achieve a number of important aims: To support Tanzania’s anti-
imperialist stand, help it withstand Soviet overtures, keep it on its socialist path and 
further develop bilateral ties.738 The request was approved and showed that Tanzania 
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was indeed “Africa’s foremost nationalist, Leftist country that has good relations with 
Beijing”.739 Bomani emphasised at a press conference that the Chinese loan and grant 
had no conditions attached: It was interest free and would help Tanzania to initiate or 
bring to completion a number of development projects, most of which the British 
government had promised to help build, but which had never materialised.740  
Nyerere sent some officials to China to study the healthcare system there. A 
goodwill mission visited China in September 1966 to learn from the government’s 
development experience and, in particular, its health ministry’s management of illness 
and disease prevention.741 The delegation was led by Junior Health Minister Lucy 
Sellina Lameck, who had trained as a medical nurse before her appointment. Lameck 
was one of two female cabinet ministers after independence and her experience was an 
example of China’s personal diplomacy. She had visited China once before, in May 
1960, and so was familiar with the Chinese system and style. She made two requests to 
her hosts: Firstly, for Tanzanian students to study in China to learn how the authorities 
had managed the colonial medical system’s legacy with traditional Chinese medicine 
and contemporary clinical practices. Secondly, that China sends doctors to Tanzania to 
help with the treatment of illness and share their experiences.742 She also commented 
that Chinese medical policy was entirely suitable and applicable to Tanzania.  
However, after the mission, Chinese medical aid to Tanzania was stalled 
because the British-born and Cambridge-educated health minister Bryceson was 
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extremely sceptical of the quality of Chinese doctors.743 Moreover, the Cultural 
Revolution was causing radical outbursts at Chinese communities and embassies 
globally, eroding the strides that had been made in Beijing’s diplomacy. But a single 
event eventually changed Bryceson’s mind: Wu Jieping, a visiting Chinese medical 
professor, made a presentation on medical services in China at the University of Dar es 
Salam’s medical faculty. Wu was well qualified, having studied at the University of 
Chicago from 1947 to 1948, just prior to the CCP’s victory in 1949, and hence spoke 
English fluently. He hailed from Jiangsu province and worked at Beijing’s No. 2 
Medical Institute, where he attended to many of the senior Chinese leaders.744 Wu’s 
lecture made Bryceson revise his opinion of what the Chinese could offer. This was 
consistent with what another member of the audience described. Charles Swift, an 
American doctor who worked at the faculty, observed that the first part of Wu’s 
presentation was contrived and the text, brimming with “Mao-isms and political 
aphorisms”, had clearly been drafted by someone else. However, during the interactive 
question and answer period, the entire tone and mood changed: 
The speaker became a different person, talking directly with warmth and 
humour and showing keen interest in medical progress elsewhere. The give and 
take was spontaneous and relaxed. He received a standing ovation in the end.745 
Ironically, the Chinese professor’s presentation had been a boon for Chinese 
health diplomacy, although not in the way that his government had originally intended. 
Witnessing Wu’s presentation firsthand made it clear to the audience that there was a 
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disjuncture between the ideological emphasis of the Cultural Revolution with the reality 
of capable, engaged, knowledgeable and well-qualified medical experts that China 
could potentially offer through its aid programme. Nyerere only spoke to Consul Zhou 
Boping about the possibility of Chinese medical assistance in September 1967, a year 
later.746 Nyerere commented to Consul Zhou that Wu had “opened [their] eyes” and 
they now wanted to formally request Chinese doctors. Consul Zhou subsequently 
invited eight Tanzanians to the embassy to brief them on the medical situation in China. 
Zhou explained that China was itself short of doctors, but as Tanzania’s needs were 
greater, his government would help as much as it could. None of the Tanzanians 
gathered had been to China before and they raised many questions during the session.747  
The commencement of the Chinese medical project in Tanzania took place at an 
important juncture in both Tanzanian and Chinese politics, as will be shown below.  
ii) Tanzania and socialist experts 
This section will show that Nyerere’s promotion of self-reliance and socialism 
created a very specific and conducive setting for the work of the Chinese medical teams. 
The Arusha Declaration that was adopted by the Tanzanian government at the TANU 
national conference in February 1967 relied on the two tenets of socialism and self-
reliance. It was, as Rugumamu has argued, “a bold, assertive policy action against the 
received Western development orthodoxy.”748 The Declaration contained the criteria for 
Tanzania’s acceptance of foreign aid: That it should be in line with socialism and self-
reliance, in no way threaten independence in policymaking, and that the debt burden 
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should be seriously considered.749 The Tanzanian government demonstrated its 
commitment to a transformation of society by giving priority to the development of the 
rural areas. Although health strategy was not explicitly reflected, the Declaration 
created opportunities for foreign socialist medical systems to establish their influence in 
the country nonetheless.750 Indeed, the country’s main health challenges – the shortage 
of doctors and ancillary staff, epidemic infections, highly prevalent chronic infections 
and parasitic diseases, malnutrition, high infant and child mortality rates, as well as 
inadequate health facilities, especially in rural areas – made foreign medical aid 
imperative.751 
Significantly, Nyerere elaborated on the government’s preference for socialist 
aid and experts in his address to the TANU national conference in October 1967. The 
president spoke of the desired “socialist experts” who would be dedicated and effective 
people with the correct attitude to support Tanzania on its chosen socialist path: 
Ideally we also need socialists in every job – which is not necessarily the same 
thing as wanting a citizen for every job, because not all Tanzanians are socialists. 
But if a competent doctor also has socialist attitudes, then he is surely an 
especially great asset to us.752 
Nyerere’s speech emphasised the importance of developing self-reliance and 
reiterated that none of Tanzania’s political, economic or social policies would be 
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compromised just to secure foreign funding.753 Nyerere’s stated ideological affinity for 
socialist, community-minded doctors created a positive setting for the further 
development of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship through medical aid from 1967 until 
the end of the decade. As a result, the Scandinavian and Eastern bloc countries were 
implicitly favoured. China, with focus on rural development and emphasis on self-
reliance, appeared particularly well-placed to provide the desired type of foreign 
assistance. Nyerere had seen the Chinese development model firsthand during his visits 
to the country. The president reportedly took a great interest in the local medical system 
and saw the potential for the applicability of the barefoot doctor scheme in rural 
Tanzania, how temporary clinics were set up and farmers trained to assist medical 
workers. Through his interactions he noted that “the Eastern countries have African 
needs: A stress on duty” and were able to “shape people’s minds and uplift their 
morality” to convert them into “well-organised manpower” for the purpose of national 
development.754 
A Tanzanian delegation travelled to Beijing on 21 November 1967 and it was 
decided that a medical survey group would be quickly despatched, followed later by 
thirty-five to forty Chinese doctors.755 The Tanzanian delegates were impressed by 
what they observed and noted that the Chinese medical system had various levels of 
doctors, ranging from those who were university-trained to medical school graduates, to 
the barefoot doctors at the other end of the spectrum.756 They also noted that the 
concept of combining traditional with modern Chinese medicine was useful to the 
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Tanzanian situation.757 In a demonstration of responsiveness to the Tanzanian request, 
the Shandong provincial medical authorities sent a medical survey team to Dar es 
Salaam four weeks later, in January 1968, for a month-long tour of healthcare facilities. 
Based on the survey team’s recommendations, an actual medical team was despatched 
to Tanzania in April 1968.  
The group of sixty-four doctors and supporting staff was led by Dr. Cao Yue 
Zhong, who was the deputy leader of the survey team; it included experts in general 
surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology, orthopaedics, otolaryngology, paediatrics and 
pharmacology. The medical team made the journey to Tanzania on the ship Yaohua 
together with the first group of technical personnel of the TanZam rail link survey team, 
as well as 12,000 tonnes of cargo.758 The arrival of the Chinese medical mission was 
timely and complemented the Tanzanian government’s broader health policy of 
creating a static elementary medical service at the grassroots level.759 The team’s two-
year tenure was agreed upon in a cultural cooperation protocol signed on 6 May 1968, 
subject to renewal.760 The medical personnel were organised into eight teams which 
were then deployed to eight districts. In his welcome address to the medical team, 
Nyerere cited Zanzibar’s positive experience with Chinese medical aid when he 
stressed that their doctors were appreciated for carrying out all the necessary tasks in 
the hospital, even the menial ones which Western doctors would not deign to do.761  
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The eight teams of Chinese medical personnel operated in a circuit system, with 
each assigned to a particular area and for a set length of time in a particular village that 
ranged from a few days up to a month. This arrangement enabled the team to treat 
“hundreds of thousands” of patients across the eight counties, as well as to conduct 
health education classes which emphasised disease prevention. The Chinese medical 
teams improvised when there were no suitable clinical facilities and would operate from 
a school classroom or even “under large trees.”762 During his second state visit to China 
a month later, Nyerere reiterated that both governments wanted people who would use 
their knowledge and abilities in service of the people. Just as Mao called for the “red 
expert” – the skilled person devoted to the country’s political creed – Nyerere insisted 
that Tanzania was searching for its “committed expert”. 763  
The Chinese experts taught through demonstration and by working alongside 
their local counterparts. These methods mitigated any linguistic difficulties and, 
together with their high level of personal conformity, discipline and diligence, the 
experts had a “strong personal influence as models”.764 Indeed, diligence was a coping 
strategy for China’s difficult socio-economic situation and was effectively reinforced 
by Maoist discipline and the Confucian stricture that emphasised the importance of 
collective good over individual benefit, the appreciation of individual sacrifice and 
one’s contributions to society.765 These less technical lessons were incorporated by the 
Chinese experts as counterpart training and coaching in work ethics. The long hours the 
experts spent working were marvelled at by their local colleagues. The differences in 
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attitudes to work and cross-cultural issues also meant that the Chinese projects were 
sites of cultural conflict, however.766 
The Chinese experts were not free to do as they pleased in the host country. 
Indeed, there was a high level of discipline which was then manifested as conformity 
among them. The Chinese government had vested interests in these informal 
ambassadors and expected them to abide by many of the same political and social 
norms as in China. For example, the Chinese medical experts were required to complete 
their assignments, which they tended to complete, in contrast to the Soviet physicians 
who often left prematurely. As Zanzibari records show, this created a positive 
impression on the host government.767 But on a less positive note, their simple dressing 
and almost identical deportment was at times seen as backwardness and worked against 
local perceptions of Chinese professional credibility. In some instances, it gave rise to 
rumours among the locals that the Chinese teams were convicts or conscripted 
labour.768 The Chinese physicians were often mistaken for the barefoot doctors from the 
Chinese communes, who had received much coverage in the local media. 
The Chinese experts faced challenging and risky conditions in the field. In 
specific circumstances, the rigidity of the Chinese aid programme and the experts’ 
professional pride were detrimental to the individual experts. For example, when a 
Chinese irrigation engineer was attacked by a swarm of bees and went into anaphylactic 
shock, a team from China was sent to treat him. In spite of the urgency, the Chinese 
refused help from the Western doctors and wanted to fly the victim to Zanzibar to be 
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treated by their own physicians. In the end, the patient’s serious condition resulted in 
the doctors flying in from Zanzibar instead.769  
Coming from a developing country, the Chinese experts’ expectations for their 
living environment were neither grandiose, nor were their material demands 
extravagant, as the Eight Principles pegged their packages and living standards to local 
African terms. This forced equality between donor country experts with local experts 
was a hallmark of Chinese development aid and won it much admiration because of the 
element of personal and national sacrifice, with no obvious or visible signs of personal 
gain. Instead, it can be argued that the Chinese experts were the ones who bore a 
disproportionately high financial and personal pressure, compared to other aid workers. 
In 1970 the Chinese government sent a letter to Abeid Karume (who was also 
Zanzibar’s Chairman for Finance), requesting a reduction in the salaries of its advisors 
and the abolition of grades in the hierarchy. This was a remarkable and unheard of 
request, especially because the Chinese experts were already on local salary scales. The 
Chinese counsellor’s letter stated that Mao’s teachings on plain living and hard struggle 
had to be preserved, and that the reduction would ease Zanzibar’s economic burden.770  
Nyerere complained that the projects sponsored by the Western countries 
always involved the preparation of the experts’ houses, in particular the installation of 
air-conditioning, then the construction of facilities which were contrary to the austerity 
that the president wanted to instil in his people. The blatant inequality in lifestyle and 
that “pleasure-seeking mindset” were criticised by Nyerere for its insidious effect on 
the people – Nyerere told Consul Zhou that it had to be stopped and he hoped that the 
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Chinese experts’ diligence, modesty and frugality would be transmitted to his people 
instead.771 
The Chinese experts lived in dormitory-style sleeping quarters with communal 
cooking facilities. They prepared their own food, did their own chores (unlike Western 
expatriates who usually hired servants) and spent their leisure time engaged in free 
recreation activities among themselves, such as table tennis.772 In contrast to the Cubans, 
who mixed easily with the Zanzibaris because of their greater cultural affinity and 
active participation in local social activities, the Chinese did not integrate as well.773 A 
contributing factor was financial, as the Chinese experts’ modest salaries limited the 
kinds of activities that they could indulge in. The perceived absence of virility or visible 
signs of masculine assertion amongst the Chinese men and the androgynous look of the 
few women, usually the interpreters, in their unisex garments was perturbing and gave 
the experts an unnatural, almost monastic, quality.774 This element of Confucian 
moderation and self-restraint was a double-edged sword and ran contrary to local 
expectations in other ways, such as feelings that the Chinese were extremely secretive 
and formal.775 
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iii) The effects of Chinese medical aid in Tanzania  
Even as the Cultural Revolution raged on in China, the Chinese medical teams 
continued their assignments in Tanzania. The two governments publicly demonstrated 
their mutual support at such a politically difficult time. Following the death of a 
Chinese irrigation expert in September 1967, Premier Zhou and President Nyerere 
agreed that the man’s remains be interred in Tanzania.776 That symbolic gesture was 
intended to transmit the importance of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship at the personal 
level. Additionally, Nyerere reportedly felt that the victim’s burial in Tanzania would 
have an effect on the other Chinese experts, as well as on the local people.777 Two 
months later, a forty-two year-old doctor died from a brain haemorrhage while working 
in Zanzibar. His funeral was attended by no less than Karume, Zanzibari government 
ministers, ASP leaders and mass organisations, Chinese embassy and consulate officials, 
doctors, nurses as well as “hundreds of people”.778 The victim was affiliated to Nanjing 
Hospital’s College of Medicine and a Tanzanian delegation to Shanghai subsequently 
visited the “martyr’s” widow to pay their respects in November 1967.779  
he Chinese team helped to run the regional and district hospitals, and visited 
the rural health centres and village dispensaries regularly. The Tanzanian Health 
Division’s 1968 Annual Report noted a “significant improvement” in the medical 
services of those regions served by the Chinese teams, noting that they ushered in new 
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health opportunities for the people.780 The rural communities of the South and North 
Mara districts were highlighted. By March 1969, the number of Chinese medical 
personnel in mainland Tanzania had increased to 80 and the Chinese government had 
donated three X-ray machines, drugs and equipment.781 Part of the group established a 
health centre in Mkoko village, fifty kilometres from Mpwapwa town, and another 
established a surgical station in the district hospital of Nachingwea in the Mtwara 
district.  
One of the most significant achievements of Chinese medical assistance was its 
alignment with and support for the Tanzanian government’s efforts to extend medical 
care to the rural areas.782 The government’s ujamaa programme attempted to organise 
(but later forced) communities in the remote rural areas into villages, to facilitate the 
provision of state-sponsored amenities and services. The Chinese medical teams in 
Mtwara, Lindi and Nachingwea hospitals paid twice-weekly visits to dispensaries and 
ujamaa villages to conduct child welfare clinics, seminars, health demonstrations, 
vaccinations and treatment. In some cases, they even stayed with the rural communities 
for several days at a stretch.783 The team in Mtwara reportedly attended to a total of 
2,013 patients in five villages of the Nachingwea District, an impressive 
achievement.784  
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The Chinese team’s tours in the Mtwara rural areas were later extended to the 
Newala district, which made a region-wide medical service available to those remote 
areas without hospitals. The Chinese team also made another important contribution by 
boosting the morale of local staff in the rural healthcare system. The experts’ “spirit of 
devotion to duty” and “hard devoted work,” was “invaluable in stimulating and 
supplementing the efforts of the health division” to extend health services to the rural 
communities through their mobile medical services.785 Indeed, the arrival of the first 
Chinese medical team provided the impetus for the increased frequency of Tanzanian 
staff visits to rural communities and made it a common feature of the health service.786  
By 1968, inexperienced army representatives had been installed in place of 
officials who were purged from the Chinese Ministry of Public Health. The entire 
ministry was sidelined, while Chinese propaganda became more extreme and distracted 
popular attention from the important work that was being done by the Chinese medical 
team at the community level. The Chinese experts were repeatedly hailed by the press 
as selfless heroes on perilous humanitarian missions in conditions of adversity in an 
ironic echo of the colonial missionaries in Africa. Incredible accounts of the miraculous 
effects and potency of Mao’s teachings appeared. One such effusive article in the 
People’s Daily alleged that a Tanzanian patient had placed a specially labelled 
photograph of Mao next to his bed and told his roommates that the Chairman was the 
Chinese people’s great leader who had sent the good doctors.787 A similar article from 
July 1968 reported that a Tanzanian woman with an abdominal tumour who had been 
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turned away by a missionary hospital, was successfully treated by the Chinese medical 
team, but only after the team reviewed Chairman Mao’s brilliant book in close 
coordination with local medical personnel prior to surgery.788 This propaganda held 
little value to Tanzanians and only drew criticism and suspicion about Chinese 
motivations in Africa.789  
Yet when Chinese medical aid is compared to other aid projects, the medical 
teams were generally less politicised by the Cultural Revolution. This will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Six. Indeed, as Wu’s lecture at the University of Dar es 
Salaam had demonstrated to the audience, while most Chinese people went through the 
basic motions of validating their political loyalty (or rather, proving the absence of 
disloyalty), the medical professionals as intellectuals were generally marginalised by 
the revolution in the Chinese healthcare system. The medical teams in Tanzania were 
comprised of fewer experts and the groups were scattered in the remote areas of the 
country, compared to the more densely concentrated community of Chinese experts on 
other projects. Furthermore, the nature of medical procedures – which mostly involved 
personal consultation – did not lend itself easily to the politicisation of work processes 
on a significant scale, as a factory or construction project would. Hence the Cultural 
Revolution did not seriously disrupt the medical projects in Tanzania.  
The practical value of the Chinese medical teams’ efforts bore modest fruit and 
was recognised at the highest level. While on his inspection tours of the country, 
Nyerere met with the Chinese medical teams in the rural Mara and Dodoma regions in 
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early August 1969 and July 1970, in a demonstration of support for their work.790 In 
addition to treating the remote rural communities, the Chinese team was also tasked to 
administer medical services (such as immunisations) to the growing number of Chinese 
experts on other aid projects. Their presence was complemented by the physicians who 
were specifically assigned to the estimated 25,000 Chinese personnel on the massive 
Tanzania-Zambia rail link project from 1970, who also treated the locals living in the 
vicinity of the project sites.791 These doctors were likely to have been trained in 
specialised centres for particular branches of medicine, for example in the treatment of 
coalminers or rail workers. Furthermore, it can be argued that the Chinese medical 
teams also tended to wounded Frelimo combatants involved in the Mozambican 
liberation struggle: By 1969 the Tanzanian government had set up four hundred villages 
in the Lindi and Mtwara regions to fortify Tanzania’s southern border with 
Mozambique.792 The Newala and Mtwara stations were close to the border and were 
served by the Chinese medical team.793 
Tanzanian health policy adopted a number of other lessons from the Chinese 
experience, when another early TANU visitor to China, Lawi Sijaona, became minister 
for health in the late 1960s. Sijaona advocated free mass immunisation, an essential 
drugs programme, the expanded training of medical auxiliaries and the training of 
villagers to provide elementary healthcare in areas where dispensaries were lacking.794 
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Although the Chinese medical team was able to make important strides because of the 
relatively low base of the healthcare system in post-colonial Tanzania, there were 
serious constraints to its efforts to promote change. The difficult conditions and limited 
resources meant that the Chinese teams were unable to address the broader questions of 
institutional sustainability in a major way. For example, Nachingwea (in southern 
Tanzania) was the largest district with the smallest population in the region. In 1969 it 
was the only unit outside of Dar es Salaam which had a surgeon, a Chinese expert and a 
rural medical aide.795 Ten rural health centres were subsequently opened in 1971, but 
the shortage of trained medical personnel made it impossible to staff them 
adequately.796  
From 1970 the Tanzanian government allocated one-third of the health budget 
to rural health services.797 The system was anchored on the village health service that 
aimed to offer elementary medical and health care in ujamaa villages. It was a model 
that drew heavily from the Chinese commune health scheme staffed by barefoot 
doctors.798 The medical helpers were recruited from within the village on the 
recommendation of villagers and worked part-time to address similar social concerns in 
Tanzania. At the TANU party conference in September 1971, it was decided that rural 
health services would have top priority in the government’s socio-economic plans, a 
major advance in health policy.799 The Chinese medical team was commended by the 
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Minister for Health in his budget speech to the National Assembly in 1971/2 for their 
active participation in the promotion of rural health services in Tanzania.800 
Thus Chinese medical aid was particularly suited to the Tanzanian government’s 
priorities for national development because of its rural focus, as well as the willingness 
of the Chinese personnel to work in the remote areas. Furthermore, it deepened 
Beijing’s level of engagement in Tanzania by bringing its experts in direct contact with 
large numbers of ordinary Tanzanians – aside from the officials, workers or soldiers – 
and was, for the Chinese, an effective practical demonstration of the value of their Eight 
Principles. The medical teams’ work and their relationships continued to grow in spite 
of the tumultuous Cultural Revolution that was rapidly unfolding in China. 
Nevertheless, in spite of some changes to the Tanzanian medical manpower system, 
financial constraints meant that its health system continued to be predominantly funded 
by foreign sources between 1962 and 1972.801 
The effect of Chinese medical aid in Zanzibar was similarly positive. Its 
emphasis was more customised to the situation, with more focus on direct service at the 
medical institutions, rather than a mobile medical team strategy. Chinese resources 
were concentrated on developing Zanzibar’s physical infrastructure, such as the 
previously mentioned vaccination facility or a pharmaceutical workshop, also the 
islands’ first, that was inaugurated in September 1968 under the auspices of the Lenin 
Hospital.802 In addition to those medical production facilities, the Chinese government 
supported the construction of a new maternity hospital (estimated to cost £20,000 or 
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$56,000), a new specialist hospital in Chake, Pemba (£51,000 or $142,800), as well as 
the equipment of the Zanzibar Hospital’s operating theatre (£26,000 or $72,800) and 
dental clinic (£5,702, or $15, 966).803 The Lenin Hospital in Stone Town continued to 
be plagued by a shortage of skilled local staff: Of the nearly four hundred Zanzibaris 
who worked there, only eleven were physicians. The majority of medical personnel 
were members of the Chinese medical team stationed there.804 
On Pemba island, the Chinese supported the construction of the Abdullah Mzee 
Hospital in Mkoani in 1970 as an “ultra modern hospital” with a new capacity of 
seventy-five beds, which was significantly larger than the old hospital which could only 
hold twenty.805 The Chinese team’s efforts were acknowledged and after more than two 
years in Zanzibar (by February 1967), one medical team had treated over 230 critically 
ill patients.806 When the East German doctors left Pemba in 1970, the Chinese were the 
sole foreign medical group remaining on the islands to provide specialised and 
community-based healthcare services. However, Zanzibar’s great shortage of trained 
medical staff remained intractable and there was no formal training institution for 
health professionals. A number of Zanzibari students were being trained in various 
colleges on mainland Tanganyika and the Chinese medical team at the Lenin Hospital 
conducted training for rural medical assistants.  
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The Chinese would later boost Tanzanian self-reliance by collaborating with the 
Tanzanian government on two important projects. The first concerned vaccine 
production at an institute in Mabibo, Dar es Salaam, which had the objective of 
producing vaccines for tuberculosis and smallpox. It was estimated that Tanzania had 
the potential to be self-sufficient in the production of those vaccines. The second 
project was a pharmaceutical plant at Gerezani, Dar es Salaam, which produced tablets 
and infusions.807 The Chinese government promised to supply chemicals to the plant 
gratis for the first year of operation and provide technicians, while the Tanzanian 
government invested 3 million Shillings ($420,000).808 
Hence the developments in the Chinese healthcare system made it particularly 
attractive to the Tanzanian government, which wanted a rural-focused, mobilised, 
community-based medical system. The combination of colonial neglect, Zanzibar’s 
positive experience with Chinese medical aid and Nyerere’s pursuit of African 
socialism allowed Chinese medical aid to perform a much-needed function. 
Conclusion: The overlap of Chinese medical assistance and Tanzania’s 
developmental agenda 
This chapter has demonstrated another facet of the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral 
relationship through the example of China’s health diplomacy. It has shown that 
Chinese aid as spelled out by the Eight Principles was unique in having delineated a 
more equitable donor-recipient relationship than the traditional Western aid 
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arrangements. Chinese medical assistance to Tanzania was timely, as the Tanzanian 
government’s relations with its major donors were strained. More importantly, Chinese 
medical aid was unique in the way that it engaged with Nyerere’s policies of self-
reliance and socialism. Specifically, it provided an added emphasis to the Tanzanian 
government’s ambition to extend medical care to the rural areas.  
The evidence has shown that Chinese aid to Tanzania was intended to support 
Nyerere’s position, as well as his government’s developmental plans. Chinese 
physicians brought healthcare services to the remote rural communities, as well as 
selected ujamaa villages, thereby strengthening Nyerere’s villageisation programme. 
Although Mao’s objectives in launching the barefoot doctor scheme in China had the 
primary purpose of providing elementary healthcare to rural communities as well as 
mobilising the corps of barefoot doctors domestically, the policy gave much inspiration 
to the design of the Tanzanian rural medical assistants programme. 
The Chinese government dispatched clinically-trained and well-qualified 
medical personnel to Tanzania and not the less rigorously-trained barefoot doctors. Yet 
despite both governments’ emphasis on socialist development and mutual 
pronouncements of support and solidarity, there remained significant cross-cultural 
differences at the inter-personal level. The Chinese medical personnel appeared 
radically different from popular perceptions of Western development experts who lived 
lavishly and were perceived as not having broken out of the colonial mould. At the 
personal level, the Chinese medical experts embodied some important qualities in 
Nyerere’s definition of the committed expert and achieved impressive professional 
results while maintaining their cultural discipline. But the personal encounters between 
the Chinese experts and Tanzanians were also sites of cross-cultural conflict. 
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Ultimately, Chinese medical aid to Tanzania was on too limited a scale to have 
a major impact on the healthcare system, both in terms of the medical teams’ reach as 
well as the changes it might have brought about within the Tanzanian health ministry. 
The Tanzanian healthcare system remained heavily dependent on donor funding well 
into the 1970s. Nevertheless, Chinese medical assistance has continued to be a 
significant area of collaboration for both countries and successive medical teams have 
been sent to Tanzania virtually uninterrupted since the 1960s. While the supply of 
medical experts overseas seemed little affected by the Cultural Revolution, the latter’s 
overall effect on the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was more marked and less positive, as 
the final chapter will show. 
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Chapter Six – The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a test of 
the Sino-Tanzanian relationship, 1966 to 1971 
Domestic political developments in China after 1966 impinged upon the steady 
development of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship that had been taking place until that 
point. Chairman Mao Zedong launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 
1966 which only officially ended with his death a decade later. The movement 
destabilised the highest echelons of the Chinese government and rippled through every 
corner of society and was by far the most turbulent and violent period of modern 
Chinese history.809 It derived its strength from the Red Guards, led by university and 
secondary school youths in the larger Chinese cities who carried out politically-
motivated purges and denounced those whom they identified as disloyal to Mao. The 
human toll from the Cultural Revolution was staggering, with one recent estimate 
linking nearly 1.5 million deaths to the campaign alone.810 
The impact of the Cultural Revolution overflowed into the sphere of foreign 
relations as well. In the words of Jan Myrdal, Chairman of the Board of the Sweden 
China Association, “friendship with China” at the time: 
Does not only signify an interest in classical Chinese culture, the Chinese 
language, Chinese life: Today friendship with China means taking a stand 
against imperialism and its anti-Chinese campaign, to stand in favour of the 
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Chinese people’s revolution. An important task will be to spread knowledge 
about the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Mao Tsetung’s thought.811 
The most dramatic effects of the Cultural Revolution on foreign policy took 
place from 1966 to 1968. Yet considerably little research has been done on the 
campaign’s international effects, with the exception of a few studies on leftist groups in 
Malaya and Cuba.812 A major obstacle to the historical scholarship on this phenomenon 
is the lack of primary sources from that sensitive period of Chinese political history. 
Hence this chapter draws on a combination of historical publications, archival sources, 
as well as oral history interviews to address the gap of research on the impact of the 
Cultural Revolution on Sino-African relations from 1966 to 1971. The analysis is 
presented in three sections: Firstly, Tanzania and the Cultural Revolution; secondly, 
how the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was tested by the Cultural Revolution; and finally, 
Tanzanian diplomatic support for PRC admission at the UN. 
I. Tanzania and the Cultural Revolution 
The 1960s began on a catastrophic note for the Chinese people. Mao’s 
ambitious Great Leap Forward campaign in the two years prior had intended to 
jumpstart Chinese industrial development, but was an unmitigated economic disaster 
instead. The Great Leap Forward resulted in an estimated twenty-five million deaths, 
mostly from famine.813 Mao subsequently retreated backstage and, for a short time, 
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only participated indirectly in the government’s policymaking. In those interim years, 
more liberal economic measures were taken. Zhou Enlai was also able to pursue a 
moderate foreign policy. In June 1965 the premier advised all Chinese representatives 
not to be pushy with their political beliefs, as a diversity of perspectives was 
encouraged because both Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought allowed for 
debate.814 But Mao re-emerged on the political stage when the economy showed signs 
of recovery in 1962, emphasising that “the party should not forget class struggle”.815 He 
criticised the measures that had been implemented as signs of “capitalist restoration”.816  
Thus Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966, ostensibly to 
transform state and society through strengthening ideological unity, but also to re-
consolidate his personal power by eliminating political opposition.817 As the movement 
gained momentum, it broke free of the government’s decision-making mechanisms. 
Even senior government officials were not spared from successive waves of political 
purges. The crippling of the foreign ministry seriously disrupted its diplomatic relations 
and aid policies.818 Indeed, in the first year of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese 
government had diplomatic spats with over thirty of the roughly forty countries with 
which it had official ties.819 But Tanzania was not amongst them. This section discusses 
in detail the effects of the Cultural Revolution on the Sino-Tanzanian relationship 
between 1966 and 1971 in three areas: The initial Tanzanian enthusiasm for the 
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Cultural Revolution; the surge of ultra-radical propaganda; and finally, the recall of 
Chinese ambassadors. 
i) Initial Tanzanian interest in the Cultural Revolution 
As earlier chapters have shown, by 1966 the Tanzanian and Chinese 
governments enjoyed a close diplomatic relationship. This was the result of mutual 
interest, Chinese aid and personal relationships between senior government officials, set 
against the backdrop of post-colonial pressures. The Tanzanian government initially 
viewed the Cultural Revolution positively, as an important undertaking that would have 
some relevance to their own efforts to mobilise the people. According to the Chinese 
embassy in Dar es Salaam in September 1966, the Tanzanian press followed closely the 
events taking place in China. Local Tanzanian youths reportedly praised Mao and Mao 
Zedong Thought – the Chairman’s collated works which formed the basis of the 
Chinese Communist orthodoxy – and lauded the Red Guards’ revolutionary activities. 
The embassy also cautioned, however, that other sources were spreading “slanderous 
information” about the Cultural Revolution, alluding to the generally anti-Chinese 
stance of many Western and African governments.820  
A Tanzanian goodwill mission was sent to China shortly after the launch of the 
Cultural Revolution, one of the first foreign delegations to visit during that period. The 
Tanzanian government had high hopes for the outcome of the visit, as the mission was 
staffed by representatives from a broad range of government ministries, from 
transportation, planning, land, settlement and water development, to education, finance, 
agriculture and forestry. In line with what Nyerere felt that he had learned and observed 
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the main objective was not only on international donor funding, but also to learn from 
the Chinese experience of industrial development. Prior to the trip, the group requested 
to view models of cultivation, harvesting and farm implements, to meet leaders in the 
Ministry of Agriculture as well as to learn from the Chinese experience of bridge-
building, road construction and infrastructure development using labour-intensive 
methods.821  
The earliest Chinese reports of the Tanzanian delegation’s visit described the 
delegates’ keen interest in the events connected with the Cultural Revolution. The 
visitors were reportedly enthralled by the rousing propaganda performance The Congo 
is Rising, even suggesting that it be made into a film for release in Tanzania to counter 
negative US influence. The group also requested that visual images of China’s 
development – such as factories and cooperatives – be documented in order to increase 
the Tanzanian people’s awareness of developments in China. One Tanzanian official 
reportedly understood the movement better after having witnessed it firsthand; he 
dispelled the Western criticisms of the Cultural Revolution and Red Guards as 
“imperialist attitude”.822 These archival records are useful primary sources because they 
show how quickly the Cultural Revolution radicalised the government bureaucracy. 
Subsequent Chinese reports of the group’s six-week stay emphasise ideology and are 
more strident in tone, suggesting an acceleration of the pace of the campaign. One 
report highlighted a consensus among the delegates that Mao’s impressive 
achievements and good leadership made him “the world’s greatest leader”.823 These 
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superlative statements should not be taken at face value because, as earlier chapters 
have shown, the Tanzanian government was hardly a Chinese mouthpiece.  
Rather, the delegation appears to have taken a candid approach and questioned 
the situation that was unfolding around them. Team leader Lucy Lameck submitted to 
Chinese officials a list of questions about the Cultural Revolution. The inherent 
contradictions of the movement were readily apparent to China’s closest African ally: 
(i) Do the Red Guards ever raise objections to the Cultural Revolution? Do they 
ever commit negative acts; what about self-criticism? Does the government still 
have control of them on the streets? 
(ii) Since China has already had one revolution, why is the Cultural Revolution 
necessary? 
(iii) Why have big character posters824? Why highlight other people’s shortcomings 
in such a public way? Would it not be better to sort these issues out internally 
first? 
(iv) At the moment, there is a Mao quotation inserted at every occasion. What 
purpose does this serve? Will this practice be continued? 
(v) Each nation has its own culture. Once the old culture has been destroyed, does 
that not mean that you will have lost its special points too?825 
It is unclear from the Chinese records if these questions – prescient as they  
were – were addressed by the Chinese leaders during the visit. But the questions do 
reveal the yawning gap between the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution and its 
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translation into often humiliating or inexplicably brutal actions on the ground. 
Subsequent Chinese reports continue to play up Tanzanian enthusiasm for the Cultural 
Revolution. In one example, Ambassador Waziri Juma expressed his interest in 
facilitating Tanzanian access to Mao’s works and his hope that the Chinese government 
would make more material available. He reportedly even suggested that if the Chinese 
government did not have the manpower or capacity to broadcast news to Africa, his 
government would be happy to send personnel to China to carry out the task.826 The 
Tanzanian delegation insisted that the West was trying to use negative reports of the 
Cultural Revolution to turn others against China. It supported the 16 Point Decision that 
outlined the objectives of the Cultural Revolution and agreed that no other country 
should interfere with an internal Chinese matter.827  
Platitudes about Chairman Mao aside, the delegation did, overall, have a 
positive impression of the Cultural Revolution. Another member of the delegation, 
TANU Regional Secretary for the Coast Region S. J. Kitundu, sent a letter to the 
TANU Secretary General of the Central Committee dated 29 October 1966.828 In it he 
reiterated that the Tanzanian government appreciated the underlying objectives of the 
Cultural Revolution. He noted that the Chinese people had developed very quickly 
because of their politics, in particular their politics of self-reliance, which he explained 
as the political faith and understanding at all levels of society. Chinese students from 
primary to tertiary levels were required to study the collected works of Mao and this 
exposure was required in the police force, army and unions as well. Kitundu explained 
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that the strong link between personal development and national development spread 
Mao’s influence to every corner of the country, reinforced further by political 
appointments that were contingent on the candidates’ political education and familiarity 
with Mao’s treatises:  
If someone gets sent to study without being given this foundation, it would be 
like he was only using his work to get money and not for his country – 
something [the Chinese] say was brought by the colonisers.829 
Kitunda also shared his doubts about the applicability of the Chinese system in 
Tanzania, as TANU’s efforts to develop self-reliance and ujamaa (familyhood) 
required a large investment of the leaders’ time. Moreover, the Red Guards’ growing 
influence in China had led to a political party that was bigger than the government – the 
CCP Central Committee took the lead on all matters, which should not be the case. 
These observations and concerns proved correct, as the CCP was subsequently 
subjugated under Mao’s personality cult. State-generated propaganda was a key tool in 
the perpetuation of that personality cult.  
ii) Chinese propaganda and Africans 
State-generated propaganda was used as an important tool for national education 
and social control in China since the CCP’s victory over the Guomindang in 1949. The 
use of propaganda was consistent across the Communist bloc countries. The CCP 
government also used culture and the arts – encompassing literature, plays, songs or 
acrobatics – as propaganda channels. These activities provided entertainment for the 
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Chinese masses and fulfilled a more crucial, instructive objective: The Chinese 
government’s positioning of itself at the core of the international revolutionary 
movement.  
The Chinese government churned out copious amounts of propaganda that 
described the support of the millions of Chinese people for anti-imperialist struggles the 
world over.830 As discussed in Chapter One, the news propaganda broadcasted by Radio 
Peking was a major part of China’s African policy from the early 1960s. At the same 
time as China extended its soft power through propaganda, domestically the message of 
third world solidarity was reinforced through the depiction of Africans in Chinese 
plays, songs and in print. Posters of Chinese people standing alongside their African 
brethren, many of which had the subjects bearing arms and poised for combat, were a 
visual testament to Beijing’s support for African liberation struggles. One such example 
was a poster with a self-explanatory and compelling title: 
People of the world unite and defeat the US aggressors and all their running 
dogs! People of the world, be courageous and dare to fight defy difficulties and 
advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. 
Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed.831 
China’s Africa policy had a racial element which cut across political ideologies 
to foster a more visceral solidarity among non-white people. This was done through 
emphasising their shared experience as victims of colonialism. Indeed, the fact that 
China itself was a large, non-white power which owned its own development agenda 
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was an inspiration to disenfranchised groups, including many key figures within the 
American civil rights movement.832 As shown in Chapter Two, the Chinese government 
played the racial card strategically in the AAPSO when it argued for the ineligibility of 
Soviet participation because the latter was neither African nor Asian. Chinese visual 
propaganda in the 1960s also depicted Chinese workers shoulder-to-shoulder with their 
non-white brethren.  
During the Cultural Revolution, the stewardship of the key instruments of state 
propaganda and communication – the New China News Agency (NCNA) and the 
People’s Daily – was taken over by the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG). 
The nationalistic and revolutionary tone in Chinese broadcasts brimmed with “rhetoric 
and revolutionary belligerence” and took Sino-centric attitudes “to new heights”.833 
From April 1966 to April 1968, the People’s Daily published a section containing 
international praise for Mao Zedong Thought.834 These developments were all part of 
the broader move to reinstall Mao at the helm of the government, as he positioned 
himself as China’s moral and ideological mentor.835 Mao Zedong Thought was lauded 
with an almost religious ferocity and was supported by a deluge of publications. 
According to the Peking Review, between June 1966 and June 1969 Mao’s little red 
book of quotations was translated into twenty-five different languages and circulated in 
as many countries and regions.836 This was further supplemented by a dizzying array of 
Mao paraphernalia that was handed out by Chinese representatives on their trips 
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overseas, ranging from badges, books and photographs to postage stamps.837 From 
September 1966, the campaign had a direct and detrimental impact on the Chinese 
government’s foreign relations because of the large-scale recall of Chinese diplomats. 
iii) Chinese diplomats and the Cultural Revolution 
The radical currents of the Cultural Revolution emanating from Beijing had a 
direct bearing on foreign relations and leached Chinese embassies of experienced staff. 
Triggered by the criticism that certain Chinese diplomats were living extravagantly at 
their overseas stations, Mao called for all embassy staff to be revolutionised on 9 
September 1966. Ambassador He Ying was recalled from Dar es Salaam in January 
1967. The extreme insularity of the Chinese government during the Cultural Revolution 
cannot be overstated. On 7 February 1967, every Chinese embassy received a telegram 
from the Foreign Ministry informing them that the vast majority of diplomatic staff had 
to return to China to participate in the Cultural Revolution. With an estimated 2,000 
people recalled from its embassies, the disengagement and disjuncture in Chinese 
diplomatic affairs was drastic.  
In May 1967, the British Chargé d’Affaires observed that “the feverish 
adulation of Mao and the widespread vituperation of his opponents left an impression 
of almost total concentration upon the immediate needs of the Cultural Revolution, to 
the complete exclusion of international affairs.”838 His assessment was taken even 
further a mere two and a half months later, when he complained that “pragmatic and 
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logical judgments based on long range Chinese interests and historic realities and 
relationships with other countries are increasingly being replaced by frenzied posturing 
and sloganeering.”839 The Red Guards overran the Chinese Foreign Ministry in July 
1967, which effectively emasculated Beijing’s foreign policymaking mechanisms.  
As the earlier chapters have demonstrated, the Chinese ambassadors and NCNA 
representatives were instrumental to the development of Chinese foreign relations, 
particularly at the higher and middle levels of government. The recall of ambassadors to 
China immediately diminished Beijing’s diplomatic capacity. The outbursts of violence 
in Cairo reflected the explosive conditions at Chinese embassies around the world and, 
more importantly, the great extent to which the authority of the Chinese government 
(and its Foreign Ministry) had been compromised. With Cairo being a historically 
important Chinese diplomatic outpost for the Middle East and Africa, the events which 
unfolded there had repercussions on Beijing’s broader African engagement and hence 
warrant mention. Chen Jiakang, China’s first ambassador to Egypt, had been stationed 
in Cairo for ten years and was an early victim of the Cultural Revolution because of his 
alleged neglect of ideology in his work, as well as for having a “bourgeois lifestyle.”840 
The Chinese embassy came under attack by some younger staff members who put into 
practice Mao’s condemnation of “the four olds”: Old customs, old culture, old habits 
and old ideas. The youths rallied together with some twenty Chinese students (who 
were in Egypt to study Arabic) and stormed the embassy compound. They destroyed 
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items of antiquity – such as statues of Greek goddesses – and left the ambassador’s 
residence in ruins.841 
Ambassador Chen was replaced by Ambassador Huang Hua in late March 1966. 
The latter was the sole ambassador who was allowed to remain at his post in the initial 
years of the Cultural Revolution; his presence created a semblance of stability in 
China’s African and Middle Eastern engagement. Huang belonged to the category of 
Chinese ambassadors who were experienced “Africa hands”, seasoned in the 
continent’s issues and who took the trouble to understand Africa.842 Huang’s dispatch 
to Cairo was a minor victory for Premier Zhou, as the latter had insisted on the Chinese 
government’s need for an ambassador overseas to handle important negotiations and 
diplomatic activities. Nevertheless, the Chinese embassies and NCNA outposts in 
Africa were staffed by more radical individuals during that period.843  
The resulting leadership vacuum at the Chinese embassies allowed for 
excessively radical behaviour by the remaining diplomats. Inevitably the skeletal staff 
that was left behind to manage the mission’s day-to-day affairs had their attention tuned 
to the rapidly changing situation in Beijing.844 Moreover, compared to the ambassadors 
who preceded them, the newly dispatched diplomats were “monolingual, xenophobic 
… [and] were less concerned to win African trust than to win merit at home for their 
revolutionary zeal.”845 The detrimental effect that the recall of higher-level Chinese 
diplomats had on China’s international diplomacy was compounded by the increasingly 
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hostile situation that faced the foreigners who lived in China. Few foreign observers – 
diplomats included – could make sense of the rapidly shifting political landscape. The 
individuals who were sympathetic to the CCP’s cause were referred to as “foreign 
friends”; this group included individuals from Western countries or from Asia, such as 
the “hardcore communists” from Malaya, who flocked to China in the early 1960s 
when Beijing had emphasised its people’s diplomacy.846 To many of these visitors, 
Communist China (“New China”) represented a socialist paradigm that contrasted 
favourably to the “corruption, decadence and abuse of political power” in the West.847 
The Chinese government allowed them to reside in China and employed them as 
propagandists, translators, teachers and technicians.848 
However, the accounts from African students and non-diplomatic Africans who 
resided in China show that there was a high level of xenophobia amongst the Chinese 
people and racism against those of African origin. In many instances, the students 
found it difficult to establish closer relationships with the local people, especially 
romantic relationships. The twenty Tanzanian youths who were sent to Wuhan in 
central China for acrobatic training under the Sino-Tanzanian cultural agreement signed 
in 1965 complained of racism and discrimination.849 Although the trainees had made 
impressive progress in learning the art – so much so that the Tanzanian government 
sent a further ten youths in 1968 to study musical accompaniment to the acrobatic 
shows – their compelling firsthand experiences debunked the myth of solidarity which 
had been played up by both governments. For African students, the East Asian 
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countries (China and North Korea) were the least popular destinations in the Eastern 
bloc. Ali Sultan described the unattractiveness of Chinese austerity: 
Our boys could not take to the Asiatic lifestyle. Chinese society was too 
monolithic. We sent eighteen students there and I think all except one left early; 
it was the same in North Korea and Albania [...] the society was too tough, and 
the social life was very bad; the students were not allowed to mix with the 
Chinese. Our boys wanted the freedom to drink and have sex, but in China, 
everyone’s eyes were watching you, as if asking, ‘Why do you want to 
fornicate?’ Also some students did not want to study Marxism-Leninism.850 
The tensions were especially acute during the Cultural Revolution, when the 
movement turned the country against its “foreign friends”.851 Foreigners in China had 
their access to information on local developments stringently regulated, especially in 
the provinces: Poster reading was prohibited, as was the purchase of Red Guard 
newspapers.852  
Ali Nabwa, a Zanzibari who worked at the Institute of Journalism in Beijing 
from 1965 to 1967 described the experience as living in a “golden cage”. He was 
generally safe from the unrest, but at a cost. Although all his daily necessities were 
provided for, he had to adhere to a regimented daily routine and was forbidden from 
mingling with the locals. Nabwa explained, “we felt like we were not really wanted, we 
were just being used […] moreover, if you asked ten Chinese people the same question, 
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you would get the same answer.”853 The cross-cultural difficulties that these foreigners 
faced upon arrival worsened when they were formally barred from participating in the 
Cultural Revolution. Chinese nationalism overtook claims of an internationalist struggle 
and many of the former “friends” of the Chinese people were now cast in a sinister light. 
They ended up as scapegoats and were exploited as “a means to reunite the country”.854 
The foreign diplomatic corps was also affected by the unrest of the Cultural 
Revolution period, as the example of the Kenyan embassy shows. Relations between 
Nairobi and Beijing were rocky from 1965 and a series of diplomatic retaliations finally 
led to a mutual expulsion of diplomats by the middle of 1967.855 What happened next 
was clear evidence of the weight that Tanzanian opinion held for the Chinese 
government even in the latter’s fractured state. When the time came for the two 
remaining members of the Kenyan embassy to leave Beijing in September 1967, they 
were caught in a bureaucratic wrangle and unable to leave. In spite of the Chinese 
government’s explicit reluctance, a visiting joint Tanzanian-Zambian economic 
delegation insisted that their Kenyan compatriots be invited to their banquet.856 
The majority of foreign students left China from late September 1966 and were 
followed by an exodus of foreign residents between 1967 and 1968. At its lowest point, 
there were only fifty-nine foreign residents left in the entire country, a further sign of 
China’s international isolation. This was mirrored in Beijing’s huge diplomatic failure 
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at the February 1967 AAPSO conference that saw it exit from active participation in the 
group, which had previously played such an integral role in China’s third world 
policy.857 The immediate result of China’s withdrawal from AAPSO was the exclusion 
of those African liberation groups which had received predominantly Chinese support –
ZANU, PAC, South West African National Union (SWANU) and Coremo – in favour 
of the Moscow-backed groups. Thus the influential position that Zhou Enlai and his 
Foreign Ministry had so carefully fostered at the AAPSO in the years preceding the 
Cultural Revolution were dealt a mortal blow. Subsequently the Chinese government 
had more direct dealings with the liberation groups. Official Chinese pronouncements 
began to laud Mao Zedong Thought and armed struggle as the liberation groups’ 
strongest weapons to gain true independence in Congo (Kinshasa), Mozambique, 
Angola and Portuguese Guinea.858 Moreover, the Africans who were being trained at 
Nanjing military academy were instructed to attribute their successes to the 
effectiveness of Mao Zedong Thought.859 The Chinese government’s relationship with 
its most important African ally, Tanzania, was also put to the test. 
II. The Sino-Tanzanian relationship put to the test 
The initial effects of the Cultural Revolution on the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral 
relationship soon gave way to more direct and overt manifestations of the unrest. The 
repercussions of the Cultural Revolution overseas were most visible in two specific 
groups: Overseas Chinese communities and Marxist groups.860 This took place at 
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various levels, which will be discussed in three sections: Firstly, Chinese aid projects 
and the transmission of radicalism; secondly, Tanzania and the Chinese government’s 
“great power chauvinism” in its bilateral relations; and finally, the Tanzanian 
government’s own Cultural Revolution with a focus on soft power. 
i) Chinese aid projects and the transmission of radicalism  
The Chinese government’s relations with overseas Communist parties, 
particularly those in neighbouring countries were enhanced by the “profound 
internationalist content” of the Cultural Revolution.861 An important factor which 
affected how quickly and dramatically the Cultural Revolution was exported to 
particular countries was the size of the overseas Chinese community there. These 
groups were vital to the propagation and sustenance of the radical outbreaks throughout 
the campaign. As host to a sizeable number of Chinese projects, Tanzania was 
particularly susceptible to the effects of the Cultural Revolution transmitted through the 
Chinese experts. Three cases are discussed here: The Ruvu irrigation project, the first 
trilateral agreement on the TanZam rail link and the Friendship Textile Mill. 
Nyerere requested an irrigation project from the Chinese leaders during his first 
state visit to Beijing in February 1965. He explained the developmental benefits of such 
a project, because irrigating the Ruvu river would open up the uncultivated land further 
downstream. A Chinese survey team conducted a detailed study in the field that lasted 
from August 1966 until October 1967. However, the survey concluded that it was 
unadvisable to carry out the project, mainly because the local farmers were reluctant to 
be relocated from their existing fertile farmlands. The report also noted that the farmers 
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would be unwilling to put in the hard work necessary to transform the wasteland into 
productive plots of land, a factor which the team believed would not change in the short 
term. Yet the rational basis for not recommending the project was met with resistance 
within the group. 
Some members of the group felt that the project should proceed, as its rejection 
might be construed as “revisionist” if it went against Zhou and Nyerere’s original 
agreement and affect bilateral relations negatively. The dissenters criticised the survey 
team leader and appealed to the embassy staff in Dar es Salaam to change the 
conclusion of the feasibility report. According to Consul Zhou, the embassy officials 
were confident of the report’s accuracy, but the report was temporarily put aside 
because the team leader became a victim of the Cultural Revolution, was arrested and 
publicly criticised. Extreme political sensitivity pervaded the entire Chinese 
establishment at that time and any allegation of being “revisionist” was extremely 
dangerous. This matter was finally resolved during Nyerere’s second visit to China in 
June 1968, when both governments agreed that the project would not be pursued and 
the matter was settled amicably.862  
The second case where the effects of the Cultural Revolution were visible in 
Tanzania was the TanZam rail link, which has already been discussed in Chapter Four. 
When the Tanzanian and Zambian leaders signed the first trilateral agreement with the 
Chinese in September 1967, two senior Chinese officials were unable to participate in 
the meetings because they had been arraigned by the rebels, yet the project progressed. 
The second trilateral meeting for the TanZam rail link was held in Tanzania in April 
1968 to resolve questions related to the survey design. On the Chinese side, only four 
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experts were sent and Consul Zhou from the embassy was appointed the head of the 
delegation.863 It was evident that the Chinese government was still undergoing internal 
turmoil and, according to Tanzanian delegate Ibrahim Kaduma, the Chinese delegates 
involved in the discussions kept changing.864 Nevertheless, the meeting went ahead 
because the same Tanzanian and Zambian delegates from the first meeting were present 
and the TanZam project proceeded smoothly.  
A full year and a half passed between Ambassador He Ying’s departure and his 
replacement’s arrival, during which the Chargé d’Affaires Zhou Boping headed the 
Chinese mission.865 Yet that hiatus did not hinder important bilateral developments. On 
the contrary, it was precisely between 1967 and 1970 that the key tripartite agreements 
were signed which committed China to the construction and sponsorship of the TanZam 
rail link.866 This phenomenal undertaking by Beijing underscored the priority of the 
Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship to the Chinese leaders, who gave it their political 
support in spite of the dire state of China’s domestic agriculture and industry. In 1967, 
for example, the value of Chinese production fell by 9.6%, with urban areas the hardest 
hit whilst the state coffers were 2.25 billion Yuan ($0.91 billion) in deficit.867 
The main site of Chinese unrest in Tanzania that was linked to the Cultural 
Revolution was Chinese-sponsored Friendship Textile Mill. Located in Ubungo, close 
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to Dar es Salaam, the mill is generally cited as a positive example of Communist 
Chinese aid in the literature. At full capacity, the textile mill could train thousands of 
skilled workers and provide jobs for nearly half of all the employees in Tanzania’s 
textile sector in 1968.868 The Chinese press described the textile mill as “a shining 
monument to China’s aid and presence”, which garnered much more national attention 
than Beijing’s more modest agricultural endeavours.869 The construction of the 
industrial facility was completed in July 1968, six months earlier than planned, at an 
estimated cost of $7 million. It was the biggest fully integrated textile mill in East 
Africa that used local cotton as the raw material.870 Over 130 Chinese advisors provided 
technical training for the local workers at both the staff and managerial levels and 
around 3,000 Tanzanians were employed there.871  
Yet an important aspect of the mill project is neglected in the literature: It was 
also a site of internal dissent and a major trial for the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral 
relationship. The fault line between a group of Cultural Revolution rebels with the more 
moderate workers and embassy staff escalated into a matter that reached the leaders of 
both countries.872 Consul Zhou Boping’s memoir offers a particularly illuminating 
version of how the Cultural Revolution was manifested in the Friendship Textile Mill 
project.873 Published in 2004, his account is part of a subtle yet significant shift in the 
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official Chinese representation of the events and especially its effects on foreign 
relations. In it, Zhou cited two problematic issues that arose in the project.  
The first stemmed from Ambassador He Ying’s misunderstanding of the 
Chinese government’s aid policy. According to Consul Zhou, in April 1966, He Ying 
suggested to Nyerere that China also construct a workers’ dormitory at the mill, to 
which Nyerere agreed. However this proposal was rejected by the Chinese State 
Council Foreign Liaison Committee which contended (in line with the Eight Principles) 
that Chinese aid should not be used for living facilities, but rather for promoting self-
reliance in economic development. This internal disagreement was raised to the chief 
administrative body of the Chinese government, the State Council, which declared the 
matter an exception and overrode the Foreign Liaison Committee’s decision. The State 
Council stated that any change in aid policy would run the risk of eroding bilateral ties 
by putting Nyerere in an awkward position if things fell through.874 Moreover, the 
decision also recognised that China’s enemies might use the opportunity to sabotage the 
Sino-Tanzanian relationship, as well as to damage its reputation as a donor. Consul 
Zhou explained the situation to Nyerere, who agreed that the dormitory be scaled down.   
The second problematic issue relating to the Friendship Textile Mill was the 
outbreak of radicalism. The Chinese experts assigned to the project first arrived in 
Tanzania shortly after Nyerere had laid the foundation stone for the ambitious project in 
July 1966. Most of the experts at Ubungo hailed from the Textile Industry Department 
in Shanghai, the second vanguard city for Cultural Revolution rebels after Beijing.875 
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Hence the project site quickly became a microcosm of the developments which were 
taking place in China. The radical experts armed themselves with Mao’s quotations and 
chanted revolutionary verses. They demanded that the PRC flag and a large portrait of 
Mao be erected, so that the work site would be transformed into an overseas node and 
“second front” of the campaign.876 Additionally, they tried to establish a group along 
the same lines as the Red Guards and, most contentiously, instigated local Tanzanian 
workers and the TANUYL to revolt against Nyerere’s government in 1968.877  
The disturbance occurred at a politically sensitive time for Nyerere. The 
president had consolidated his power in the September 1965, laid down a one party 
state (under TANU on the mainland and ASP in Zanzibar), embarked on major 
economic restructuring and adopted the Arusha Declaration (1967).878 As has been 
discussed in the earlier chapters, Nyerere took great pains to defend his acceptance of 
Chinese military, economic and developmental support against the advice of Western 
sceptics. Hence any domestic unrest sparked off by the Chinese experts would leave 
Nyerere open to criticisms from political opponents and undermine his authority. 
Events in China did not help his case. The Red Guards’ attack on the British Embassy 
in Beijing in August 1967 caused huge international outrage. Premier Zhou had been 
unable to implement any restraint on the extremists and the extent of his helplessness 
surfaced in his conversation with Shirley Graham, the widow of eminent black 
American scholar W. E. B. Du Bois. Speaking about the mayhem that was unfolding 
around him, Zhou expressed the possibility that the Chinese revolution might be lost, 
adding that “if we are defeated here, you in Africa will learn from our mistakes, and 
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you will develop your own Mao Zedong, and you will learn to do it better. And so, in 
the end, we shall succeed”879  
Nyerere decided to raise his concerns about the disruptive experts at the 
Friendship Mill during his second visit to China in June 1968. He raised the matter 
directly to the Chinese leaders even though the mill project was nearly completed. 
Chairman Mao was the quintessential statesman, and although he was the progenitor of 
the Cultural Revolution, he successfully addressed Nyerere’s concerns by condemning 
the rebels’ actions in Tanzania. He assured the president that the perpetrators would be 
recalled immediately. Premier Zhou Enlai emphasised that the Chinese government did 
not condone anarchists abroad and that Chinese aid projects should be appropriate to 
the host country’s specific conditions and safeguard local institutions.880 Nyerere was 
reassured that the Chinese leaders would prevent any further unrest from spreading to 
Tanzania. Moreover, the Tanzanian government was in need of further military and 
economic assistance, which Nyerere had requested and Zhou guaranteed.881  
The three incidents of the Ruvu irrigation project, the TanZam rail link and the 
Freedom Textile Mill show that the radicalism from the Cultural Revolution was 
transmitted through a small group of Chinese experts sent to Tanzania for the aid 
projects. Due to the rapport and mutual need at both the inter-governmental and 
personal levels, the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was resilient and successfully 
withstood the trial of the Cultural Revolution.  
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ii) Nyerere’s concerns about the Cultural Revolution 
The Chinese government could not avoid the diplomatic embarrassment 
and damage caused by the Cultural Revolution. In 1967, Mao and Zhou were 
compelled to apologise for various diplomatic incidents, as well as to personally 
vouch for the credibility of China’s overseas experts. The Zambian leader Kenneth 
Kaunda had already lodged a similar complaint with the Chinese leaders even 
before Nyerere’s second trip to China.882 Premier Zhou responded by reiterating 
the experts’ role: To serve the local people wholeheartedly; and not interfere in the 
domestic situation; to quickly return to China after transferring knowledge to their 
local counterparts; and not to enjoy privileged treatment or show “big country 
chauvinism.”883  
The Chinese leaders gave explanations and apologised to some African 
governments for the Chinese embassies’ breaches of diplomatic etiquette, which 
included official correspondence that brimmed with Mao’s quotations. Premier 
Zhou recalled these incidents in his address to an audience of Chinese diplomats 
who had been recalled to Beijing on 12 December 1967 and gave an account of 
Mao’s apology to the prime minister of Congo (Brazzaville), during which the 
Chairman had thanked the Congolese for their criticisms and for having corrected 
China’s own “great power chauvinism.”884 Significantly, the PRC’s political rival, 
the Republic of China (ROC), was able to gain precious diplomatic ground 
through obtaining official recognition by many African governments between 
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January 1966 and mid-1968.Mao finally took steps to curtail his personality cult 
from 1968.885 Chinese foreign policy became “less revolutionary, more sober and 
increasingly determined by concerns of national security” in the late 1960s. 886 
This was externally motivated, in part by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 and the outbreak of Sino-Soviet border skirmishes on the Amur-
Ussuri river in 1969. The Chinese government’s concerns about its southern flank 
also came into focus with the intensifying American offensives in South Vietnam. 
Mao’s strategy to defray the risk on both fronts was to portray the Soviet Union as 
a “socio-imperialist power”, hence the possibility for a thaw in relations with 
Washington was created without any serious outward compromise or retraction of 
Mao’s ideological framework.887 
Meanwhile, Zhou was eager to rectify the situation and rehabilitate his 
government’s international profile. On 6 February 1968, the Premier addressed his 
Foreign Ministry colleagues once again and, citing the shortage of senior diplomats in 
China’s overseas missions. He assured the audience that most ambassadors would 
return to their posts by the end of March or early April, especially to the embassies in 
Africa and Asia. However, this policy did not extend to the few ambassadors “who had 
failed to pass the test of the Cultural Revolution.”888 It appears that Mao, without 
wanting to make a volte face on the Cultural Revolution, still wanted to emphasise 
Chinese leadership in the third world. On 17 March 1968, Mao finally put a stop to the 
distribution of Mao badges to foreigners and the printing of his quotations on cargo that 
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was destined as foreign aid.889 This change in external propaganda was justified 
through Mao’s admission that the emphasis on Beijing as the centre of world revolution 
was “self-styled and mistaken.”890 Mao Zedong Thought was, henceforth, removed 
from all documents related to foreign affairs. 
In Tanzania, Nyerere’s commitment to the southern African liberation struggle 
and his frustration with the intransigence of the former colonial powers led him to look 
favourably at the combative language of the Cultural Revolution which supported anti-
imperialism and selected armed struggles. This need for external assistance and the 
continued desire for a non-aligned foreign policy thus helped to lead the Tanzanian 
government to a more accommodating stance towards the unrest caused by the Cultural 
Revolution. Thus Nyerere did not publicly criticise the excesses of the Cultural 
Revolution. Indeed, his speech in Beijing on 18 June 1968 suggested that he was more 
than happy for the friendship to continue. He stressed that there was very little 
difference in the objectives of both governments’ various activities and drew parallels 
between their countries, that:  
All of the major changes Tanzania has introduced have been intended to secure, 
or at least to further, the supremacy of the people. As I understand it, that was 
also the purpose of the Cultural Revolution.891  
In another speech delivered on 21 June (also in Beijing), Nyerere insisted that 
the Sino-Tanzanian friendship was based on respect, equality and non-interference in 
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each other’s affairs; it was deep enough to accommodate differing opinions and – lest 
there be any question about his position on bilateral relations – added that: 
Tanzania is enriched by this friendship, and we value it […] I have, therefore, 
no reason to believe that friendship between Tanzania and China will not 
continue indefinitely, and grow stronger as time passes […] I believe that you 
sympathise with us in our struggle, just as we sympathise with the Chinese 
people’s determination to defend their own country and build it according to 
their own desires.892 
Coming as it did during the Cultural Revolution, Nyerere’s expression of 
support was crucial for the Chinese government’s ailing diplomatic position and should 
not be underestimated. The Australian Foreign Ministry noted that this was the 
Tanzanian president’s second visit to China and, significantly, the first time that he had 
visited a country twice.893 Nyerere called on Consul Zhou after returning to Dar es 
Salaam and appeared satisfied with his trip. He was apparently impressed by the way 
that Mao had dealt with the rebels at the textile mill, because it showed that the Chinese 
government valued its relations with a recipient country above that of its own 
experts.894 The fact that this incident is virtually unmentioned in nearly all the English-
language accounts of the Friendship Textile Mill suggests that both the Chinese and 
Tanzanian governments were eager to maintain the image of solidarity and closeness. 
Thus high level diplomacy had ensured that the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship 
remained robust, especially in the eyes of the international community. Nyerere’s visit 
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to China was part of a longer tour to the East Asian communist countries, which also 
included North Vietnam and North Korea. The Australian Third Secretary in Dar es 
Salaam observed that the bilateral relations between Tanzania and North Korea were 
“demonstrably more cordial” since early 1968, prompted by three main reasons: 
Nyerere’s identification with countries which have distinguished themselves in the 
struggle against “imperialist aggression”; his admiration for the economic achievements 
of North Korea, which he saw on his recent visit; and a feeling that he could develop 
“an easier relationship with these small Asian communist countries than […] with the 
colossus of China”.895 These observations allude to the challenges which the Tanzanian 
government faced in being the smaller partner in a bilateral relationship with a grossly 
larger power. Nevertheless, Chinese aid to Tanzania continued throughout the early 
years of the Cultural Revolution, in spite of the purges of intellectuals and “bourgeois” 
experts that disrupted the Chinese military, as well as the country’s industrial and 
technological capacity.896 The Friendship Textile Mill was completed ahead of 
schedule, as the majority of Chinese experts were not involved in the seditious 
activities.897 This continuity of aid policy was also evident from the progress that was 
made on the TanZam rail link project between 1967 and 1970. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the labour intensive Chinese projects meant that 
large groups of workers were exposed to the risk of radicalisation. However, the 
Cultural Revolution was only ever a limited threat in Tanzania, because the essential 
factors for a large scale outbreak were absent. Unlike in countries with a resident ethnic 
Chinese community which were part of local networks and had the freedom of 
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movement, the Chinese experts in Tanzania were geographically confined to their 
worksite.898 This made it easier to identify the radicals and quell any disorder. 
Additionally, the radicalism did not spread locally because there was little fertile 
ideological ground. The Tanzanian political actors who identified most closely with 
Maoism were the Umma cadres in Zanzibar but, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, 
this group declined as an ideological force from 1964. Furthermore, Nyerere’s African 
socialism stole some ground from the extreme left. 
The Cultural Revolution’s excesses alienated the more moderate African 
intellectuals who were initially sympathetic to the Chinese cause. Many were perturbed 
and appalled by the Red Guards’ inexplicable activities. Nabwa shared that he was at 
first intrigued by the developments that engulfed China, but then found the persecution 
of esteemed leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi humiliating. In his opinion, these 
activities gave the Chinese government a bad reputation.899 Similarly Fay Chung of the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) saw great value in Mao’s concept of the 
“just war” as “the most practical model for Africa,” but was put off by Mao’s tirades 
against intellectuals.900 Hence, the Cultural Revolution worried China’s friends in 
Africa: The effects of the campaign went far beyond the domestic arena and exacted a 
heavy toll on Chinese diplomacy. As the section has shown, Tanzania was one of the 
affected countries, but local political developments there helped to smoothen the rocky 
path that the Cultural Revolution created. 
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iii) Tanzania’s own Cultural Revolution 
Not every aspect of the Cultural Revolution was viewed negatively. In fact, the 
Chinese government’s apparent success in rallying the masses for national development 
was admired by many third world leaders, who were looking for ways to create an 
“ideological and moral foundation for national unity and citizenship education.”901 
Initially, China’s Cultural Revolution appeared to be “an external salvation” for those 
who sought an alternative to Western political hegemony.902 This reflected the success 
of the Chinese government’s soft power – through its propaganda, personal diplomacy 
and various aid projects – as well as the frustration of the post-colonial situation that the 
African governments faced.  
There were important parallels between Mao’s Cultural Revolution and 
Nyerere’s policies at the time. As Mkandawire has pointed out, “Nyerere was one of the 
few African nationalists who straddled the two worlds of thought and action, not only 
by providing leadership to a nationalist movement, but also by articulating both its 
ideologies and visions.”903 Nyerere’s inspiration for mass mobilisation and the fostering 
of nationhood came from the socialist countries. Hashim Mbita, the former TANU 
party secretary, explained in an interview the urgency for a nationwide mobilisation 
campaign: 
In a society that has been subjugated in a particular way of life for a long time, 
you can fight that system and may even have political victory, but may not have 
conquered the depth of that subjugation in the people. A slow process of 
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political education until people change would perhaps take fifty years, but a 
shorter time was preferable. That was what the Chinese did and in Tanzania, the 
1967 Arusha Declaration – a type of Cultural Revolution – was to change the 
minds of people, to realise that they were complete.904 
The creation of the Tanzanian national service and the pursuit of “education for 
self-reliance” were entirely in line with the Marxist tenets of sustaining the nation 
through the efforts of the youth.905 Taking inspiration from the socialist bureaucratic 
structure, TANU’s hierarchy and governance extended into the cultural domain and 
included the production and presentation of culture for the purpose of transmitting 
ideological doctrine to the people.906 As shown in the earlier chapters, Nyerere was 
impressed by aspects of the Chinese model, including Mao’s success at tapping the 
energy of the youth for his government’s political objectives.907 The president 
implemented policies which did not only focus on economic prescription, but extended 
into the cultural sphere. This included the designation of Swahili as the national 
language and the pursuit of African socialism. Youth groups were regarded prime 
targets for “radical challenge” to Nyerere.908 A letter from a fictitious youth group that 
called itself the Tanzanian Friends of China made its rounds in Tanzania in August 
1970. The letter lambasted Nyerere’s brand of socialism and hailed Beijing as 
Tanzania’s “only friend and comrade in the battle against modern revisionism and 
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imperialism”.909 Nyerere adopted a version of the Red Guards: The Green Guards were 
formed from the TANU Youth League. Unlike the former, who rose to prominence as 
defenders of Mao’s continuous revolution in China, the Tanzanian Green Guards’ 
mandate was to create a disciplined and diligent unit that would keep the perceived 
excessive and indulgent expressions of youth in Dar es Salaam in check. The group was 
the crystallisation of a movement to revive a more “authentic” culture which had 
already surfaced in Dar es Salaam in the early 1960s. The Green Guards held marches 
in support of compulsory national service and opposed rioting university students who 
were protesting against the same policy in October 1966. Outwardly the Green Guards 
adopted similar visual trappings as the Red Guards: They donned badges of Mao and 
Nyerere and were issued with collections of the president’s quotes in “little green 
books”.910 However, as Snow has argued, although it was Tanzanian initiative which 
linked the Green Guards to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, “people were frightened, 
and the Chinese got the blame.”911 
Nyerere appreciated the conceptual necessity of the Cultural Revolution, even 
though its practical shortcomings and excesses were clear. During his visit to China in 
1968, Nyerere expressed his wish that “all the people of Tanzania could come to China 
and witness for themselves what a determined people can do.”912 Drawing parallels 
between the determination of the Chinese, faith and Christianity, it seems clear that 
Nyerere’s rhetoric was for a home audience as much as the Chinese. Perhaps to quell 
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Tanzanian wariness of the officially atheistic Communist Chinese, he cleverly declared 
that: 
Today, after the Cultural Revolution, the spirit of the people of China is even 
greater than before. One of the sayings of Christianity is that Faith can move 
mountains. You Chinese people have great faith; nor is it blind faith. You 
believe in the creative power of the people; you believe in your great leader, 
Chairman Mao Zedong; you believe in the spirit of self-reliance and self-
criticism; and you believe in the oneness of the oppressed peoples of the world. 
But you do more than believe. You are showing us that it is not enough to 
believe: one must practice what one believes.913 
The government-driven and -controlled Tanzanian cultural revolution drew its 
momentum and inspiration from the Chinese campaign. Just as the Chinese campaign’s 
condemnation of the “four olds” was a modernising effort, the TANUYL 
announcement of Operation Vijana (a campaign against indecent dress and 
adornments) in October 1968 was part of a “modernisationalist face of the national 
cultural project” that was “aimed at defending Tanzania’s culture.”914 However, the 
Green Guards’ link to their Red “compatriots” in China eventually led to the former’s 
dissolution. When the Red Guards started acting without the Chinese government’s 
direction, TANUYL’s request to the Chinese embassy for badges with Nyerere’s image 
as well as support for the formation of the Green Guards fizzled out.  
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Finally Mao himself accepted that bilateral relations “no longer necessarily 
implied revolutionary friendship or a commitment to common ideological goals, but 
rather it simply meant those who were sympathetic to China’s current political line.”915 
Thereafter there was greater regularity in the Chinese embassy’s operations in 
Tanzania, as well as its more moderate and acceptable diplomatic stance in Africa 
overall.916 A new Chinese ambassador, Zhong Xidong, finally arrived in Dar es Salaam 
in June 1969. The British High Commissioner Horace Phillips described him as 
“intelligent and urbane […] anxious to be affable and to create a good impression.”917 
Zhong appeared accommodating and, in their meeting, insisted that, although pure 
Marxism-Leninism was only practiced in China and Albania, his government still 
wanted to help the Tanzanians to maintain their independence and enjoy socio-
economic progress. To illustrate his point, he cited the TanZam railway project as 
evidence of China’s desire to help Tanzania, despite the project’s “misrepresent[ation] 
by China’s enemies.”918 There was a marked decrease in the embassy’s ultra-left 
sloganeering, a space that quickly filled by Mao’s warnings about the ominous Soviet 
threat. Zhong’s arrival led to the start of active anti-Soviet propaganda, which took the 
form of cinema screenings, including the less than subtle Anti-China atrocities of the 
New Tsars about Moscow’s broken promises to China. Nyerere made special effort to 
attend the event, much to British chagrin, as it was a break from the president’s practice 
of absenting himself from functions at diplomatic missions. Between 350 to 400 
Tanzanians and Chinese experts were present, too.919 
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Thus in spite of the tribulations that were exacted on the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship during the Cultural Revolution, the leaders of both governments remained 
committed to maintaining good bilateral ties. Nyerere disapproved of the violence and 
extreme radicalism which later set in, but did not publicly criticise the Chinese 
government. As the Chinese campaign unfolded, the Tanzanian president promoted a 
Cultural Revolution in Tanzania which, at the surface, bore some striking similarities to 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Nyerere appreciated and understood the domestic 
objectives of the campaign, as he was attempting to achieve similar things in Tanzania. 
Both the Chinese and Tanzanian leaders prioritised their own agenda and the benefits 
that a strong bilateral relationship had to offer. Those benefits were soon enjoyed. 
III. Tanzanian diplomatic support for the PRC at the UN 
The significant test of whether the early political, diplomatic and development 
aid relationship could withstand the upheavals in China came to the fore with the issue 
of China’s representation at the UN. This section examines the main factors that led to 
the PRC’s entry into the UN in 1971, given the major challenges that Chinese 
diplomacy faced during the Cultural Revolution. The Tanzanian government and its UN 
delegation made important contributions to this process, as will be explained. 
The decline of Chinese radicalism made the PRC more acceptable to other 
governments, enhanced its strategic position and international status and thus paved the 
way for the “restoration” of Beijing’s seat in the UN Security Council.920 Concurrently, 
Mao allowed Sino-American relations to thaw, so that initially halting contacts were 
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made between Beijing and Washington from 1968 to 1969 that eventually led to US 
President Richard Nixon’s monumental visit to China in 1972. This section examines 
the important role played by individual Africans in furthering the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship and, more significantly, their role in enhancing Chinese diplomacy in the 
late 1960s. It will illustrate this through a case study of Ambassador Salim Ahmed 
Salim, a Tanzanian diplomat with Zanzibari roots who was closely identified with the 
PRC’s entry into the UN in 1971. 
i) China and Salim  
Salim Ahmed Salim was well-suited for his intimate involvement in promoting 
and developing bilateral ties between Tanzania and China. The first factor was Salim’s 
political roots with the ZNP and Umma party. He was an active trade unionist and ZNP 
member in the early 1960s and subsequently joined Babu’s left-wing Umma group in 
1963 as publicity secretary, editing the party newspaper and acting as Secretary General 
of the All Zanzibar Journalists’ Association.921 Salim’s career in the foreign service 
began after the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964, when the Zanzibar Revolutionary 
Council appointed him ambassador in Cairo and then in New Delhi. Unlike many of his 
Umma comrades whose political careers vaporised after the union of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar, Salim integrated himself well into the union government.922 British records 
described him as “one of the ablest” diplomats and, in spite of his youth, he enjoyed an 
illustrious career in the foreign service. At the UN, Salim earned himself a reputation 
for being “one of the UN’s youngest and most militant men”. He continued to play a 
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visible and vocal role on anti-colonial issues – a reflection of the Tanzanian 
government’s stance as well as his personal convictions – as Chair of the UNGA’s 
Special Committee on Colonialism in 1966.923  
Salim also had a good rapport with the Chinese leaders. He was appointed 
ambassador to China in 1969, a sign of the Tanzanian government’s high regard for its 
relationship with the “emerging superpower”, as the embassy in Beijing played an 
important role in the politically and symbolically valuable relationship.924 In addition to 
its higher level diplomatic work, the mission also produced a monthly news bulletin 
that was distributed as widely as Hong Kong, Japan and Tanzania.925 Salim’s account 
sheds new light on the Tanzanian government’s attitude towards Beijing and holds the 
key to understanding the continued Sino-Tanzanian commitment to cooperation.  
Salim arrived in Beijing on 21 April 1969, during the CCP’s Ninth Party 
Congress. The ambassador was welcomed with a rousing reception which, noted the 
British Chargé d’Affaires drily, would likely make him sympathetic to further Chinese 
overtures.926 Salim’s speech on 26 April, on the occasion of Tanzania’s fifth 
anniversary, probably confirmed those fears when he congratulated the Chinese people 
on the “great victories in all fields” that were achieved during the Cultural Revolution, 
the accelerated economic and political progress, as well as the undermining of 
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imperialists.927 Salim enjoyed tremendous access to the Chinese leaders during his 
tenure as ambassador, which he described as “a more favoured relationship” and 
“discriminatory diplomacy in Tanzania’s favour.” He met Zhou no less than a dozen 
times between April and December and the Premier reciprocated by attending two 
official functions at the Tanzanian embassy, something which the European diplomatic 
corps “could only have dreamed of.”928 
Salim was deeply impressed by Premier Zhou, whom he mainly saw late at 
night for discussions because the Premier kept very long working hours. Salim insisted 
that Zhou had “an incredible command of facts and figures” as well as a “profound 
analytical mind.” Zhou also advised Salim to travel out of the capital because “Beijing 
was not necessarily China,” which created many opportunities for the ambassador to 
visit industries, villages and state farms in the northeast.929 These were in areas such as 
Fushun, Dalian or Heilongjiang, where he saw the best and the worst living conditions 
for the Chinese people.930 The Tanzanian embassy reported that travelling around the 
country was important for two reasons: “To see and know” because very little 
information about China was otherwise available, and to “spread” Sino-Tanzanian 
friendship to the Chinese people.931 At the same time, this exposure meant that the 
Tanzanians were fully aware of the practical constraints of daily life in China.932 The 
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Chargé noted critically that taxis were expensive, because they were meant for 
“bourgeois foreigners whose monies the Chinese are determined to take as much as 
possible […] there is nowhere to go for entertainment of any sort and even churches are 
closed”.933 
The Tanzanian experience in China was unique, as other African diplomats in 
Beijing did not necessarily enjoy a similar level of access to the Chinese leaders. 
Indeed, British records suggest that they were discontented, as they “lived in a vacuum 
and were bewildered and unhappy in the face of Chinese unwillingness to let them 
make friends or find out what was going on in the country.”934 Moreover, with limited 
resources and little knowledge of the country, few of these African missions had any 
Chinese speakers, nor adequate or secure communication channels with their own 
governments. Yet Salim’s tenure in Beijing was brief, as within barely eight months 
after his arrival he was appointed Tanzanian Permanent Representative to the UN in 
December 1969, owing to the sudden death of his predecessor in New York and the 
Tanzanian government’s limited human resources.935 In hindsight, this development 
benefitted the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship, because the PRC now had a 
charismatic ally at the UN. Salim’s diplomatic aptitude and prior experience in China 
made him an important driver of the PRC’s representation at the UN, with Tanzania 
always having been one of the sponsors of the pro-PRC resolution. 
ii) Salim and Tanzanian support for the PRC at the UN  
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The UN was the international stage on which the robust Sino-Tanzanian 
bilateral relationship was reinforced in three ways: Firstly, because of Nyerere’s overt 
support; secondly, through Salim’s contributions; and thirdly, by common knowledge 
of the Tanzanian government’s close relations with the Chinese. 
As shown in Chapter Two, Nyerere had always been a proponent of the PRC’s 
entry into the UN. At the TANU National Conference in October 1967, he once again 
deplored the PRC’s exclusion and the occupation of the Chinese seat by 
“representatives of a government which was overthrown eighteen years ago,” adding 
that the UN would be impotent on Asian and other crucial international issues if the 
situation persisted. Nyerere underscored Tanzania’s continued advocacy for China’s 
admission and stated that he would continue to persuade others that the PRC’s 
existence should be accepted, “whether or not they liked or approved of its 
government.”936 Nyerere took this stand consistently on international platforms. In his 
address to the UN General Assembly in 1970, he criticized the ongoing injustice of the 
PRC’s exclusion.937 
As Tanzania’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Salim had a pivotal role in 
furthering his government’s support for the pro-PRC resolution. The general trend in 
international sentiments on the “restoration” of the PRC’s seat at the UN rose 
throughout the 1960s. In 1970, the votes for Communist China outnumbered those 
against for the first time, but the number was less that the two-thirds majority needed to 
defeat Resolution 1668 (adopted on 15 December 1961 that declared the representation 
of China an “important question”, requiring a two-thirds majority instead of a simple 
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majority). According to Salim, the pro-PRC delegations at the UN were “organised and 
systematic.”938 They had agreed that he would be tasked to manage any unexpected 
occurrences as “the responsibility of the unknown,” which he executed well.939  The 
international political tide was in their favour and on 25 October 1971, at the UN 
General Assembly’s 26th Session, the “important question” resolution on PRC 
membership was finally defeated.940 Until that point, Nixon had outwardly maintained 
the stance that the PRC should adhere to a “Two China” (dual recognition) arrangement 
in order to enter the UN, in spite of Kissinger’s top-level dialogues with Beijing. Indeed, 
Kissinger had concluded that there were insufficient votes for the US-sponsored “Two 
China” option and that their interests would in any case be best served by “cementing 
the Chinese relationship that mattered for the future.”941  
The announcement that the US president would visit China before May 1972 
increased the momentum for the restoration of Beijing’s seat, as other countries were 
concerned that they might be left out in the cold.942 Salim described the situation as 
“Washington wanting to have its cake and eat it too.”943 On 15 November 1971 the UN 
General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 to seat the PRC and oust the ROC by a 
conclusive vote of seventy-five to thirty-five.944 On hearing the result of the vote, Salim 
reportedly burst into dance, an episode that was recalled as a minor diplomatic drama 
that identified him – and his government – as a strong Chinese stalwart. Salim 
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personally denied that he had danced, saying instead that there was a “jubilant” and 
“ecstatic” eruption amongst the delegates upon hearing the news. In any case, the event 
was, in the words of another former Tanzanian ambassador Paul Rupia, “a culmination 
of Tanzanian efforts to cement relations between the countries.”945  
The PRC’s entry into the UN was a monumental event in its diplomacy and 
triggered a downward spiral for Taiwanese diplomacy, as various governments stepped 
forward to recognise the PRC in rapid succession.946 This diplomatic breakthrough in 
Beijing’s international relations gave mettle to Mao’s claims that his revolution had 
effectively brought China from weakness into strength.947 In his speech welcoming the 
PRC delegation to the UN, Salim praised: 
Those of us who have been fortunate, as I have been, to have lived with and 
know something about the people of China have good reason to admire their 
ancient and well preserved culture, their heroic struggle for their own dignity 
and independence and their unflinching support for the liberation struggle all 
over the world.948 
This event ushered in a new chapter in Beijing’s international relations and 
coincided with the return of Chinese ambassadors to their posts in the early 1970s. 
China’s UN membership and its diplomatic relations with many more governments 
necessitated a large number of skilled and able staff. The Foreign Ministry, which had 
many of its personnel scattered during the Cultural Revolution, had “depleted ranks.” 
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Beijing was not adequately equipped to manage the issues that its membership would 
have raised, and it thus refrained from joining some specialised UN agencies.949 Aware 
of the gravity of the situation and the fact that all eyes would be on the Chinese 
delegates, Mao briefed the diplomats bound for New York. He emphasised that they 
should cooperate with the twenty-three countries that co-sponsored the resolution – 
“our friends in need” – as well as the other fifty-three which supported the resolution.950  
Significantly, Mao explained that although there were seventeen delegations 
which abstained, they did not in fact succumb to US pressure and had demonstrated 
their support for China through their abstentions; he told the Chinese delegates to 
maintain contact with the thirty-five countries which opposed the resolution, as it was a 
diverse group that represented various interests. The Chairman also stressed the 
importance of extending the “international united front” at the UN and that the 
delegates should treat others as equals, without arrogance and to adhere to non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Premier Zhou urged the group to 
be modest, prudent and to devote themselves wholeheartedly to their diplomatic work 
so as to live up to the expectations of the Chinese people and third world countries. He 
added that they should undertake their tasks seriously and not take advantage of their 
veto power.951 
This section has shown that, despite the great damage caused to China’s foreign 
relations by the Cultural Revolution between 1966 to 1968, Beijing was still able to 
reap diplomatic support that quickly led to its successful entry into the UN in 1971. An 
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important component of that support came from the African countries and third world 
governments which pushed the pro-PRC resolution through. The visibility of 
Communist China’s aid projects in Africa, as well as its support for the southern 
African liberation struggles won it more support. The Tanzanian delegation at the UN 
supported the pro-PRC position throughout the 1960s and the accounts from Tanzanian 
diplomats demonstrate that their government identified itself closely with the push to 
“restore” Beijing’s membership in the UN. 
Conclusion: A friend in need is a friend indeed 
The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 was a domestic phenomenon in 
China which, at its worst period, brought the entire country to the brink of chaos and 
anarchy. This chapter examined the effects of the Cultural Revolution on the Sino-
Tanzanian relationship during the most tumultuous years of the campaign, from mid-
1966 to 1969. The Chinese government’s diplomatic position in Africa declined 
markedly from 1965 and was further eroded by the onset of the Cultural Revolution. 
These developments caused many governments to question the Chinese government’s 
political intentions, suitability as a donor and overall reliability as a third world ally. 
This chapter has demonstrated in detail the resilience of the Sino-Tanzanian 
bilateral relationship in the face of pressures from the Cultural Revolution. Mao 
launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966 to transform the Chinese state and 
society through strengthening ideological unity. However, his personal agenda was to 
consolidate his power by eliminating his political rivals. The Tanzanian government 
initially viewed the explicit tenets of the Chinese campaign positively, as there 
appeared to be important parallels with what Nyerere wanted to achieve. He appreciated 
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its underlying objectives and implemented a number of similar initiatives in Tanzania 
during the same time.  
However, the negative effects of the Cultural Revolution quickly became 
apparent – first to the visiting Tanzanian delegation, to diplomats, Africans living in 
China and, finally, in Tanzania itself. Ambassador He Ying left Dar es Salaam as part 
of the worldwide recall of Chinese diplomats and China’s African policy was left to 
Ambassador Huang Hua in Cairo, as well as the skeletal staff comprised of junior 
diplomats. Radical propaganda was circulated by the Chinese embassy in Dar es 
Salaam, which increasingly emphasised Mao’s personality cult. Three incidents were 
discussed in this chapter – the Ruvu irrigation project, the TanZam rail link discussions 
and the disturbances at the Friendship Textile Mill – which demonstrated how the 
Cultural Revolution affected China’s aid projects. There was factionalism within the 
Chinese government and bureaucracy, so that high-level, internal decision-making 
processes were based on radical rather than geo-political objectives. Numerous officials 
in government ministries were purged, which disrupted the progress of Chinese aid 
projects and created very negative impressions in the host countries. Specifically at the 
Friendship Textile Mill, radical Chinese experts had a direct, destabilising influence on 
the local workers. Yet these challenges and threats to the Sino-Tanzanian friendship 
were effectively mitigated.      
Top-level engagement between the Tanzanian and Chinese governments was 
vital to the continuation of the Sino-Tanzanian collaboration and Nyerere did not 
hesitate to raise his concerns about the Chinese experts’ behaviour at the textile mill 
directly to Mao. The research shows that the developmental and diplomatic dividends 
from the Sino-Tanzanian relationship, discussed in the earlier chapters, sealed both  
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governments’ commitment and allowed them to survive the most intense years of the 
Cultural Revolution. In contrast to the negative outcomes that extreme Chinese 
radicalism had in other countries, Sino-Tanzanian ties at the highest levels appear to 
have strengthened by the trials in those difficult years. The visible indicators of the 
robust bilateral relationship were the continuation of Chinese aid projects in Tanzania, 
Nyerere’s second state visit to Beijing in 1968 and the Tanzanian government’s active 
role in supporting PRC membership at the UN. The goodwill that had been generated 
by China’s offer to construct the TanZam rail link, as well as its other economic and 
development assistance, yielded significant dividends. 
Mao attempted to ameliorate China’s diplomatic crisis by shifting the emphasis 
from domestic ideological transformation to countering foreign threats to China, both 
by the Soviet Union at its northern border and by the United States in Vietnam. Thus 
began the Chinese government’s more sober and moderate stance, which paved the way 
for the PRC’s admission to the UN. Yet aside from the changing international political 
landscape and strong state to state relations between Tanzania and China, personal 
relationships were also a crucial component that facilitated bilateral ties through those 
challenging times.  
The tide finally turned in Beijing’s favour in November 1971, when there was a 
majority vote at the UN General Assembly in favour of admitting the PRC delegation. 
That monumental event marked the close of Beijing’s severe diplomatic isolation and 
ushered in a new era in Chinese international affairs. Throughout these challenging 
years in the Sino-Tanzanian relationship, Tanzanian support for the PRC’s entry into 
the UN was unwavering and the Tanzanian delegation was a stalwart support of PRC 
admission into the organisation. 
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Conclusion – The Sino-Tanzanian relationship in the 1960s 
The thesis addresses a gap in the historical narrative of the celebrated Sino-
Tanzanian relationship during the crucial phase of the 1960s, which was the formative 
period of the bilateral connection. It explains how the friendship between what Nyerere 
called “unequal equals” was first struck, fostered, deepened and then tested by external, 
Chinese and local African factors. Yet the 1960s has received comparatively little 
scholarly attention. The majority of publications about that decade are not historical 
studies, but are from the fields of political science and international relations. On the 
other hand, newly available primary sources allow for a more nuanced historical 
research which will, hopefully, grow. There is currently much scholarly – and media – 
interest in contemporary Sino-African relations, because of China’s renewed 
engagement with the continent. Hence, this case study of Sino-Tanzanian relations in 
the 1960s offers valuable insights to the broader discourse on the evolution of Sino-
African relations and contributes towards a fuller understanding of the conduct of 
bilateral relations, particularly the dynamics between donor and recipient governments.  
The thesis stands out as a work of history, having re-examined and added new 
dimensions to the geopolitical paradigms of decolonisation and the Cold War, through 
which the Sino-Tanzanian relationship was previously studied. It also contrasts with the 
literature’s focus on Chinese objectives and actions. While recognising the significance 
of the Cold War and other externalities, the research has broken new ground by 
demonstrating that local African factors, such as the political dynamics in Zanzibar, the 
dynamic role of individual Tanzanian (Zanzibari and Tanganyikan) politicians and 
diplomats, as well as Tanzania’s political stability from 1965, contributed greatly to the 
rapid development of the bilateral relationship.  
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The research has shown the unique qualities of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship 
in the 1960s as it developed through three chronological phases: The foundations of 
Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanganyikan ties (Chapters One and Two); the potentially 
fragile post-colonial African state and Chinese anti-imperialist aid (Chapters Three and 
Four); as well as the realities of the growing Sino-Tanzanian relationship at the 
governmental and community levels (Chapters Five and Six). For this, it has drawn on 
recently available primary and secondary sources. Significantly, a number of important 
memoirs by Chinese officials (published in Chinese) have added useful insights on how 
the developments in Tanzania were perceived; these were complemented by oral history 
interviews with selected historical actors. 
For the first phase, the thesis has presented a new analysis of the history of the 
Sino-Tanzanian relationship through a careful examination of the very separate 
developmental paths of China’s relations with Zanzibar and Tanganyika respectively. 
Independence made the Tanganyikan and Zanzibari governments more accessible to 
Chinese diplomatic overtures. Yet the concomitant existence of post-colonial and 
colonial countries due to incomplete decolonisation in Africa created pressures which 
promoted South-South, Afro-Asian solidarity, as well as political tensions, since China 
was generally perceived as a militant, revolutionary Communist power. Contrary to 
most scholarly accounts which attribute the growth of those connections solely to 
Chinese initiative, the findings suggest that the Zanzibari nationalists actively sought 
and cultivated the relationship, initially through Communist bloc sponsored activities.  
The Zanzibari Marxists were attracted to Communist China as a country run by 
a successful revolutionary government that offered relevant lessons on combining 
socialism, nationalism and development. Dynamic individuals such as Abdulrahman  
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Babu and his colleague Ali Sultan Issa were important conduits who, on the one hand, 
secured Chinese assistance in support of their political objectives and, on the other, 
informed official Chinese understandings of African affairs as local experts. Through 
their efforts, Zanzibaris were selected and sent to China to work at Radio Peking and at 
the Foreign Language Institute, directly contributing to the extension of Chinese soft 
power throughout Swahili-speaking East Africa. Babu, in particular, was the crucial 
broker of China’s inchoate foray into the region. Local African agency and 
participation was, thus, integral to the rapid development of a Chinese bridgehead in 
Zanzibar and continuously shaped and buttressed the high level diplomatic 
rapprochement. 
In comparison to the Zanzibari case, the early Chinese contact with 
Tanganyikan nationalists began more gradually and was not initially a result of an 
ideological preference for Communist assistance on Nyerere’s part. Rather, the 
president’s reputation as a respected leader and his non-aligned foreign policy made 
Tanganyika a popular destination for foreign aid across the donor spectrum. While the 
typical donor-recipient relationship was one of asymmetrical power, China was an 
exception in this respect, as it was a developing country itself, facing its own great 
domestic needs. It was also in a relatively weak diplomatic position internationally. As 
the thesis has shown, there was a mutual need and benefit in the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship. Indeed, even prior to Tanganyika’s independence Nyerere had supported 
Beijing’s One China policy and expressed his personal commitment to reinstating the 
PRC’s seat in the United Nations Security Council – an issue of paramount importance 
to the Chinese government. The Sino-Tanganyikan relationship thus developed through 
mutual interest between 1962 and 1963. However, Tanganyika’s expanding role in the  
African liberation struggle created tensions in its bilateral relations with the former  
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colonial governments, while the Chinese government’s support as a militant, Afro-
Asian, anti-imperialist power grew apace. The benefits were mutual: China soon 
became a trusted and important ally for the Tanganyikan government, while Nyerere 
was similarly regarded by his Chinese counterparts. 
Hence the research has shown that the Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanganyikan 
bilateral relationships were distinct yet inter-related – a fact that has not been discussed 
in the existing literature. A fuller analysis of the first phase of the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship must take into account China’s strategic connections with both Zanzibar 
and Tanganyika, in recognition of the disparate historical experiences that were brought 
together when the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was formed in April 1964. As has 
been demonstrated, the political (ideological), economic and social differences between 
mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar affected the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship 
throughout the 1960s, although the overall result was still a deepening of Sino-
Tanzanian ties.   
The thesis has argued that the second phase of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship 
was one of deepening mutual engagement at the highest levels which was precipitated 
by two locally masterminded crises in January 1964. The Chinese government used the 
opportunities that arose in the aftermath of the Zanzibar Revolution and the Tanganyika 
Rifles mutiny to enhance its ties with both governments through providing military and 
other assistance. Chinese military support to Tanganyika proved timely and filled the 
vacuum that was left by the withdrawal of West German and later British aid. More 
significantly, Nyerere’s response to the potential fragility of the post-colonial state was  
to break away from the inherited military hierarchy to create a politically embedded,  
developmental militia that also engaged in nation-building. The Tanzania People’s  
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Defence Force (TPDF) was thus subjugated under the authority of the Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU), an arrangement that was mainly inspired by the 
design of the Chinese people’s army.  
Moreover, the importance of the Chinese government’s immediate embrace and 
support for the government of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964 
cannot be overstated. From Beijing’s perspective, it was prepared to work with 
whichever was the incumbent African government. In this case, the change was 
positive, as the Union combined a diplomatically important Tanganyika with a 
revolutionary Zanzibar. Key Zanzibari figures such as Babu and Salim continued to 
reinforce the Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship. Nyerere’s commitment to the 
bilateral relationship quickly made him China’s favoured and respected partner in East 
Africa. Chinese friendship with the Tanganyikan government yielded significant 
political dividends for the diplomatically isolated Chinese government and facilitated 
its support for the African liberation movements. 
The numerous visits made by Tanganyikan officials to China in the early 1960s 
had prepared the ground for the high-level visits by Nyerere and Zhou Enlai in 1965. 
Personal diplomacy between the leaders played an increasingly important role 
henceforth. The Tanzanian government welcomed the inflow of Chinese assistance and, 
in exchange, it supported Chinese influence on the international stage without 
necessarily compromising on its own political objectives. The clearest indicator of the 
importance of Tanzania to China’s African policy was the Chinese government’s offer 
to construct the Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) rail link in February 1965, a move which 
had immense political repercussions on Tanzania’s foreign relations with other 
governments.  
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Beijing’s offer to build the TanZam rail link seriously altered the geo-political 
situation in southern Africa by injecting a new Communist actor in an equation that had 
previously been defined by ineffectual British decolonisation in Rhodesia and black-
white racial tensions. Therefore, by the middle of the 1960s the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship had attained the character of a militant and anti-imperialist friendship that 
yielded mutual dividends. Most significantly, there was an extremely strong personal 
rapport between the leaders of both countries, who held each other in high regard. More 
generally, China’s new role as a donor to African governments was based on an entirely 
different historical experience, ideology and political philosophy from any Western 
precedents, appearing all the more threatening in Western eyes for its insidious appeal.  
When Zhou announced China’s Eight Principles Governing China’s Foreign 
and Technical Aid to Foreign Countries (in late 1963/early 1964), this espoused a more 
equitable donor-recipient relationship than the traditional Western aid arrangements. 
Uniquely, Chinese assistance included support for the political consolidation of the 
newly independent government, mass mobilisation for development and the 
encouragement of self-reliance through its projects. The thesis has argued that these 
were revolutionary principles, as they clearly articulated political intent as well as the 
desired political outcomes for the recipient country. In contrast to this, Western donor 
countries presented foreign aid as apolitical.  
The existing literature on the Tanzam rail link focuses very much on Chinese 
objectives for the offer to sponsor the project and, indeed, the benefits that such a 
successful, high profile project would have because of its direct impact on Zambia’s 
effectiveness as a frontline state, as well as the potentially great impact in delivering 
development to Tanzania’s remote Kilombero region. The Cold War literature explains  
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the opportunities that African leaders such as Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda had for 
bargaining for more assistance from foreign governments in order to secure the best 
arrangement possible. However such a focus on geopolitics does not adequately 
account for local African agency and factors.  
As the research has clearly shown, Nyerere did not simply proceed with the 
Chinese offer – not even for the completion of just the Tanzanian segment of the rail 
link. After all, Communist China was not his preferred donor for such a technologically 
complex and capital-intensive undertaking, so he continued to pursue other donor 
options instead, while trying to convince his sceptical Zambian counterpart Kenneth 
Kaunda of the feasibility of a Chinese sponsored rail link should no other offers 
materialise. Most published accounts of the history of the TanZam rail link neglect the 
disagreement between and within the Tanzanian and Zambian governments about 
Chinese sponsorship. The Chinese government acknowledged at the time that the 
decision lay with the two African leaders, and that the sum total of its own efforts might 
be in providing Nyerere with a trump card to improve his bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the Western donors, a role that it was fully prepared to play. The pressure of the 
Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November 1965 warmed the 
Zambian government’s attitude towards Chinese overtures in 1966, so that the first 
tripartite agreement to build the rail link was signed in 1967. 
As the thesis has shown, however, following the promising first and second 
phases of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship, events in the third phase revealed its 
weaknesses. The thesis examined three main trials, which were distinct but related: The 
effects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; the contradictory effects of  
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Chinese military aid and, finally, the gap between both governments’ solidarity rhetoric 
and reality.  
Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that started in 1966 and officially 
lasted until 1976 unleashed successive waves of domestic turmoil. In its most intense 
period between 1966 and 1968, the campaign crippled the Chinese foreign ministry, 
radicalised many overseas Chinese communities and fuelled a violent xenophobic tide 
within China. The research has shown that even Premier Zhou struggled to contain the 
Cultural Revolution’s worst excesses from interfering with his government’s foreign 
relations. China’s closest African ally was not spared from this radicalism, as the 
disruptions at the Friendship Textile Mill and discussions of the Ruvu irrigation project 
in 1968 illustrated. These important episodes appear in selected Chinese language 
publications, but have gone largely unmentioned in the English language studies. Yet 
how the Tanzanian and Chinese governments responded to them is crucial to 
understanding their level of mutual commitment to the success of the bilateral 
relationship by the late 1960s. Fuelled by mutual needs – China’s desire for 
international and domestic legitimacy combined with Tanzania’s need for economic 
and military development – both governments worked together to contain any 
diplomatic fallout from the incidents, suggesting a high level of trust between their 
leaders.  
The second important trial that confronted the Sino-Tanzanian relationship in its 
third phase was the double-edged nature of Chinese military assistance. Zanzibar’s 
relations with Tanganyika were complex and at times contradictory; they were only 
papered over by the formation of the Union. The thesis has argued that the Cold War 
threats which existed prior to April 1964 did not simply disappear with the creation the  
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Union, although it strengthened Nyerere’s authority on the mainland and Karume’s in 
Zanzibar. For the latter, the Union shielded Karume from political opposition until his 
assassination in 1971 and buttressed his personal power, as he successfully exploited 
the Sino-Soviet rivalry by building up the islands’ military, thus stonewalling 
Zanzibar’s military integration process with the mainland. The third and final important 
trial that the research has highlighted in the third phase of the Sino-Tanzanian 
relationship was the gap between both governments’ solidarity rhetoric and the 
interactions between their peoples. Nyerere was attracted by the Chinese revolutionary 
and development experience; he was similarly impressed by the traits of frugality, duty, 
discipline and sense of community above self which he had observed in China. The 
Arusha Declaration in 1967 articulated Nyerere’s objectives of a socialist and self-
reliant developmental path. In this way, the Chinese experts matched his definition of a 
committed expert. Nevertheless, in spite of the mutual pronouncements of fraternal 
feelings, problems arising from cross-cultural differences revealed the relative 
shallowness of that professed solidarity. 
The progressive strengthening of Nyerere’s political position in Tanzania 
through policies that included the subjugation of the military under TANU, the 
constitutional change that formalised a single party rule in 1965 and the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967 was in stark contrast to the dramatic deterioration of China’s 
domestic situation during the same period. In fact, as the research has shown, Nyerere’s 
relatively successful consolidation of power after the army mutiny in 1964 created a 
politically stable situation in which a consistent policy towards Communist China could 
be pursued whereas, elsewhere in Africa, military coups that erupted in the mid to late 
1960s resulted in the cessation of diplomatic ties with the PRC. Combined with  
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Nyerere’s strong personal regard for the Chinese leaders, as well as the solid foundation 
of Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanganyikan relations during the two earlier phases, the 
Sino-Tanzanian bilateral relationship was shielded to a large degree from the 
disruptions of the Cultural Revolution and did not attract international scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government continued to prepare for the TanZam project, 
while the Tanzanian delegation at the UN was a stalwart supporter of the PRC’s 
admission into the organisation. Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim, in particular, was a 
prominent example of a charismatic individual in Nyerere’s government whose tenure 
at the UN quickly became identified with his support for the PRC’s membership at the 
international organisation.  
The Sino-Tanzanian relationship was complex and resilient in the face of 
intense external and domestic pressures. It emphasised the shared similarities and 
attitudes between its governments and played down the differences. Both governments 
placed great importance on the success of the bilateral connection and did not allow it 
to fail. Significantly, it can be argued that their mutual interest was not merely for 
political or economic gain, but also for what the leaders believed to be an alternative 
version of development in the post-colonial world. As the thesis has shown, Nyerere’s 
government successfully maintained a strong position despite the bilateral connection 
appearing to be between the “unequal equals.”  
This research has emphasised the importance of understanding the long 
historical relationship that underpins contemporary China-Africa relations. Broad 
comparisons between the current discourse on Sino-African relations and the historical 
literature in the 1960s and 1970s show interesting parallels – allegations of neo-
imperialism and neo-colonialism still abound, albeit in the economic rather than  
 
  
Alicia Altorfer-Ong: Old Comrades and New Brothers (PhD thesis) 331 
political or ideological sense. Aside from those broad brushstrokes, the stark 
differences between the Chinese government under Mao and that of his successors, 
from Deng Xiaoping to the present day, suggest that few actual similarities exist. 
Colonialism in Africa has been replaced by economic and developmental concerns, and 
Afro-Asian solidarity no longer holds much political weight. The international and 
domestic contexts in China and in African countries today are dramatically different 
from the situation in the 1960s, although, in the case of China and Tanzania, both 
governments favour proclamations of a history of good bilateral relations. As this thesis 
has shown, this was clearly the case in the 1960s, when the Sino-Tanzanian relationship 
was not necessarily smooth or straightforward, yet had successfully weathered 
significant tribulations to enter the decade of the 1970s as close political allies.  
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Appendix I: Poem from the People’s Daily 
Spring wind blows to the Land of Cloves – dedicated to Zanzibar 
In the endless night, gunfire rings out, 
At dawn break, the sun of revolution rises! 
Zanzibar, I stand in Beijing watching you, 
With happy tears in my eyes! 
The Land of Cloves has thousands of trees 
But for whom did they bloom in the past? 
Red flowers freshly covered by blood, 
For whom did the flower gatherers toil? 
The ancient slave market, 
Is now the home of revolution, 
After so many bitter years,  
The Land of Cloves welcomes its first spring. 
The spring wind blows into a shack, 
It puts smiles on the workers’ faces, 
In the stunning Pearl of the Indian Ocean, 
Human hearts and cloves alike are in full bloom! 
You use spears, stones, pikes, 
You use rage, hatred, strength, 
You use the weapons captured from the rulers, 
The enemy is felled! 
You reclaim the fat of the land, 
Reclaim the fragrant clove, 
Reclaim freedom and happiness, 
Reclaim the islands’ great beauty! 
Zanzibar, share your honour with me, 
Our friendship, high as the mountain and long as the river, 
I brim with tears of happiness, 
As I watch you from Beijing. 
 
Zang Kejia, 8 April 1964, Beijing 
 
Translated from Chinese by Alicia Altorfer-Ong, with kind assistance from Xiao Li. 
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Appendix II: Photograph from Nyerere’s state-visit to Beijing 1965 
 
 
 
[Material removed for copyright reasons.] 
 
 
 
Figure 1: President Julius Nyerere’s state visit to Beijing, February 1965 
Source: DNA, Photograph from the NCNA. 
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